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ABSTRACT and KEYWORDS

This thesis examines the competing principles within the decision-making models for what it
means for directors and officers to act in the best interests of the corporation. The first
model is the traditional shareholder primacy model, which shifts to a creditor primacy model
in a situation o f financial distress or insolvency.

It requires directors and officers to

maximize corporate value for the benefit o f the corporation’s residual economic
beneficiaries. The second model is the pluralistic decision-making model, adopted by the
Supreme Court o f Canada as the law in this country. It requires directors and officers to
identify, consider and treat fairly all interests affected by the contemplated corporate
decision. At play are the following two public policy objectives: promoting economic activity
for the general benefit o f society; and protecting stakeholder interests that may be prejudiced
in a socially unacceptable way from the pursuit o f the first objective. This thesis prefers the
shareholder primacy model, switching to a creditor primacy model in financial distress or
insolvency. The underlying rationale for this preferred model is maximization o f corporate
value fo r the greatest number, thereby promoting economic activity. Stakeholder interests
are not sacrificed as there exists an extensive system o f statutory protections supplemented
by common law and equity.

Keywords: corporations, director’s duties, officer’s duties, best interests of the corporation,
insolvency, vicinity of insolvency, zone of insolvency, near insolvency, twilight of
insolvency, financial distress, shareholder primacy, pluralism, duty shifting, oppression
remedy, shareholders, creditors.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This thesis focuses on what it means for directors and officers to act in the best
interests of the corporation. However, it is instructive first to review the legal basis for a
corporation and the role assigned to directors and officers within a body corporate. This
will provide the necessary context for examining what it means for directors and officers
to act in the best interests of the corporation.
Corporations are creatures of statute. Corporate statutes have been established by
all Canadian provinces and territories and the government of Canada. These acts govern
the incorporation, internal structure, and conduct of the business and affairs of
corporations that are incorporated thereunder. The provisions of these various corporate
acts are similar. Thus, a review of the provisions of only one of these statutes is required
for an understanding of the conceptual framework of a corporation in Canada.

For

example, under the Canada Business Corporations Act,123 (“CBCA”) one or more
individuals may incorporate an entity for the purpose of carrying on business.

This

entity is a corporation and it is thereafter given the “capacity” and “rights, powers and
privileges of a natural person”. As a corporation is given the status of a natural person,
one or more bodies corporate may in turn incorporate another body corporate for the

1 Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, as amended [CBCA}. Approximately 50% o f
Canada’s largest business corporations have been incorporated under the CBCA. See online: Industry
Canada <http:\\www.ic.gc.ca\eic\site\clip-pdci.nsf\eng\h_cl00022.html> [Industry Canada Website].

2 Ibid, at s. 5(1) and s. 15(2).
3 Ibid, at s. 15(1).
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purpose of carrying on business.4 The statutory process that is to be followed for creating
a corporation, being its own legal person, is quick, simple, and inexpensive. Step-by-step
guidance is provided on Industry Canada’s internet website.5 Forms entitled Articles of
Incorporation, Initial Registered Office Address and First Board of Directors are to be
completed and filed along with the requisite fee. If the incorporated entity is to have its
own name, as opposed to simply being known by the number that is assigned to it by
Industry Canada upon incorporation, then approval of the proposed corporate name also
is to be requested. This request for approval is done by filing a completed Corporate
Name Information form and a search report from the Newly Upgraded Automated Name
Search database confirming that the chosen name has not already been given to a body
corporate.
The statutory creation of a corporation as a separate legal person is not a new
phenomenon. It is also not unique to Canada but is equally applicable in the United
States and all commonwealth jurisdictions.

As far back as 1844, the United States

Supreme Court wrote that:
A corporation created by a state.. .though it may have members out
of the state, seems to us to be a person, though an artificial one,
inhabiting and belonging to the state, and therefore entitled, for the
purpose of suing and being sued, to be deemed a citizen of the
state.6

4 Ibid, at s. 5(2).
5 Industry Canada Website, supra note 1.
6 Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston Railroad Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. 497 (1844) at 555 as quoted in
Leonard I. Rotman, “Debunking the ‘End o f History’ Thesis for Corporate Law” Boston College
International
and
Comparative
Law
Review
[forthcoming
2010
available
SSRN:
<http://ssm.com/abstract= 15178467>1 at 9.
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As the House of Lords wrote in 1897:
...once the company is legally incorporated it must be treated like
any other independent person with its rights and liabilities
appropriate to itself...78
Thus, corporations are given status as separate legal entities, but they are
inanimate business creatures in that they do not have an organic mind of their own. It is
the people behind the corporation - i.e., its directing minds - that dictate its behaviour
and its relations with third parties. The CBCA provides that the directors of a corporation
are its first directing minds. They are elected by the shareholders and are responsible for
managing, or supervising the management of, the business and affairs of the corporation.9
They may appoint a managing director, or committee of directors, and delegate any of
their powers to such managing director or committee.10 They also may designate offices
of the corporation, such as the offices of Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial
Officer, President, Vice-President, and Secretary-Treasurer. They may specify the duties
of these offices, appoint persons as officers, including themselves, and delegate to these
officers their powers to manage the business and affairs of the corporation.11 As such, it
is the directors and officers of a company that end up being its directing minds or
managers after it is incorporated and organized.

7 Salomon v. Salomon (1896), [1897] A.C. 22 (H.L.) at 30 [Salomon], as quoted in Rotman, ibid.
8 CBCA, supra note 1 at s. 106(3).
9 Ibid, at s. 102(1).
10 Ibid, at s. 115(1).
" Ibid, at s. 121(a), (b), and (c).
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The involvement of corporations, and directors and officers who give them their
personality, in Canadian economy and society is significant. Individuals interact with
corporate entities and corporations interact with other corporations on a daily basis.
Those persons who have an interest that may be affected by the conduct of the
corporation, such as shareholders, employees, suppliers, creditors, consumers, the
government, and the general public in protecting the environment, are commonly referred
to as corporate stakeholders.

Given the pervasiveness of the corporate body in our

society, and the plurality of interests that it affects, the question has arisen as to what role
corporations should play in society. This question “has existed almost as long as the
modem corporation itself’.
debate.

It has generated a long-standing and continuing academic

The debate in the 1930s between Adolf Berle of Columbia University and

Merrick Dodd of Harvard University is often cited as having initiated this long-standing
i "2

discourse over “corporate governance that remains alive and well”.

The preoccupation,

at the state level, with the question of what role a corporation should play in society is
evident from the significant amount of provincial and federal legislation that has been
enacted to regulate corporate conduct. To state the obvious, if we want corporations to
conduct themselves in a certain way, then we need to influence the behaviour of their
directing minds, being their directors and officers. In this regard, as explained in more123

12 Rotman, supra note 6 at 7.
13 Ibid at 3 and 10-12. This essay was posted online at SSRN on December 4, 2009.
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detail in the body of this thesis, the law imposes on directors and officers a paramount
general duty to govern with a view to acting in the best interests of the corporation.14
The roles, responsibilities, duties, and liabilities of directors and officers that are
under examination in this thesis apply equally to both as managers of the corporation.
For ease of reference, the balance of this paper will refer only to directors, understanding
that what is written in respect of them applies equally to officers.15
I now turn to the primary question explored by this thesis. What does it mean for
directors to act in the best interests of an inanimate corporate body? Does it mean
governing so as to maximize the economic value of the corporation for the ultimate
benefit of those persons with share capital in the corporation? These persons are the
shareholders of the corporation. Should this duty shift to maximizing economic value for
the benefit of the corporation’s creditors, as the corporation’s residual beneficiaries, when

14 As the Supreme Court o f Canada wrote in BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 560 at
para. 81 [BCE], “...it is important to be clear that the directors owe their duty to the corporation...[to] act
in the best interests o f the corporation...”.
15 This thesis considers the statutory duties that apply equally to directors and officers under s. 122( 1)(a)
and (b) o f the CBCA, supra note 1, being, respectively, the duties to act honestly and in good faith with a
view to the best interests o f the corporation and to exercise the care, diligence, and skill o f a reasonably
prudent person in the circumstances. This thesis also considers the provisions o f s. 241(1), (2), and (3) of
the CBCA, supra note 1, known as the oppression remedy. These provisions apply equally to directors and
officers and give rise to a broad discretionary power in judges to fashion an appropriate remedy for a
complainant when the conduct o f directors and officers is found to oppress or unduly disregard or prejudice
the “interests o f any security holder, creditor, ...”. This remedial power includes the power to impose
personal liability on directors and officers. Directors and officers need to be respectful of, and honour, the
reasonable expectations o f shareholders and creditors, failing which they may be subjected to an oppression
remedy that might include personal liability. It is noted that the provincial corporations acts have similar
oppression remedy provisions as under the CBCA. This thesis also examines additional statutes that are
designed to impose liability on both directors and officers with a view to influencing how they conduct the
business and affairs o f the corporation... From a practical perspective, officers will play a role in the
management o f the business and affairs o f the corporation based on the nature and scope o f the offices that
they occupy. Thus, they form part o f management o f the corporation and to have effective laws seeking to
promote good corporate behaviour officers as well as directors must be targeted..
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the corporation is in the “vicinity of insolvency”16178or is insolvent? The former is known
as the shareholder primacy model and requires decisions to be made from the perspective
of what would be in the best economic interests of the shareholders, and the latter is
known as the creditor primacy model and requires decisions to be made from the
perspective of what would be in the best economic interests of the creditors.
Alternatively, does it mean governing in such a way as to consider, balance, and treat
fairly the plurality of stakeholder interests that are affected by the corporation, known as
the pluralistic model, rather than focusing on one set of interests? These are the questions
that this paper analyzes and seeks to answer.
In Peoples Department Stores Inc. (Trustee of) v. Wise,xl the Supreme Court of
Canada displaced the traditional shareholder primacy model as the prevailing corporate
decision-making model and rejected the emerging judicial trend toward recognizing a
creditor primacy model when a corporation enters the “vicinity of insolvency” or
becomes insolvent. Instead, the court favoured a pluralistic corporate decision-making
model under all circumstances.

The Supreme Court of Canada elaborated upon its

conception of the pluralistic decision-making model in BCEn and, in so doing, held that
affected stakeholders are entitled to reasonably expect to be treated fairly in the decision
making process, thereby making mandatory what had been a permissive pluralistic
decision-making model. The end result is that more stakeholder protection is achieved by
16 “Vicinity o f Insolvency” is the phrase that was used by the Supreme Court o f Canada in Peoples
Department Stores Inc. (Trustee of) v. Wise, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 461 at para. 46 [SCC People’s ]. The court
dismissed the concept as being incapable o f having a legal definition. The court nonetheless noted that
“[w]hat it is intended to convey is a deterioration in the corporation’s financial stability”. Chapter 8 o f this
paper argues that “vicinity o f insolvency” is capable o f legal definition.
17 Ibid.
18 BCE, supra note 14.
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directors being required to consider the community of affected interests in the corporate
decision-making process.
This thesis argues that the shareholder primacy model, shifting to a creditor
primacy model when a corporation is in the “vicinity of insolvency” or is insolvent,
which was rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada, is a better model than the pluralistic
decision-making model. The Supreme Court did not perform a comparative analysis of
the competing models to determine which model was best-suited for meeting the public
policy objective of promoting economic activity. The court did not undertake a detailed
analysis of whether existing statutory law, common law, and equity afforded corporate
stakeholders sufficient protection, thereby making it unnecessary for the court to add an
additional layer of stakeholder protection by way of the pluralistic model. The court did
not consider the competing models to determine which of them provided directors with a
greater degree of certainty as to how they are expected to conduct themselves. Put
another way, no thought appears to have been given as to whether ambiguity or
uncertainty rendered the pluralistic model ineffective.
This paper argues that the shareholder primacy model did not need to be displaced
as it is better suited than the pluralistic model for generating economic activity for the
well-being of society, without sacrificing stakeholder interests which are sufficiently
protected by existing statutory laws and regulations. There already existed a legislative
balance between generating economic activity, through the principle of maximizing the
economic value of the corporation for its shareholders, and protecting stakeholder
interests that are deemed worthy of protection. It was not necessary for the court to give
more weight to protecting stakeholder interests, especially without an analysis of existing
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protections and the consequences of having more protection.

A preference for the

rationale behind the shareholder primacy model also supports a shift to maximizing the
economic value of the corporation for the creditors when a corporation enters the
“vicinity of insolvency” or becomes insolvent resulting in the shareholders having likely
lost the value of their investments. Striving to maximize the economic value of the
corporation for the economic class with the residual, or last, economic interest in the
corporation requires providing an economic return to all other classes of economic
interests in priority thereto.
In this paper, references to maximizing corporate value, or maximizing a
corporation’s value, mean conducting the business and affairs of the corporation in the
best economic interests of the stakeholder with the residual economic interest in the
corporation.

This will be the shareholders, unless the financial condition of the

corporation is such that the shareholders have likely lost their investments, in which case
the class of unsecured creditors becomes the residual beneficiaries.

Inherent in this

meaning of maximizing corporate value is that the conduct of the business and affairs of
the corporation will be in the economic best interests of the greatest number of economic
classes of interests in the corporation. This is a utilitarian concept.
In contrast to the shareholder primacy model, the pluralistic model does not
provide directors with a clear focus and is ambiguous. It is easier for directors, who are
assumed to be practical business people, to understand and implement a strategy that
focuses on one set of economic interests — those of the residual beneficiary — instead of
a plurality of interests. Furthermore, the pluralistic model requires directors to balance
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conflicts among competing economic interests without guidance as to how to resolve
conflicts among competing interests.
The position taken in this paper in favour of a shareholder primacy model,
shifting to a creditor primacy model when a corporation enters the “vicinity of
insolvency” or becomes insolvent, is not to be taken as arguing for the maximization of
corporate value as an absolute or overriding norm. To the contrary, it is but an important
principle that forms the foundation of an already existing pluralistic decision-making
model that is created by the state with a view to creating a balance between promoting
economic activity and protecting stakeholder interests. As Adam Winkler explains,
Despite the common conception of corporate governance as
pertaining to shareholder-management relations, the actual
decision making of corporate officers is heavily constrained by
legal rules from outside of corporate law...One must take into
account environmental law, labour law, civil rights law, workplace
safety law, and pension law, lest one be left with the distorted and
incomplete view of how the law actually shapes those corporate
decision matrices.19
In order to support the thesis of this paper, it is presented in ten chapters. The
first and last chapters are the introduction and conclusion, respectively.

Chapter 2

explains that when a corporation is fully capitalized, is performing well, and has good
prospects, directors have at their disposal sufficient economic resources to satisfy the
economic interests of the corporation and its stakeholders. Thus, these interests tend to
be aligned in the pursuit of the objectives for which the entity was incorporated. No issue
arises as to whether directors should be working to maximize corporate value for
19 Adam Winkler, “Corporate Law or the Law o f Business?: Stakeholders and Corporate Governance at the
End o f History” (2004), 67 Law & Contemp. Probs. 109 at 133 [Adam Winkler, “Corporate Law”], as
quoted and cited in Rotman, supra note 6 at 62.
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shareholders or creditors or whether directors should be making decisions based on
balancing and treating fairly affected stakeholder interests. However, this equilibrium is
disturbed when directors do not have the luxury of access to sufficient operating funds,
whether from revenue, financing, or liquid assets, to satisfy all economic stakeholder
interests. Financial distress gives rise to conflict between the economic interests of the
corporation and its stakeholders and as between stakeholders. How this conflict should
be resolved by directors makes relevant the question of what it means for directors to act
in the best interests of the inanimate corporate body that they serve.
It is not just the conflict between competing interests arising in circumstances of
financial distress that makes relevant the question of what it means for directors to act in
the best interests of the corporation. It is any conflict between the corporation and its
stakeholders or as between stakeholders that is in need of resolution that makes this
question relevant.

For example, the corporate takeover scenario also may present a

conflict - typically between shareholders and creditors - that requires interpretation of
what it means for directors to act in the best interests of the corporation. As noted above,
the law in Canada as to what it means for directors to act in the best interests of the
corporation is primarily the result of jurisprudence resulting from the Supreme Court of
Canada’s decisions in People’s, a case dealing with what it means for directors to act in
the best interests of the corporation in a “vicinity of insolvency” or insolvency situation,
and BCE, a case dealing with what it means for directors to act in the best interests of the
corporation in a corporate takeover situation.
Chapter 2 concludes by observing that the scope of affected interests, and the
potential impact on society at large, would appear to be greater in a “vicinity of
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insolvency” or insolvency scenario. It adds that, as such, what it means for directors to
act in the best interests of the corporation is an important societal question that needs to
be answered.
Chapter 3 is the longest chapter of this paper and contains the crux of the
argument in favour of the shareholder primacy model, shifting to a creditor primacy
model in a “vicinity of insolvency” or insolvency situation.
underlying academic debate.

It will examine the

Chapter 3 will review the conceptual and pragmatic

arguments in the debate. It will accept the conclusion of other authors that the pragmatic
debate, comparing the consequences of each model on social welfare, has arisen largely
as a result of the conceptual debate being indeterminate.
Special attention will be given to the practical argument in favour of the
shareholder primacy model, since it is based on the shareholders having the residual, or
last, economic interest in the corporation. By striving to maximize corporate value for
the shareholders, all other classes of economic interests in priority to the shareholders
also benefit. Accepting this maximizing-corporate-value-for-the-greatest-good principle
means that, in a situation where the corporation is in the “vicinity of insolvency” or is
insolvent, and thus the shareholders have likely lost their investments, the creditor class
becomes the residual beneficiary. At that point, maximizing corporate value for their
benefit will result in protecting the economic interests of the most number of classes of
corporate stakeholders.
Chapter 3 concludes that, on balance, the shareholder primacy model is preferable
because it is better-suited to achieve the public policy objective of promoting economic
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growth without jeopardizing the public policy of preventing or limiting the hazards that
are generated by pursuit of economic growth. These hazards are addressed through
regulation, including the statutory law of oppression.
Chapter 4 looks at the jurisprudence arising from the courts in Delaware in
respect of what it means to act in the best interests of the corporation. As explained in
this chapter, the Delaware courts are generally recognized as an authority on company
law principles. The law of Delaware prefers the shareholder primacy model, switching to
a creditor primacy model in a “vicinity of insolvency” or insolvency situation, over the
pluralistic model. As such, the jurisprudence arising from the Delaware courts is relied
on in this paper for persuasive value.
Chapter 5 provides a review and analysis of the statutory oppression remedy. The
statutory oppression remedy seeks to influence the behaviour of directors. It gives judges
the discretionary power to fashion an appropriate remedy in circumstances where the
conduct of directors is found to oppress shareholders and creditors, two major corporate
stakeholders, or to unduly disregard or unduly prejudice their interests.

I argue in this

chapter that the statutory oppression remedy gave rise to a pre-existing form of statutory
pluralism, which made it unnecessary for the Supreme Court of Canada to adopt a
pluralistic definition of what it means for directors to act in the best interests of the
corporation insofar as shareholders and creditors are concerned. In particular, given the
existence of the oppression remedy, it was unnecessary for the Supreme Court of Canada
to interpret broadly a director’s duty to act in the best interests of the corporation in order
to address the grievance of the creditors in People’s and the dispute between the20
20 CBCA, supra note 1 at s. 241(1), (2), and (3).
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bondholder creditors and shareholders in BCE.

Ironically, in neither case did the

creditors benefit from a pluralistic corporate decision-making model.
As the oppression remedy gives rise to a statutory form of pluralism, I undertake a
comprehensive analysis of the law of oppression. The two-part test established by the
Supreme Court of Canada in BCE for applying the oppression remedy will be reviewed.
The first part of the test involves an examination of whether the complainant has a
reasonable expectation to be protected. The second part of the test examines whether the
reasonable expectation was oppressed, unduly disregarded, or unduly prejudiced, by the
conduct of the director.
Chapter 5 also examines the concept of “complainant”, being the entity that is
entitled to invoke the oppression remedy, and what constitutes directorial conduct that is
oppressive or that unduly disregards or unduly prejudices a reasonable expectation that is
found to exist. This chapter also notes that, under the oppression remedy, personal
liability is imposed on directors in order to influence their behaviour to consider the
reasonable expectations of shareholders and creditors in their decision making. The
judicial trend is to impose personal liability on directors when there has been some
conduct considered by the court to be inappropriate, despite the fact that, under the law of
oppression, it is not necessary to find inappropriate conduct for judicial intervention and
the imposition of personal liability.
Chapter 5 concludes by addressing the influence of the law of oppression on the
Supreme Court of Canada in its development of the concept of what it means for
directors to discharge their duties to act in the best interests of the corporation. The court
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in BCE adopted oppression remedy principles in defining “acting in the best interests of
the company” by noting that directors are obligated to treat all individual stakeholders
fairly in the corporate decision-making process as that is what individual stakeholders are
entitled to reasonably expect.
Chapter 6 undertakes an analysis and critique of the decisions of the Supreme
Court of Canada in People’s and BCE, with the ultimate view of formulating a statement
of the law in Canada of a director’s duty to act in the best interests of the corporation.
These decisions rejected the traditional shareholder primacy model and the emerging
judicial trend toward a creditor primacy model when a corporation entered the “vicinity
of insolvency” or became insolvent, in favour of a pluralistic corporate decision-making
model. Chapter 6 demonstrates that the corporate pluralistic decision-making model that
is the law in Canada is intricate and complicated, and arguably too intricate and
complicated for directors to understand and be able to implement effectively.
Chapter 7 reviews the legal principle often referred to as the business judgment
rule.

This concept dictates that judges should be careful in disturbing the business

judgment that is exercised by directors. It is meant to prevent hindsight bias and is an
acknowledgment that judges are not by nature experienced corporate managers. Thus,
the business judgment rule requires judicial deference to be granted to decisions that are
made by directors. However, this is not an absolute deference and such decisions may be
subject to judicial intervention. Chapter 7, therefore, examines the test that is to be
applied in examining the decisions of directors, as corporate decisions must pass this test
in order not to be disturbed. Directors must be aware of this test and must meet its
requirements in order for their decisions to pass muster. As such, the test for when a
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corporate decision will be granted judicial deference further defines how and to what
extent directors and officers are to consider stakeholder interests as part of a pluralistic
decision-making model.
The thesis of this paper is that the corporate decision-making model should be the
shareholder primacy model, shifting to a creditor primacy model when a corporation is in
the “vicinity of insolvency” or is insolvent, as modified or augmented by statutory laws
and regulations. Thus, in order to support this thesis, “vicinity of insolvency” must be
capable of being defined, as that is when the shift is to take place from a shareholder
primacy model to a creditor primacy model.
Chapter 8 tackles the difficult question of defining “vicinity of insolvency” and
argues that it can be defined. Insolvency is a defined statutory term. There exists a body
of law that interprets this concept. Accordingly, directors know what an “insolvency” is
and can appreciate when the corporation is faced with a material risk of insolvency. In
any event, the law has no hesitation applying an objective test to determine whether a
director’s duties have been breached. As such, there should be no hesitation in applying
an objective test for determining if a corporation’s risk of insolvency has become
material and the directors were or reasonably ought to have been, aware of this material
risk.
It is important that a line be drawn as to when a corporation is in the “vicinity of
insolvency”. From a public policy perspective, it is at that time that directors need to
change their thinking to a more conservative corporate recovery strategy benefiting the
creditors, as the residual beneficiary class, and the greatest number of economic classes
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of stakeholders. A speculative corporate recovery strategy, for example, with a view to
recouping the lost investment of the shareholders, would run too high a risk of a complete
corporate failure, thereby prejudicing all classes of stakeholders.
Chapter 9 considers a factual example of a corporation that is in financial distress
to illustrate the position in which directors will find themselves and how the principles
that are considered in this paper might affect their decision-making process. Chapter 10
concludes this paper. It provides a summary of the discussion and conclusions that are
reached in the preceding chapters. It formulates a proposed statement of law for what it
means for directors to act in the best interests of the corporation.
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CHAPTER 2
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF FINANCIAL DISTRESS OR INSOLVENCY
Why is a corporation’s financial status, or health, relevant to how directors
manage the business and affairs of the corporation? It is relevant because financial
distress may give rise to competing interests among the corporation, its shareholders, and
its creditors, which the directors are to reconcile in the corporate decision-making
process. As the Supreme Court of Canada recognized in People’s, “[t]he interests of
shareholders, those of creditors and those of the corporation may and will be consistent
with each other if the corporation is profitable and well capitalized and has strong
prospects. However, this can change if the corporation starts to struggle financially.”212
This “change” in financial status, giving rise to the possibility of competing
interests among shareholders, creditors, and the corporation, has been said to occur when
the corporation enters the “vicinity of insolvency”.

However, the Supreme Court of

Canada in People’s dismissed the concept of “vicinity of insolvency” as being incapable

21 SCC People’s, supra note 16 at paras. 44-45. People’s was a case dealing with a subsidiary financing the
purchase o f inventory for its parent corporation on terms that were favourable to its parent corporation to
the detriment o f its own creditors in a “vicinity o f insolvency” or insolvency situation. A more detailed
explanation o f the facts and analysis o f this case will be found in Chapter 6 below.
22 A considerable amount o f literature exists regarding the concept o f the “vicinity o f insolvency”. It also is
sometimes referred to as the “zone o f insolvency”, “near insolvency”, or “twilight o f insolvency” to denote
when directors need to be cognizant o f the competing interest o f creditors. See, for example: Scott
Bomhof, “Duties o f Directors in the Insolvency Zone” (October 2009), online: Torys.com
<http//www.torys.com/publications/documents/publications%20PDFs/AR2009-51.pdf>;
Jonathan
T.
Edwards and Andrew D. Appleby, “The Twilight o f Insolvency: New Developments in Fiduciary Duty
Jurisprudence that May Affect Directors and Officers while in the Zone o f Insolvency” (2009), 18 J. Banks.
L. & Prac. 3 ART. 2.; Cory Dean Kandestein, “The Duty to Creditors in Near-Insolvent Firms: Eliminating
the ‘Near Insolvency’ Distinction” (2007), 60 V. and L. Rev. 1235.
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of having any legal definition. Nonetheless, the court noted that “[w]hat it is intended to
•

•

•

.

t o

convey is a deterioration in the corporation’s financial stability”.

Thus, the economic

interests of the corporation and some of its stakeholders may begin to compete upon a
“deterioration in the corporation’s financial stability” or when a “corporation starts to
struggle financially”.
Edward M. Iacobucci23242567arrived at this conclusion in an article that was published
prior to the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in People’s. Iacobucci pointed out that
a director’s paramount duty is to act in the best interests of the corporation and, “in a
perfect world,” this amounts to a duty to maximize the economic value of the corporation
for the benefit of the corporation and its stakeholders.

Iacobucci, therefore, concluded

that there is a general absence of opposing interests among shareholders, creditors, and
the corporation as to what is in the best interests of the corporation.

Iacobucci noted

that a conflict arises among the interests of the corporation and its shareholders and
creditors when directors are faced with having to make “safe or risky” investment
decisions presented by circumstances of financial distress or insolvency.

In an

insolvency or financial distress situation, the general assumption is that “safe” or more
conservative financial decisions would be better for the corporation and its creditors.

23 SCC Peoples, supra note 16 at para. 46. Chapter 8 below argues that “vicinity o f insolvency” is capable
o f being defined.
24 Edward M. Iacobucci, “Directors’ Duties in Insolvency: Clarifying What Is At Stake” (2003), 39 Can.
Bus. L.J. 398 [Iacobucci, “Directors’ Duties”].
25 Ibid, at 400-401.
26 Ibid, at 399 and 405.
27 Ibid, at 405.
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Such an approach is seen as being more likely to preserve the economic value of the
corporation.
This general assumption, that in a situation of financial distress or insolvency
creditors and the corporation are better served by conservative measures to deal with the
circumstances, is premised on the existence of the following three factors:
(a)

little or no equity available in the corporation for the shareholders, or, at a

minimum, the situation being one of rapidly diminishing equity;
(b)

the creditors thus displacing the shareholders as the class with the residual,

or last, economic interest in the value of the company’s business or assets; and
(c)

the interests of the creditors in protecting their economic investment being

better served by a conservative restructuring strategy to preserve the value of the
corporation as a going concern business28 or by winding it down and liquidating
its assets without further diminution in value.
This third factor is to be contrasted with a more aggressive restructuring approach, which
might be preferred by shareholders who have lost their investments and are looking for
the best opportunity of recovery. More aggressive measures might give rise to a better
result, but have less chance of success, and thus create too high a risk of economic
resources being wasted.

In other words, having lost their investments, shareholders

might be more inclined to gamble existing economic resources otherwise available to
other economic stakeholders to recover their losses as they would have no downside.
28 Insolvency practitioners refer to corporate restructuring measures with a view to maintaining the
corporation as a going concern business as a “turn around” or “corporate rescue” exercise, reflecting the
goal o f reversing the financial decline o f the corporation and, thus, saving it.
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Failure in this high risk approach would result in a significant or complete diminution in
the residual value of the corporation that otherwise would have been available for the
creditors and all other classes with an economic interest in the corporation.
Sabin Willett writes that a “director’s dilemma” arises when a corporation is in
financial distress and directors are faced with having to decide between a conservative
corporate rescue plan that favours creditors and a more aggressive one that favours
shareholders. Willett notes that corporate valuations are inherently uncertain, as they are
based on assumptions and projections.

Thus, directors’ predictions about how a

corporation’s value will be affected by different options may not necessarily be accurate.
Willett adds that the dilemma becomes more pronounced if the plan that favours
shareholders is assessed at even, or close to even, chances of success.

The point that is

highlighted by the “director’s dilemma” is that directors are required to make difficult
decisions in an environment of uncertainty when the corporation is in a situation of
financial distress or insolvency. Directors are required to use their business judgment in
deciding what it means to act in the best interests of the corporation in circumstances of
competing interests.
In addition to the “vicinity of insolvency” or insolvency situation, there are other
scenarios that may give rise to competing corporate and stakeholder interests for directors
to reconcile in exercising their business judgment to act in the best interests of the92
29 Sabin Willett, “Gheewalla and the Director’s Dilemma” (2009), 64 The Business Lawyer 1087. Willett
refers to conservative measures to maintain a distressed corporation as a going concern for the benefit o f
creditors as “enterprise maximization” versus more aggressive measures for the benefit o f shareholders,
which is referred to as “equity preservation”. Willett argues that directors should always decide in favour
o f equity preservation measures for shareholders as this would be “more faithful” to the traditional
fiduciary duty to act in the best interests o f the shareholders as reaffirmed by the Delaware Supreme Court
in North American Catholic Education Programming Foundation, Inc., v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92 (Del.
Sup. Ct. 2007) [North American Catholic].
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corporation.

For example, the corporate takeover scenario also may give rise to a

dilemma for directors in deciding how best to exercise their business judgment. In a
corporate takeover scenario, shareholders and creditors may disagree on a proposed
method of dealing with the shares or assets of the corporation, thereby placing directors
in the middle of a dispute among corporate stakeholders. This conflict has allowed courts
an opportunity to further examine what it means for directors to act in the best interests of
the corporation in the face of competing interests.
In particular, the Supreme Court of Canada in BCE, a leading case dealing with a
corporate takeover scenario, recognized again that “[ojften the interests of the
shareholders and stakeholders are co-extensive with the interests of the corporation”. 30
In that case, these interests would have continued to be “co-extensive” but for the
contemplated purchase and takeover of the corporation. Thus, directors face the same
potential dilemma, whether the change is caused by a deteriorating financial situation or a
corporate takeover. They will be required to reconcile potentially conflicting stakeholder
interests in determining what is in the best interests of the corporation because the
contemplated course of action may not benefit stakeholders equally and those
stakeholders negatively affected may dispute the approach being proposed. Further, the
same legal test, or standard, applies in how directors should address the plurality of
interests at play in acting in the best interests of the corporation.
The conflict between shareholders and creditors that the directors had to reconcile
in the context of a corporate takeover is well-illustrated in BCE.

The directors in BCE

faced criticism by BCE’s debenture holders, who objected to a decision of the directors to
j0 BCE, supra note 14 at para. 37.
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approve a leveraged sale of the corporation’s shares. The leveraged buy-out would be of
financial benefit to the shareholders, but it would result in a reduction in the credit rating
and market value of the bonds that were held by the debenture holders. This adverse
effect on the bonds was due to increased debt that was to be incurred by the corporation
under the terms of the leveraged buy-out. The proposed transaction was expected to
result in a drop of approximately 20% in the trading value of the bonds versus an
approximate 40% increase in the market price of common shares that were held by
shareholders. The directors had to make a decision: obtain the highest possible share
price for shareholders or maintain the credit rating and value of bonds for debentureholder creditors? The court held that the decision of the directors, which favoured the
shareholders over the debenture holders, did not “oppress” the debenture holders and that
the best interests of the corporation “arguably favoured” accepting the buy-out offer.31
Nonetheless, but for the disturbance that was caused to normal relations among the
directors and shareholders and creditors by an out-of-the-ordinary event, the interests of
the shareholders and debenture holders would not have presented a conflict.
The impact on social welfare, and the community within which the corporation
carries on business, is likely more significant where directors have to reconcile
competing stakeholder interests in a situation of financial distress or insolvency, as
opposed to a corporate takeover situation. In a financial distress or insolvency situation,
directors are required to allocate economic resources among interested parties where

31 Ibid, at para. 112. While the court in BCE addressed the concept o f a director acting in the best interests
o f the corporation, that was technically not an issue that was before the court. The debenture holders had
structured their complaint on the basis that the leveraged buy-out either oppressed them under the
oppression remedy, or court approval thereof, as an arrangement under s. 192 o f the CBCA, supra note 1,
should not be granted as it was not “fair”. See Chapter 5 below for a detailed analysis o f the oppression
remedy.
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demand exceeds supply. This deficiency will result in prejudice to those stakeholders
whose economic interests are not fulfilled. The breadth and scope of the negative impact
of financial distress or insolvency on society is self-evident from a simple observation of
some of the consequences that arise when a corporation does not have sufficient cash
flow, whether from operations or financing, to pay its corporate obligations in a timely
way. For example, it may mean that:
(a)

Goods and Services Tax, retail sales tax, corporate income tax, and
employee source deductions are not remitted to the government to fund
government programs and initiatives for the public;

(b)

employees are not paid their wages or vacation pay and may lose their
jobs and, thus, no longer have a continuing income and access to group
health and medical benefits, and employee pensions are no longer funded
by employer contributions, and perhaps may be left underfunded;

(c)

suppliers of goods and services will not get paid what they are owed and
may lose a future income stream;

(d)

landlords may be not be paid arrears of rent and may lose an ongoing
rental income stream;

(e)

leasing companies and secured creditors will not get paid what they are
owed and may lose the balance of the return on their investments;

(f)

shareholders will suffer a loss of their economic investments; and,
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(g)

the corporation cannot pay for any environmental remediation costs due to
environmental contamination that is caused by operations.

The adverse effects of these consequences are not limited to stakeholders. They
also affect persons who are economically dependent on stakeholders, like family
members.

It is, therefore, worthwhile to examine how the law requires directors to

govern themselves and the corporation in cases of financial distress or insolvency in
order to assess the extent to which the existing state of the law creates a socially desirable
result or could use some improvement.
In summary, when a corporation is performing well financially, directors manage
a situation where the corporation is able to satisfy the economic interests of both the
corporation and its stakeholders. However, this is likely to change when the corporation
experiences financial difficulty or is insolvent, as competing interests arise. A director’s
role in managing in the face of competing interests is more complicated. Directors have
to manage a situation where there is a shortage of available funds from operations and
financing to meet both the corporation’s needs and those of its stakeholders.
Restructuring options to maintain the company as a going concern, if available, may
affect competing economic interests differently. Corporate stakeholders may be assumed
to want decisions made by directors that they perceive to be in their best interests. Lastly,
the success of available restructuring options is uncertain and the repercussions on
society are significant.
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CHAPTER 3
THE ACADEMIC DEBATE: SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY v. PLURALISM

(A)

General
It is a trite proposition of Canadian corporate law that a director owes a duty to

the corporation to act in its best interests.32 The academic debate about what this means
has centered around two competing corporate decision-making models. The traditional
model is the shareholder primacy model. It focuses on directors acting to maximize
corporate value. Its competitor is the pluralistic decision-making model. It requires
directors to consider the interests of all affected stakeholders in their decision making.
The preceding chapter explained how the interests of the corporation and its stakeholders
are generally aligned when the corporation is profitable, is well-capitalized, and has
strong prospects, and how this changes and these interests are likely to begin to conflict
when the corporation begins to experience financial distress.

Each decision-making

model brings a different approach to addressing the interests of the corporation and its
stakeholders in a time of financial distress or insolvency. This chapter will review each
model and compare the main arguments for and against each model, with special
attention given to a situation of financial distress or insolvency, with a view to
determining whether, on balance, one model is preferable over the other model.

j2 See BCE, supra note 14, CBCA, supra note 1 at s. 122(l)(a), and Iacobucci, “Directors’ Duties”, supra
note 24.
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Mohamed F. Khimji33 and Ian B. Lee3435provide comprehensive summaries of the
•

•

”3 c

long-standing academic debate between the shareholder primacy and pluralistic models.

As the footnotes to both of these papers reveal, this debate has generated a significant
amount of literature. Khimji points to the notable debate in the 1930s between A.A.
Berle and E. Merrick Dodd on the question of: “For Whom Are Corporate Managers
Trustees?”36

Berle supported the shareholder primacy model, arguing that a

corporation’s responsibility is profit maximization within the law for the benefit of the
shareholders. Dodd, drawing on the notion that a corporation is a legal person, supported
pluralism and took the position that corporations are accountable to the general public
and not just to shareholders. Twenty years later, Berle conceded Dodd’s position that
corporations are social institutions accountable to the public and accepted pluralism, but
the debate continued as to whether to equate the best interests of the corporation with the
best interests of the shareholders, considered to be profit maximization, or with the
community of interests as represented by the general body of stakeholders.
Lee characterizes the debate as taking place on both a conceptual and pragmatic
level. The conceptual debate is, in general, a confrontation between the concept that

33 Mohamed F. Khimji, “People’s v. Wise - Conflating Directors’ Duties, Oppression, and Stakeholders
Protection” (2006), 39 U.B.C.L. Rev. 209.
34 Ian B. Lee, “Corporate Law and the Role o f Corporations in Society: Monism, Pluralism, Markets and
Politics” (2006), 85 The Canadian Bar Review 1 [Lee, “Corporate Law”].
35 See Khimji, supra note 33 at 215-217 and Lee, “Corporate Law”, ibid, at 5-14. See also: Christopher C.
Nicholls, Corporate Law (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications Limited, 2005) at 257-312; Kevin P.
McGuiness, Canadian Business Corporations Law, 2nd ed. (Markham: LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2007) at
959-994; J. Anthony VanDuzer, The Law o f Partnerships & Corporations, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law
Inc., 2009) at 548-587; and Thomas W. Joo, ed., Corporate Governance Law, Theory and Policy (Durham:
Carolina Academic Press) at 2-10.
36 E. Merrick Dodd, “For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees” (1932), Harvard L. Rev. 1145. See
summary by Khimji, ibid, at 209-210 and fns. 4-11.
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shareholders are the owners of a corporation’s business assets, thereby favouring a
shareholder primacy model, versus the notion that incorporation is a concession, or
privilege, which is granted by the state, thereby favouring pluralism.

•>7

The pragmatic

debate arises because of the inconclusive nature of the conceptual debate and the rise of
economic analysis of company law and focuses on whether social welfare is more likely
maximized under the shareholder primacy or pluralistic model of corporate decision
making.
(B)

Conceptual Arguments
(I)

Shareholder Primacy

The classic conceptual argument in favour of the shareholder primacy model is
that corporations ought to be managed by the directors in the interests of the
shareholders, as the shareholders are owners of the business assets that are used to carry
on the corporate business. This classic argument views corporations as incorporated
partnerships or incorporated sole proprietorships with the shareholders being the owners
of the business who are actively involved in managing its business and affairs. Any
corporate objective other than profit maximization in this scenario is an infringement of
pnvate property. 39
•

However, this classic argument in support of shareholder primacy has been
discredited, or at least neutralized, by a number of counter-arguments. As the size of378*

37 Lee “Corporate Law”, supra note 34 at 5.
38 Ibid, at 8.
j9 Khimji, supra note 33 at 215 and Lee, “Corporate Law”, ibid, at 5-6.

28

corporations have grown, with increased numbers of shareholders being passive
investors, the argument that is premised on the shareholders being in control of the
business has become limited in application to closely-held private corporations. Further,
regardless whether a corporation is a closely-held one or a large public one, it is arguable
that directors are leaders of institutions with social responsibilities that go beyond profit
maximization given the proliferation, pervasiveness, and impact on social welfare of
incorporation as a vehicle for conducting business in our society.40
Another criticism of the ownership argument is that it is circular in nature.
Property for a shareholder consists of a “bundle of rights”. One such right may be the
right to have directors manage the corporation with a view to maximizing profit and,
thus, share value. However, to use the concept of ownership as the basis for the existence
of this right is to assert the right without any justification for why it is or should be an
incident of ownership.41
Lastly, the “shareholders as owners” argument is refutable based on the classic
legal framework of incorporation. Shareholders have no interest in the assets of the
corporation and it is the directors that are its directing minds. Shareholders only have
ownership rights in relation to their shares, which give them certain rights as
shareholders, such as the right to vote and to receive dividends, if declared, and the

40 Khimji, ibid, at 215 and Lee, “Corporate Law”, ibid, at 6-7.
41 Lee, “Corporate Law”, ibid, at 7.
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oppression remedy protects their reasonable expectations but does not translate to any
proprietary rights in the corporation’s assets.42
(II)

Pluralism

The classic argument in favour of the pluralistic model is that corporations are
brought into existence and sustained by legislative enactment, resulting in many private
benefits and advantages for shareholders and, as these are privileges that are granted by
the state, it is justifiable for the state to impose limitations or restrictions on them in
favour of public responsibilities 43
However, this argument in favour of pluralism has been discredited, or at least
neutralized, mainly by two counter-arguments.

First, the general availability of

incorporation makes it less of a special privilege that is granted by the state as it was in
times when incorporation required a special Act of Parliament or a discretionary grant of
letters patent by the state (sometimes with monopoly privileges).44

Second, the

prevailing or modem corporate law concept of a corporation is that it constitutes a series
of voluntary relationships, or a “nexus of contracts”, among directors and shareholders,
directors and employees, directors and creditors, and directors and other stakeholders.
Based on this theory of company law, the purpose of the state enacting general

42 Khiraji, supra note 33 at 216.
43 Lee, “Corporate Law”, supra note 34 at 7.
44 Ibid, at 8-9.
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incorporation statutes is to provide a mechanism for directors and corporate stakeholders
to manage their relationships and not to legislate preferential status.45
A review of the traditional theories for shareholder primacy and pluralism does
not seem to result in one model making more conceptual sense than the other. In other
words, a review of the traditional theories for the purpose of determining whether one
model is more attractive than the other proves inconclusive or indeterminate. As such,
the examination of whether shareholder primacy or pluralism is more desirable as a
corporate decision-making model, and why, has evolved from a conceptual inquiry to a
pragmatic one. The pragmatic analysis focuses on and compares the consequences for
social welfare that are produced by these competing models.46 A review of the pragmatic
arguments for and against each of these models favours, on balance, the shareholder
primacy model.
(C)

Pragmatic Arguments
(I)

Social Welfare v. Agency Costs

Defenders of pluralism argue that shareholder primacy gives rise to unacceptable
social welfare costs. Non-shareholder interests will be compromised and prejudiced in
the pursuit of maximization of corporate value. For example, employers will not agree to
employee benefits that increase costs and decrease profits.

45 Ibid, at 9. An explanation and analysis o f this “nexus o f contracts” conceptualization o f corporate law is
found in Jason W. Neyers, “Canadian Corporate Law Veil-Piercing, in the Private Law Model” (2002), 50
U.T.L.J. 173 [Neyers, “Canadian Corporate Law”]. Neyers’ essay is discussed below at pages 48-49.
46 Lee, “Corporate Law”, ibid, at 8.
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Defenders of shareholder primacy counter that shareholder wealth and social
welfare may be aligned to a considerable extent and, thus, this concern is over-stated.
For example, directors realize that they must take into consideration the interests of
employees, customers, and creditors. In order to make a profit, the corporation needs
loyalty, patronage, and credit. Where directors do not have a sufficient incentive to take
certain stakeholder interests into consideration, regulatory law designed to influence their
behaviour by threat of personal liability will fill the gap.4' Furthermore, as explained in
Chapter 2, it would seem to be a generally accepted norm that, when a corporation is
performing well financially, stakeholder interests are aligned.

The potential for

conflicting interests crops up when a corporation’s financial situation begins to
deteriorate or insolvency sets in.
Proponents of shareholder primacy add that pluralism imposes costs of its own.
They refer to them as increased agency costs. In particular, the agency-cost argument
against pluralism is that pluralism makes it difficult to analyze and evaluate the
performance of directors in that you can look at the corporation’s financial statements
and stock prices to see whether a profit has been made, but there really is no similarly
definitive marker to which one can look to determine whether the directors have
succeeded in taking into consideration the interests of other stakeholders.

Another

agency-cost argument against pluralism is that it results in accountability to different478

47 Ibid, at 9. A detailed discussion o f the role o f regulatory law in influencing directorial behaviour is set
out below at pages 50 -60.
48 Ibid, at 9-10.
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competing interests and that this amounts to accountability to nobody.49 Such lack of
accountability also gives directors the opportunity to pursue their own self-interests. In
any event, lack of accountability increases the monitoring costs of all stakeholders in
having to watch over directors to ensure that their interests are not prejudiced.50
There do not seem to be any empirical data comparing social welfare and agency
costs. There may not be an objective measure of whether social welfare or agency costs
are more significant. Lee concludes that the social welfare versus agency costs debate
does not result in a winner, as the shareholder primacy model probably does not do a
better job at controlling agency costs in any event. Lee points to the business judgment
rule, which is reviewed in Chapter 7 below, as to why the shareholder primacy model
may not be able to control agency costs. The business judgment rule allows directors a
significant amount of latitude and flexibility within the profit maximization principle, and
thus agency costs may arise in order to, for example, monitor the conduct of directors to
insure that shareholder interests are advanced.51
It may not be possible to objectively weigh social welfare costs and agency costs,
but agency costs arising under pluralism do highlight a different problem. Pluralism
creates a less certain mandate for directors. Directors have to balance a plurality of
interests without any clear objectives for measuring and evaluating performance. This
49 Khimji, supra note 33 at fn. 36 cites as authority for this proposition Ronald J. Daniels & Randall Morck,
eds., Corporate Decision Making in Canada (Calgary: University o f Calgary Press, 1995) at 8. Lee,
“Corporate Law”, ibid, at fh. 41 attributes the statement that “a manager told to serve two masters (a little
for the equity holders, a little for the community) has been freed o f both and is answerable to neither” to F.
Easterbrook and D. Fischel, The Economic Structure o f Corporate Law (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1991) at 38.
50 Lee, “Corporate Law”, ibid, at 9-10.
51

Ibid, at 10-11.
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vague or uncertain aspect of the definition of pluralism in and of itself makes pluralism a
less favourable model than the single purpose shareholder primacy model.
(II)

Pluralism = Team Production

In support of pluralism, it is argued that a corporation’s business success results
from a “team production” where trust is important between the directors and all those
who are committing resources to the enterprise and that this trust may be breached, and
the integrity of the team weakened, in circumstances where maximization of corporate
value necessitates breaching the trust.52 However, like the question of whether social or
agency costs are greater in magnitude, there do not appear to be any empirical data and
there is no way of objectively measuring whether this added cost of shareholder primacy
under the team production theory outweighs the agency costs that are associated with
pluralism.53
(III)

Shareholders are Residual Beneficiaries
(a)

General

Supporters of the shareholder primacy model rely on the residual-claimants
argument to support their case for shareholder primacy over pluralism. The shareholders
as a class are said to have the residual economic interest in the corporation, in the sense
that the shareholders receive a return on their investment only after the interests of all
other economic stakeholders have been satisfied.

Therefore, striving to operate a

52 Khimji, supra note 33 at 216 and Lee, “Corporate Law”, ibid, at 13-14.
53 Lee, “Corporate Law”, ibid, at 14.
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corporation so as to maximize corporate value for the shareholders means taking care of
all other economic interests in priority to the interests of shareholders. Lee describes this
argument as an attempt to break the impasse between the shareholder primacy and
pluralism debate in favour of shareholder primacy, on the basis that maximization of
corporate value for the benefit of the shareholders, by implication, benefits all.54
A criticism of this argument is that it assumes that maximization of corporate
value cannot have a negative impact on non-shareholder stakeholders. Thus, it is too
general a proposition as it fails to recognize that, under certain circumstances,
maximization of corporate value will negatively affect the non-shareholder class of
stakeholders.55

Supporters of shareholder primacy respond to this criticism by

acknowledging that there sometimes may be negative consequences on non-shareholder
stakeholders, but they add that these consequences should be tolerated as a necessary by
product of maximization of corporate value because it is of benefit to most of the non
shareholder economic interests that are concerned. Further, these negative consequences
can, in any event, be dealt with by laws and regulations that are imposed by the state for
determining the socially desirable limits to the shareholder primacy model. Supporters of
shareholder primacy also note that non-shareholder stakeholders have assumed the risks
of maximization of corporate value for shareholders in the bargain that they reached with
the corporation.56

54 Ibid, at 11.
55 Ibid.
56 Khimji, supra note 33 at 216 and Lee, “Corporate Law”, ibid, at 12.

35

The shareholders-as-residual-beneficiaries argument, in favour of the shareholder
primacy model, raises the following three questions:
(a)

is maximization of corporate value, being the premise upon which the
argument is founded, generally in the best interests of all stakeholders;

(b)

if yes, then which model is better-suited for achieving maximization of
corporate value; and,

(c)

if it is the shareholder primacy model, then is there a sufficient network of
laws and regulations in place to address the consequences that are deemed
to be socially unacceptable and that result from maximization of corporate
value.
(b)

Maximization of Corporate Value is in Best Interests of all
Stakeholders

Within our economic system, corporations are widely used as vehicles for
carrying on business. Economic stakeholders are dependent on the corporate business
vehicle to satisfy their economic interests. Striving to achieve an economic return for the
stakeholder with the residual economic interest in the corporation by definition first
requires satisfaction of all other the economic interests in the corporation. This approach
of striving to maximize corporate value for the residual economic interest is significant
because it satisfies the economic interests of the corporation’s constituent stakeholders
and has societal benefits beyond satisfying these immediate interests, for the general
benefit of society. For example, some of the obvious benefits to society of the economic
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interests of stakeholders being satisfied is that it results in access to funds which can be
applied:
(a)

by stakeholders to pay income and sales taxes owing to fund government
programs and services for the benefit of society in general;

(b)

by employers and employees, to make remittances on account of health
taxes, the Canada Pension Plan, and unemployment insurance benefits;

(c)

by employees, to earn incomes and, among other things, to provide for
themselves and their dependents and reinvest in consumer goods and
services, thereby further stimulating economic activity;

(d)

by suppliers of goods and services, to generate an income to allow for the
purchase of goods and services from other suppliers that are required to
carry on business, to pay employees, and to satisfy the balance of their
own economic stakeholders, thereby generating further economic activity;

(e)

by lenders, for reinvestment or spending elsewhere, thereby generating
further economic growth; and,

(f)

by shareholders, for reinvestment or spending elsewhere, thereby
generating further economic growth.

It may not be possible to maintain all of these societal benefits in cases of
financial distress or insolvency. The preference would be to preserve as many of them as
possible. Some form of economically-viable going-concem business will generate more

37

economic activity than one that is no longer in business. Thus, in a situation of financial
distress or insolvency, restructuring measures that are designed to turn around the
corporation’s financial situation are preferable to a liquidation strategy. Whether the
corporation is solvent, in the vicinity of insolvency, or insolvent, the maximization of
corporate value principle is in the best economic interests of the corporation and all
stakeholders and society.

There is no doubt that generating economic activity is a

fundamental public policy objective of corporate law. The maximization of corporate
value principle is designed to satisfy the economic interests of stakeholders and results in
general benefits for society. Which model is better-suited to achieve the maximization of
corporate value principle?
(c)

.

Which Model is Better for Increased Economic Activity?

As Mark J. Roe5758points out, at the root of the shareholder primacy model, or the
justification for having directors focus on maximization of corporate value, is a utilitarian
“greatest good for the greatest number philosophy”.

Under this principle, the economic

stakeholders represent classes and the objective is to maximize corporate value for the
most number of classes. This concept also gives rise to obvious democratic connotations,
albeit based on democracy among classes of stakeholders. Any negative fall-out from
maximization of corporate value,
...is the price to be paid for strong capital markets, and allocative
efficiency and that these benefits are so powerful that they
overwhelm the normative benefit of any distributional favouring
57 Mark J. Roe, “The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization” (2000-2001),
149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2063.
58 Ibid, at 2065.
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[of other stakeholders over] shareholders. In the long run, the
argument goes, employees and other stakeholders are overall better
off with fluid and efficient capital markets, managers need a
simple metric to follow, and both wealth, and, in the end, fairness
are maximized by the shareholders being the corporation’s residual
beneficiary...59
In rejecting the shareholder primacy model in favour of a pluralistic one, the
Supreme Court of Canada in People’s, followed by its decision in BCE, overturned the
prevailing view of Canadian courts that a director’s obligation to act in the best interests
of the corporation meant maximization of corporate value.60 Justice Pelletier of the
Quebec Court of Appeal in People’s exemplified the prevailing judicial view by
overturning Justice Greenberg’s trial decision as being contrary to the traditional
shareholder primacy model. Justice Pelletier saw “the interests of the corporation as
coinciding with the interests of all the shareholders in the pursuit of the objectives of the
creation of the corporation”.61
It would be difficult, if not impossible, to argue that the shareholder primacy, or
profit maximization, model, which, as noted in the preceding paragraph, was the
applicable legal corporate decision-making model before the Supreme Court of Canada’s

59 Ibid.
60 Janis Sarra, “The Corporate Veil Lifted: Director and Officer Liability to Third Parties” (2001), 35 Can.
Bus. L.J. 55 at 56 [Sarra, “The Corporate Veil”].
51 Peoples Department Stores Inc. (Trustee of) v. Wise, (2003), 22 D.L.R. (4th) 509 (Que. C.A.) at para. 82
[.People’s CA], rev’g (1998), 23 C.B.R. (4th) 200 (Que. S.C.) [People’s QSC]..
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decision in People’s, did not promote economic activity for the benefit of society. This
seems to have been the model’s raison d ’etre. As David Goddard62 has written,
[i]n the field of commercial law, more than many other areas of
law, we can say with some confidence that the economic benefits
of an institution are co-extensive with its social benefits, and so
with the policy rationale for its existence. The institution of the
company, and the legal and administrative edifice that supports it,
can be justified only by the economic benefits it creates. Absent
those benefits, the institution’s rationale is exhausted.63
In a situation of financial distress or insolvency, the shareholder primacy model
becomes a misnomer for describing its underlying utilitarian or democratic rationale of
the “greatest good for the greatest number” of classes of economic stakeholders. When
the corporation is making a profit, is fully capitalized, and has a promising future all
stakeholders benefit. In this regard, directors are striving to maximize corporate value for
the shareholders, being the class with the residual economic interest in the corporation,
which benefits all classes of economic stakeholders. However, in a situation of financial
distress or insolvency, when there is little or no economic value in the corporation for the
shareholders, the creditors displace the shareholders as the class with the remaining, or
residual, economic interest in the value of the company. Striving to maximize corporate
value for the creditor class as the residual beneficiaries benefits the most classes of
stakeholders. Lee refers to the creditor primacy model as a qualified shareholder primacy
model.64 The creditor primacy model is also sometimes referred to as the duty shifting

62 David Goddard, “Corporate Personality - Limited Recourse and its Limits” in Charles E. F. Rickett and
Ross B. Grantham, eds., Corporate Personality in the 2(fh Century (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998) 11
[Goddard, “Corporate Personality”].
63 Ibid, at 17.
64 Lee, “Corporate Law”, supra note 34 at 3.
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model.

It calls for a shift from the traditional role that is recognized for directors,

whereby acting in the best interests of the corporation is defined as acting to maximize
corporate value for shareholders, to acting to maximize value for, and thus protecting,
creditors’ economic interests. The shift takes place in a deteriorating financial situation
or in an insolvency situation.
The creditor primacy, or duty-shifting, model was developed in Commonwealth
jurisdictions outside of Canada - i.e., Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand - and
was brought to the attention of the Canadian legal community by Jacob S. Ziegel in an
essay that was published in 1993 entitled “Creditors as Corporate Stakeholders: The
Quiet Revolution - An Anglo-Canadian Perspective”.65 This duty-shifting doctrine was
subsequently accepted and applied by Justice Greenberg in 1998, as the trial judge in
People’s QSC66 Justice Greenberg found the directors of People’s personally liable in
the amount of $4.4 million on the basis that they had breached both their fiduciary duties
and their duties of care. In so doing, Justice Greenberg cited Ziegel’s 1993 paper, which
referred to Commonwealth developments on the issue of a shifting duty that is owed to
creditors, and concluded that Canadian corporate law should evolve in the same
direction.67

65 Jacob S. Ziegel, “Creditors as Corporate Stakeholders: The Quiet Revolution - An Anglo-Canadian
Perspective” (1993), 43 U.T.L.J. 511 [Ziegel, “Creditors as Corporate”].
66 People ’s QSC, supra note 61.
67 Ibid, at paras. 193, 202, and 205.
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In coming to his conclusion, Justice Greenberg quoted and applied the following
rationale, which was set out in Ziegel’s essay, in support of extending the duty-shifting
doctrine to Canada,
It is not unreasonable, in exchange for the benefit of limited
liability, to impose a duty on directors not to sacrifice creditors’
interests when the going gets rough...if the company is insolvent,
only the creditors still have a meaningful stake in its assets. This
will be obvious if the company has been formally declared
bankrupt. Why should it make a difference that bankruptcy has
been delayed for a period of time? If we accept the paramountcy
of creditors’ interest when the company is insolvent, it must
likewise be wrong, and a waste of economic resources, for the
directors to continue to buy goods and services on credit knowing
there is no reasonable prospect of the creditors ever being paid.68
As noted, Justice Pelletier, writing for a unanimous bench of the Quebec Court of
Appeal,69 rejected Justice Greenberg’s extension of the duty-shifting doctrine to Canada.
Justice Pelletier was not prepared to allow the traditional shareholder model to be
qualified in circumstances of financial distress or insolvency.70 The Supreme Court of
Canada, for its part, rejected both the traditional shareholder primacy model and its
variation, the creditor primacy model in circumstances of financial distress or insolvency,
and endorsed a permissive pluralistic model.
It is important to note that the duty-shifting doctrine was developed as part of the
judicial interpretation of a director’s duty to act in the best interests of the corporation. It
did not develop as part of the jurisprudence arising under the director’s duty to take

68 Ibid, at paras. 203-204.
69 Peoples CA, supra note 61.
70 Ibid.
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reasonable care so as not to cause others - i.e., corporate stakeholders - reasonably
foreseeable harm.

To illustrate this point, Brian Morgan and Harry Underwood71

demonstrate how duty-shifting developed as a doctrine under the director’s duty to act in
the best interests of the corporation through an examination and analysis of the cases in
Australia, Great Britain, and New Zealand that gave rise to the duty-shifting doctrine,
which Justice Greenberg extended to Canada.72

Thus, the duty-shifting doctrine

acknowledges that, in an insolvency or vicinity of insolvency situation, the interests of
the corporation may be equated with the interests of creditors.73 In other words, they are
synonymous, thereby giving rise to the creditors being the residual beneficiaries of the
corporation. Endeavouring to maximize corporate value for them achieves “the greatest
good for the greatest number”.
Stéphane Rousseau also makes the point that the duty-shifting doctrine arises
from an examination of a director’s duty to the corporation and not from a duty to third
parties. After examining the decisions of the trial judge and Quebec Court of Appeal in
People’s, Rousseau writes that,
It is worth emphasizing that the duty of directors not to disregard
creditors’ interests remains a duty owed to the corporation. The
fact that the duty is “mediated” through the company implies that
the enforcement of the duty belongs to the corporation or a
plaintiff acting through a derivative action. Creditors who will
want to enforce the duty of directors will need to satisfy the
conditions of the derivative action, which purports to control
opportunistic litigation by creditors...by restricting access to
71 Brian Morgan and Harry Underwood, “Directors Liability To Creditors On a Corporation’s Insolvency In
Light o f Dylex and People’s Department Stores Litigation” (2003), 39 Can. Bus. L.J. 336.
72 Ibid, at 340-350.
73 Ibid, at 350.
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derivative actions, courts ensure that creditors “cannot
inappropriately use corporate resources to pursue litigation”.74
It is worth noting that, while the Supreme Court of Canada in People’s did not go
so far as to say that, in an insolvency or deteriorating financial situation, a director’s duty
to act in the best interests of the corporation is to be equated with a duty to act in the best
interests of the creditors, the court did concede the ever-increasing importance of the
interests of creditors to be considered by directors when acting in the best interests of the
corporation in an insolvency or worsening financial situation.

The Supreme Court

recognized, as a matter of principle, the rising importance of the interests of creditors in
an insolvency or situation of financial deterioration by writing that,
Short of bankruptcy, as the corporation approaches what has been
described as the “vicinity of insolvency”, the residual claims of
shareholders will be nearly exhausted. While shareholders might
well prefer that the directors pursue high-risk alternatives with a
high potential payoff to maximize the shareholders’ expected
residual claim, creditors in the same circumstances might prefer
that the directors steer a safer course so as to maximize the value
of their claims against the assets of the corporation...
The fact that creditors’ interests increase in relevancy as a
corporation’s finances deteriorate is apt to be relevant to [a court
deciding whether to grant standing to a creditor to pursue an
oppression remedy claim against directors].75
The underlying rationale of the shareholder and creditor primacy models is
maximization of corporate value for the corporate residual beneficiary class in good and
distressed financial times.

This approach benefits the most number of classes of

Stéphane Rousseau, “The Duties o f Directors o f Financially Disturbed Corporations - A Quebec
Perspective on the People’s Case” (2003), 39 Can. Bus. L.J. 368.
75 SCC People's, supra note 16 at paras. 4 4 ,4 5 , and 49.
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economic interests in the corporation and generates economic activity. Is the pluralistic
corporate decision-making model just as well-suited, or perhaps better-suited, for
promoting economic activity for the general benefit of society in good and distressed
financial times?
It is arguable that the Supreme Court of Canada’s pluralistic decision-making
model, requiring directors to ascertain the interests of stakeholders so as to treat them
fairly and equitably in the decision-making process, is not as effective in maximizing
corporate value. First, unlike the shareholder and creditor primacy models, the pluralistic
decision-making model qualifies the pursuit of maximization of corporate value by
making it conditional on treating fairly all affected stakeholder interests. Second, this
qualification gives rise to uncertainty in the mandate that the pluralistic decision-making
model sets for directors. It is an easier task for directors to understand and implement a
maximization of corporate value goal as opposed to a maximization of corporate value
goal qualified by the requirement to consider and treat fairly all affected stakeholders
without any direction as to how to rank these interests in terms of priority. Third, such a
lack of clarity and certainty increases the risk of personal liability of directors to
stakeholders. This undermines the separate legal personality principle of company law,
providing that corporations are separate legal entities, and the related limited liability
principle of company law, providing that there is no recourse for claims against a
corporation beyond the value of its assets. The effect of these two principles is to provide
protection for directors from personal liability for corporate acts. The maximization-ofcorporate-value principle relies on these principles.

The undermining affects of the
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pluralistic decision making model on these concepts of separate legal person, limited
liability and protection from personal liability are explored below.
The pluralistic corporate decision-making model, which was created by the
Supreme Court of Canada in People’s and BCE, requires directors to focus on a plurality
of interests to be canvassed and to be treated fairly and equitably in creating a “better
corporation”76 or in directing the corporation to act as a “good corporate citizen”.77
Having to consider and balance a plurality of interests creates a broader and complicated,
and thus less focused, mandate for directors to discharge as compared to a single purpose
maximization-of-corporate-value mandate.
Further, defining the mandate of directors as being to create a “better corporation”
or to direct the corporation to act as a “good corporate citizen” is to create a decision
making model that is inherently ambiguous and uncertain. Such phrases lack practical
meaning to business people, which is what directors are. To the contrary, a business
person is more likely to understand what it means to act so as to maximize corporate
value under all circumstances. This uncertainty resulting from the pluralistic model is
concerning, as it is when a corporation is experiencing financial distress or is insolvent
that stakeholder interests conflict and directors are most in need of clear guidance as to
their mandate. A maximization of corporate value mandate is easier to understand and

76 Ibid, at para. 41 wherein the Supreme Court adopted as a correct statement o f law Justice Farley’s
position set out in 820099 Ontario Inc. v. Harold E. Ballard Ltd. (1991), 3 B.L.R. (2d) 123 (Ont. Gen.
Div.) affd (1991), 3 B.L.R. (2d) 113 (Ont. Div. Ct.), at 171, that directors and officers in resolving conflicts
between stakeholders are to act to make the corporation a “better corporation”.
77 See BCE, supra note 14 at para. 81 wherein the Supreme Court concluded that where directors are faced
with conflicting interests that involve the interests o f the corporation then “it falls to the directors o f the
corporation to resolve them in accordance with their duty to act in the best interests o f the corporation,
viewed as a good corporate citizen”.
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implement by directors than is one requiring the measuring and balancing of a plurality of
interests in a situation of financial distress or insolvency.
Under the corporate pluralistic decision-making model in Canada, directors are
accountable to a plurality of interests. The model is more complicated and less welldefined than the shareholder primacy model. These factors result in greater uncertainty
as to a director’s mandate or objectives in situations of financial distress or insolvency.
Uncertainty increases the risk of personal liability.
interpretation as to how a director should act.
objections to decisions that are made by directors.

It allows greater room for

This means more challenges and
It also may result in a director

believing that certain conduct will not attract liability when it will. As Janis Sarra writes,
“[pjarties need certainty in assessing liability for their conduct [and] [t]his is particularly
the case with thinly capitalized corporations where third parties are looking beyond the
corporate veil to satisfy their claims”.78 Sarra also notes that qualified independent
directors may be reluctant to act in larger companies unless the scope of their liability is
relatively clear.79
The increased risk of personal liability on directors under the pluralistic decision
making model undermines the separate legal personality and limited liability principle of
company law. By virtue of statutory incorporation, companies are given attributes of
legal personality, meaning that they have the legal powers and obligations of a natural
person to hold property, make contracts, sue and be sued in their own name, and

78 Sarra, “The Corporate Veil ”, supra note 60 at 56.
79 Ibid, at 68.
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perpetual succession.

The separate legal personality principle, in turn, gives rise to the

concept of limited liability, meaning that, because the corporation is a separate legal
entity, only the corporation will be liable for its wrongful conduct and such liability will
be limited by the extent of its assets.8
081823456 Limited liability, as it originated, applied only to
shareholders,

but the concept was expanded to include employees, directors, and

officers and it is common to refer to the limited liability concept as giving rise to a
“corporate veil” beyond which the individuals who decided the wrongful corporate
conduct, usually the directors, will have no personal liability.
Goddard

reviews the separate legal personality and limited liability concepts

emanating from Salomon v. Salomon

oc

t

t

1

and notes the “extensive academic literature on

the economic rationale for separate legal personality and limited liability”.

He explains

that the practical importance of these doctrines is three-fold. In summary:

80 Ibid, at 55.
81 Ibid, at 56.
82 Christopher C. Nicholls, “Liability o f Corporate Officers and Directors to Third Parties” (2001), 35 Can.
Bus. L.J. 1 at 2 [Nicholls, “Liability o f Corporate Officers”].
83 Sarra, supra note 60 at 56.
84 Goddard, “Corporate Personality”, supra note 62.
85 The first judicial pronouncement o f the limited liability principle arising from a registered company is
often cited to be the 1897 decision o f the House o f Lords in Salomon, supra note 7. That case dealt with
“one man companies” or incorporated sole proprietorships. The House o f Lords held that the shareholder
o f Aaron Salomon & Company Ltd. had no personal liability to its creditors.
86 Goddard, “Corporate Personality”, supra note 62 at 18 and fii. 16, wherein Goddard cites F. Easterbrook
and D. Fischel, The Economic Structure o f Corporate Law (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1991) as a “convenient summary” o f the economic rationale for the separate legal personality and limited
liability principles upon which company law is founded.
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(a)

to enable capital for a business venture to be collected from a number of
investors over time, while avoiding the costs of transfer of the business’s
assets when new investors are admitted or existing ones depart;

(b)

to reduce the cost of transferring the business’s undertaking by
transferring the shares thereof rather than the underlying assets; and,

(c)

to enable the business venture to be conducted on a limited recourse basis
as the default model.

07

Goddard notes that the first two above-noted factors produce obvious reductions
in transaction costs, but what is “less immediately obvious [is] why a default rule
providing for limited recourse is a desirable legal rule, producing social gains”.
Goddard sets out three arguments in favour of limited recourse as the default rule. They
may be paraphrased as follows.
(a)

Incorporation, giving rise to separate legal personality and liability limited
to the extent of a corporation’s assets, is the most economically efficient
form of business model. Separate legal personality and limited liability
arise by default upon the decision to incorporate a business. The market,
therefore, is in the best position to dictate which arrangement, or structure,
for carrying on business is the most efficient one. The predominance of
the corporate form as a business vehicle, with the market thereafter87

87 Goddard, ibid, at 18.
88 Ibid, at 18-19.
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determining to what extent the default rule is to be varied, is evidence that
•

the default rule is considered to be the most economically efficient one.
(b)

OQ

It is a red herring to complain that the protection from personal liability
for corporate acts, that flows from the concepts of separate legal person
and limited liability, is harmful to voluntary creditors and, thus, is not a
justifiable legal concept. Voluntary creditors, who can adjust contract
terms for credit risk, have no greater complaint for not being able to
collect from a corporation than they do from an individual. The risk of
non-payment in our free market system is inherent in every transaction
that involves extending credit or loaning money - business is all about
managing risk and “Salomon is clearly right [because] [t]he company’s
creditors knew they were dealing with a limited company”.8990 Nonetheless,
Goddard makes an exception where a creditor is deliberately or carelessly
misled as to the creditworthiness of the corporation and the information
that was withheld would have been material to the creditor’s decision to
extend credit or loan money. He makes another exception for situations in
which the creditworthiness of the corporation changes after the initial
agreement to extend credit or loan money to the corporation and the
creditor is unaware of this change.

In this situation, he argues that

directors who know that a company cannot pay for goods or services that
89 Ibid, at 23.
90 Ibid, at 23 and 27. Goddard does not believe that voluntary creditors should have no recourse against
directors. At 30-32, he says that he would allow such personal recourse in all instances o f fraud,
misrepresentation, and deception, including where creditors are misled, including by silence, when a
corporation cannot meet its obligations as they come due yet continues to trade.
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are obtained on credit, or for loans advanced, are “practicing a deception
on those creditors”.9192
(c)

Protection from personal liability reduces monitoring costs, in the sense
that, since shareholders do not have personal liability, they do not need to
micromanage the conduct of the corporation to make sure that its debts get
paid, and it makes securities markets possible by basing the determination
of share prices on the value of the corporation and not the net worth of the
selling shareholder. If shareholders were to be liable for corporate debts,
then a shareholder’s ability to pay for such corporate debt, or a
shareholder’s net worth, would need to be factored into the determination
of share value. This would complicate the valuation of shares and the
same shares in a corporation would differ in value because the net worth
of each selling shareholder might be different.

The separate legal person and limited liability concepts, resulting in protection
from personal liability for directors as well as shareholders, also give rise to another
social benefit by creating an environment whereby directors feel safe in taking business
risks with a view to maximizing corporate value and, thus, stimulating socially beneficial
economic activity. As Goddard points out, “[b]usiness people do not seek to eliminate
risk - quite the reverse. They actively seek to take certain risks, and to find the most

91 Ibid, at 30-31.
92 Ibid, at 23-24.
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appropriate way to manage other risks which result from business decisions.93” This may
be referred to as entrepreneurial risk, which is to be encouraged.
Decreasing the protection that is afforded to directors from personal liability,
under basic corporate law concepts, is inconsistent with maintaining an atmosphere that
promotes directors taking business risks with a view to maximizing corporate value and,
thereby, stimulating economic activity. As Jassmine A. Girgis94 explains, increased risk
of personal liability may lead to over-deterrence on the part of directors, or, put another
way, directors may proceed in too cautious and conservative a manner, thereby missing
legitimate business opportunities. This is especially critical in a deteriorating financial
situation or insolvency, as directors may decide against, or simply fail to appreciate,
reasonable measures that might be implemented with a view to turning around the
corporation’s failing financial situation and bringing it back to profitability for the benefit
of all, or at least the majority of, stakeholders.95
Increased risk of personal exposure also may result in directors resigning,
corporations not being able to attract qualified directors, and directors acting
precipitously to assign the company into bankruptcy or file for bankruptcy protection.
The bankruptcy options would afford protection to the directors under bankruptcy

93 Ibid, at 22.
94 Jassmine Girgis, “Deepening Insolvency In Canada?” (2008), 63 McGill L.J. 167.
95 Ibid, at 181.
See also Jason Harris, “R elief From Liability For Company Directors: Recent
Developments and Their Implications” UWS Law Review [forthcoming in 2009 available at SSRN:
<http://ssm.com/abstract=1399191>] [Harris, “R elief’], wherein it is noted that the Commonwealth
Treasury o f Australia is reviewing whether state regulation imposes too high o f a risk o f personal liability
on directors and the author, at 17, recognizes that “too much regulation may institute excessive sanctions
that drive corporate managers and directors to be overly cautious and conservative which could lower
economic performance, harm the economy, and lower national living standards”.
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legislation, but if exercised prematurely, would result in the corporation being put out of
business, or a costly bankruptcy restructuring taking place, without adequate
consideration first being given to measures that might have been taken to turn around the
corporation without resorting to bankruptcy laws.96
Some argue that the legal principle that a corporation is a separate legal entity
with limited liability, and thus its directing minds are immunized from personal liability
for corporate acts, may be so porous that it is no longer a meaningful theory of company
law. Jason Neyers97 reviews the principle that a corporation is a separate legal entity with
limited liability and arrives at this conclusion. Neyers argues that Canadian company law
is incoherent because it is centered on a separate legal entity doctrine that is disregarded
and pierced so often that a corporation cannot both be and not be a separate legal person.
He adds that it also is incoherent because it does not explain who or what a legal
corporation is, making it virtually impossible for directors to figure out what it means to
act in the best interests of the corporation.98
Coherent or not, what is important about the doctrine of separate legal entity and
limited liability, and what is worth saving, is one of the basic results that flows from these

96 I have practiced in the area o f bankruptcy and insolvency since 1991. Based on this experience, it is
evident to me that invoking bankruptcy legislation to liquidate or restructure adds an additional layer o f
professional costs to the situation. These costs are borne by the corporation and its stakeholders.
Economic efficiency dictates avoiding these costs if possible.
97 Neyers, “Canadian Corporate Law”, supra note 45.
98 Ibid. Neyers offers an alternative or replacement principle for the foundation o f company law rather than
the separate legal entity doctrine. He proposes a private law model that acknowledges that a corporation is
a nexus o f jural relationships between players - i.e., between shareholders, shareholders and directors
whereby directors make a promise to the shareholders to manage the corporation’s patrimony with care and
loyalty so as to maximize its net present value, and directors as agents o f the corporation and outside
entities with an interest in what the corporation does, whereby, for example, creditors agree to limit their
execution for default or breach against the assets o f the corporation.
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doctrines. It is that directors are not liable for corporate acts. Directors need protection
from exposure to personal liability so that they may feel and be safe in taking business
risks with a view to maximizing corporate value and, thus, stimulating socially beneficial
economic activity.

Thus, the overriding consideration should be to give directors

sufficient protection from personal liability in order to allow them to make the necessary
decisions and take the necessary risks, with a view to maximizing corporate value for the
benefit of all stakeholders. To fit this principle within the nexus of a jural-relations
theory of company law, we could say that there is an understanding among directors and
all stakeholders that the directors will govern with a view to maximizing corporate value
for the general benefit of all stakeholders without personal liability.
(d)

Do Sufficient Governmental Controls Exist to Address Socially
Undesirable Consequences of Maximization of Corporate
Value?

To recap, a strong argument can be made that maximization of corporate value is
generally in the best interests of the corporation and of all, or at least most, of the
stakeholders and that the shareholder and creditor primacy models are better designed to
achieve this objective. Nonetheless, it is also generally accepted by proponents of the
shareholder and creditor primacy models that maximization of corporate value, as a
desirable social policy, has its limits, as it may have consequences or give rise to
behaviour that is deemed not to be socially acceptable. As such, the legislatures have
stepped in to create an extensive network of rules and regulations with the intention of
promoting and protecting stakeholder interests and social welfare in general. Is this
government intervention sufficient to protect the stakeholder interests as contemplated by
the Supreme Court of Canada in People’s - i.e., shareholders, employees, suppliers,
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creditors, consumers, the government, and the environment - or was displacing the
incumbent maximization-of-corporate-value decision-making model with a more
pluralistic one warranted?

This question can only be answered by taking into

consideration the existing regulatory framework for protecting stakeholder interests.
It has been estimated that, in Canada, there may be as many as 200 federal and
provincial statutes imposing potential personal liability on directors with the aim of
influencing their behaviour99 Legislation for the purpose of imposing liability on
directors to influence their behaviour is not unique to Canada. In the United States and in
the English-speaking Commonwealth countries, there are extensive statutory regimes
imposing personal liability on directors with an eye to influencing their behaviour to
achieve socially desirable norms. In Australia, a government review is underway to
examine the appropriateness of current levels of statutory personal liability on directors.
The concern is that “too much regulation may institute excessive sanctions that drive
corporate managers and directors to be overly cautious and conservative which could
lower economic performance, harm the economy and lower national living standards.100”
A similar concern seems to be emerging in Canada at the level of the federal
government. The Parliamentary Information and Research Service of the Library of
Parliament, in its 2008 report entitled “Directors’ Liability Under the Canada Business

99 Steven Donley and Nigel Kent, “Directors and Officers Liability in Canada: A Review o f Exposures and
Coverages Available Under D&O Policies” (June 2008), online: Clark Wilson LLP
http://www.cwilson.com at 9 and fn 74 [Donley and Kent, “Directors”], citing Marsh Canada Limited
(December 2006) “Directors and Officers Liability”, publication no. B 061112 (C06120STE): 2006/12/13.
100 Harris, “R elief’, supra note 95 at 17.
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Corporations He/”,101 acknowledges that “[cjhanging the law to make directors
personally liable is a relatively simple way to influence corporate behavior” with a view
to achieving objectives that are considered to be socially desirable, like “regulations
designed to protect the environment, for example”. However, it cautions against the risk
of too much personal liability creating an imbalance between two important public policy
objectives, being protecting stakeholder interests that are deemed to be worthy of
protection and promoting economic activity.102
The risk is that too much personal liability in the equation expands “the class of
stakeholders to whom a duty is owed” and, thus, “may alter the traditional motivation of
corporations, that of maximizing shareholder values” and it may make Canadian
corporations less competitive and efficient.

The negative effect on a corporation’s

competitiveness and efficiency would be the result of:
(a)

increased compliance costs, as directors will incur costs for professional

fees for advice on corporate governance and for errors and omissions insurance to
protect themselves from personal liability;
(b)

indecision resulting from fear of being sued personally; and

101 Library o f Parliament, Directors’ Liability Linder the Canada Business Corporations Act by Andrew
Kitching (Ottawa: Parliamentary Information and Research Service PRB 08-25E October 16, 2008). The
Parliamentary Information and Research Service o f the Library o f Parliament is a support service for
Parliament. Its analysts conduct research and provide information to Committees and Members o f the
Senate and House o f Commons on issues or matters that are deemed to be o f national interest. This service
is provided on a without partisan basis.
102 Ibid, at 2-3.
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(c)

•

•

»

1

an inability to attract qualified individuals to act as directors.

rn

The report concludes by pointing out that the balance between achieving good
corporate governance through personal liability and promotion of economic activity is a
national issue that is being monitored, given the expansion over the past decade of
personal liability both by statute and the judiciary, and that:
[t]he imposition of ever-increasing personal liability on directors
may eventually affect the management and business efficiency of
Canadian corporations. If that is the case, amendments to the
CBCA that place limits on the personal liability of directors may
become necessary.103104
There is a high degree of uniformity between the federal and provincial statutes
that have been enacted to protect stakeholder interests in Canada.105 It is not within the
scope of this paper to conduct a detailed analytical review of the federal and provincial
statutory provisions that impose personal liability on directors and the jurisprudence
emanating thereunder. For the purpose of this paper, what is important is simply that
there does exist an extensive regulatory network that requires directors, under the threat
of personal liability, to consider and protect all of the stakeholder interests that are listed
by the Supreme Court of Canada in People’s and reiterated in BCE.106 What is significant
about this is that the court did not consider this extensive regulatory network in deciding
103 Ibid.
104 Ibid, at 5.
105 Donley and Kent, “Directors”, supra note 99 at 1.
106 An attempt is made to list all federal statutory provisions imposing personal liability on directors in
Donley and Kent, ibid. These authors, at p. 6, also note that securities regulation is a matter o f provincial
jurisdiction and that Ontario, by way o f its Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, as amended, plays the lead
role in securities regulation as it has the largest and most active capital markets. The authors also note that
other provinces seem to be following Ontario’s lead in adopting similar securities legislation.
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whether it was necessary to dilute the maximization of corporate value principle to
provide for more protection of stakeholder interests by displacing the incumbent
shareholder primacy model with a more pluralistic one. The existence of this extensive
regulatory framework may be found in the comprehensive practical guides and reference
materials on directors’ liabilities that are published by all major Canadian law firms. The
purpose of these materials is to educate directors about which stakeholder interests they
need to protect in the corporate decision-making process in order to avoid the risk of
•

•

•

personal statutory liability.

107

For example, Torys LLP107108 and Osier LLP109 publish practical comprehensive
guides for directors, listing and examining the statutory provisions that expose directors
to risk of personal liability in order to influence their behaviour. These two practical
guides are consistent in the statutory liabilities that they list and explain in order to
educate directors as to which stakeholder interests must be protected to avoid personal
liability. In the Osier LLP guide, the stakeholder interests that directors are taught to

1071 undertook a review o f the internet websites o f seven major Canadian law firms to determine the extent
o f publications addressing the nature and scope o f personal liability for directors. These seven law firms
were: Blakes, Davies, Goodmans, McCarthy, Osier, Stikeman, and Torys. These firms were chosen as they
are commonly referred to as the “seven sisters” o f Canadian law firms. This is a moniker that was given to
these firms in a 2003 article in a law magazine known as Lexpert, which promotes itself as “Canada's
leading source o f news and information about the business o f law” online: Lexpert.ca
<http://www.lexpert.ca>. Lexpert gave the firms this nickname because they were identified as the top
ranking law firms in Canada based on their involvement in the biggest corporate transactions for 2002. All
o f their internet websites contained materials for the purpose o f educating directors as to the nature and
scope o f their personal liability in the form o f updates, bulletins, and reference manuals.
108 Scott Bomhof, Duties o f Directors in the Insolvency Zone, (October 2009), online: Torys.com
<http//www.torys.com/Publications/Documents/Publication%20PDFs/AR2009-51.pdf>.
109 The most comprehensive publication from among the seven major Canadian law firms referred to above
appears to be the reference guide that is published by Osier. See Shelley Obal, ed., Corporate Governance
in Canada: A Guide to the Responsibilities o f Corporate Directors in Canada, 5th ed. (March 2009), online:
Osler.com <http://www.osler.com/resources.aspx?id=8115>.
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protect in their decision-making in order to avoid personal liability may be paraphrased
as follows.
(a)

The reasonable expectations of, among others, shareholders and creditors
as “complainants” under the oppression remedy. It is to be noted that
creditors include lenders and suppliers and generally anyone to whom the
corporation owes money.

It is also worthy to note that the class is

broadened by the inclusion of contingent creditors. Any stakeholder with
a claim for monetary loss or damages against the corporation that has
either not yet crystallized or is still subject to proof of liability and
quantification and with a reasonable expectation that assets of the
corporation will be available to satisfy any judgment granted is a
contingent creditor. An example of such a contingent creditor would be
an employee with a wrongful dismissal claim.110
(b)

The interests of, among others, shareholders and creditors, when they are
synonymous with the interests of the corporation.

In this regard,

shareholders and creditors, including contingent creditors, may be granted
leave of the court, if they qualify as “complainant” to commence an action
against a director on behalf of the corporation if the director has
committed an actionable wrong against the corporation and that wrong
resulted in the corporation suffering loss or damages, which in turn
prejudices their interest in the corporation. For example, if a director has

110

Ibid, at 15. See fh. 161 below.
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breached his or her fiduciary duty or duty of care to the corporation and
the corporation has suffered a loss, thereby adversely affecting share
values or the corporation’s ability to pay creditors, then, by derivative
action, those stakeholders may recover for the corporation its loss, which,
in turn, would allow the corporation to honour its commitments to them.111
(c)

The interests of any third party in having the corporation abide by its
articles, by-laws, or unanimous shareholders agreement. This is done by
way of a compliance order.112

(d)

The interests of the existing shareholders in maintaining the value of their
shares by prohibiting the issuance of shares for property or past services
that have a fair market value that is less than the money that the
corporation would have received if it had issued the shares for money.113

(e)

The interests of creditors, such as lenders and suppliers, in not having the
assets of the corporation depleted by the purchase, redemption, retraction,
or other acquisition of shares, the payment of a dividend on shares, the
provision of financial assistance to certain related parties, or the payment
to a shareholder who has exercised statutory dissent rights, where to do so
would contravene the statutory insolvency tests. These tests are where the
corporation is, or would be after the payment in question, unable to pay its

111 Ibid, at 16.
112 Ibid, at 17.
113

Ibid, at 66.
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liabilities generally as they come due or the reasonable value of its assets
would be less than the aggregate of its liabilities and stated capital of all
classes of shares.11415
(f)

The interests of investors, and the economy for the benefit of the public in
general, in having fair and transparent capital markets by: (i) prohibiting
insider trading, meaning that persons who have information about a
corporation that might affect stock prices should not use that information
to trade in securities of the corporation or to assist others in trading in such
securities before the information becomes public; and, (ii) requiring a
certain amount of disclosure to be made to investors who are looking to
purchase corporate stock and prohibiting market manipulation, fraud, and
certain other misconduct as set out in securities legislation. It is worth
noting that securities regulation is a matter of provincial jurisdiction and
that Ontario, by way of its Securities Act, plays the lead role as it has the
largest and most active capital markets, and other provinces seem to be
following Ontario’s lead in adopting similar securities legislation.113

(g)

The interests of shareholders to be advised of and to be given the
opportunity to vote at a meeting of the shareholders and to be made aware
of material facts affecting the corporation, by making it an offence to fail
to deliver a proxy to shareholders at the time that they are given notice of

114 Ibid, at 66-68.
115 Ibid, at 69-71, in respect o f insider trading, and 46-53, in respect o f securities regulation. In respect o f
securities regulation, see also Donley and Kent, supra note 99 at 6-9. See also Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990,
c. S.5, as amended.
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a meeting of shareholders, to fail to send a management proxy circular
before soliciting proxies, and to include an untrue statement of material
fact in certain documents, such as a management proxy circular, or the
omission of a material fact in such a document.'16
(h)

The interests of the public in preventing harm to the environment. There
are federal and provincial statutes imposing potential liability on directors
who do not take reasonable care to ensure that the corporation complies
with environmental legislation and where a director has some involvement
in environmental damage that is suffered. There are also related statutes
protecting, by way of personal liability, specific environmental harms,
* 1 1 7
such as the harmful alteration or destruction of fish habitats.
•

(i)

The interests of employees in their pensions.

Under pension benefits

legislation, directors may be guilty of offences if they authorize or
participate in a failure by the corporation to remit amounts that are owing
to the pension fund.
(j)

I i o

The interests of employees in being paid their wages and vacation pay
and, in the case of corporations under federal jurisdiction, termination and
severance pay if certain conditions are met.11678119

116 Obal, ed., ibid, at 71.
117 Ibid, at 71-73. See also Donley and Kent, “Directors”, supra note 99 at Appendix A.
118 Donley and Kent, ibid. See also Obal, ed., ibid, at 73-74.
119 Obal, ed., ibid, at 74-75.
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(k)

The health and safety of employees on the work-site pursuant to health
and safety regulations,

(l)

and,

The public interest in collection of taxes to fund government programs.
Directors may be liable for the corporation’s failure to remit to Canada
Revenue Agency employee payroll deductions for personal income tax
that is payable by the employee, the employee’s unemployment insurance
and Canada Pension Plan premiums, and any unpaid Goods and Services
Tax and, in respect of the provinces, any unpaid retail sales tax that is
collected by the corporation. 121
•

The following additional protections are afforded to consumers and the public in
general by way of personal liability on directors:
(a)

for deceptive marketing practices or improper packaging and label
•
122
practices;
• •

123

(b)

for advertising, selling, or importing a prohibited product;

(c)

for failing to properly handle dangerous goods.12013124

and,

Although not forming part of the analysis in this thesis, in addition to regulatory
protection, stakeholders also are afforded protection by way of personal liability against

120 Ibid at 76.
121 Ibid, at 76-78.
122 Donley and Kent, “Directors”, supra note 99 at Appendix A.
123 Ibid.
124

Ibid.
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directors at common law and in equity under doctrines such as negligent and fraudulent
misrepresentation, fraud, and deceit, and the principles that govern when a corporation’s
veil should be pierced. Thus, given the protection that is afforded to stakeholders under a
comprehensive regulatory regime, supplemented by common law and equity, it is
arguable that the rejection of the traditional shareholder primacy model in favour of a
pluralistic one, and thus the deviation from the maximization of corporate value principle,
was not warranted.
(D)

Summary
This chapter reviewed the conceptual and pragmatic arguments in the academic

debate between shareholder primacy and pluralism, as corporate decision-making
models. The conceptual debate does not produce a clear winner. Thus, I undertook a
pragmatic comparison of the effects of each model with a view to ascertaining whether
one model was preferable over the other based on pragmatic considerations.

The

conclusion of this chapter is that the pragmatic residual-claimants argument resolves the
debate in favour of the shareholder and creditor primacy models. This is because the
residual-claimants argument is based on the maximization-of-corporate-value principle,
and this principle is worthy of protection and promotion because of its more certain focus
on stimulating economic activity for the benefit of society as a whole under all
circumstances or, at a minimum, preserving economic value for as many classes of
economic interests as possible - i.e., “greatest good for the greatest number”. However,
this is not an absolute principle. It co-exists with an extensive state-imposed pluralistic
regulatory regime, supplemented by common law and equity, making it unnecessary to
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displace the maximization-of-corporate-value model with a more ambiguous pluralistic
one.
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CHAPTER 4
DELAWARE CORPORATE LAW
We have seen how the question of what it means for directors to act in the best
interests of the corporation has spawned a debate between two competing corporate
decision making models, being the shareholder primacy model and the pluralistic model.
We have seen how the shareholder primacy model was the generally accepted corporate
decision-making model in Canada prior to the Supreme Court of Canada in People’s
adopting a pluralistic decision-making model. Moreover, the shareholder primacy model,
with a shift to a creditor primacy model upon financial distress or insolvency, is the
accepted model in the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand.

This chapter

examines how Delaware treats the question of what it means for directors to act in the
best interests of the corporation.
Delaware is widely recognized as having one of the most advanced and flexible
business formation statutes in the United States. Furthermore, Delaware has a longserving specialized court, known as the Court of Chancery, for dealing with corporate
law matters.

Both of these factors draw to Delaware people that are looking to

incorporate. The volume of business incorporations invariably gives rise to an increased
number of corporate law disputes upon which the specialized Court of Chancery and the
Supreme Court, on appeal, adjudicate. This has resulted in a significant amount of
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corporate law jurisprudence and the Delaware courts being widely recognized as a
leading authority on corporate law.
The shareholder primacy model, shifting to a creditor primacy model in
circumstances of financial distress or insolvency, and the pluralistic decision-making
model have been described and explained in previous chapters. For ease of reference,
they may be summarized as follows.
(a)

The shareholder primacy model equates directors acting in the best

interests of the corporation with the economic interests of the residual riskbearers. Under this model, the primary duty of directors is to strive to maximize
corporate value from the perspective of the shareholders, except in cases of
financial distress or insolvency where it appears that the shareholders have lost
their investments.

When it appears that the shareholders have lost their

investments, the creditors replace the shareholders as the residual risk-bearers and
directors are required to act to maximize or preserve corporate value for them, so
as to protect their remaining economic investment.
(b)

The pluralistic model equates directors acting in the best interests of the

corporation with making a decision that considers and balances the interests of all
affected stakeholders. In other words, directors are to focus on making a decision
that is considered fair and reasonable in the circumstances, given its impact on all125

125 See online: State o f Delaware <http://www.corp.delaware.gov> and Delaware State Courts
<http://www.courts.delaware.gov/Courts/Court%20oP/o20Chancerv/> . Also, the Delaware courts are
described in Rotman, supra note 6 at 30, as being “readily acknowledged as the primary source o f domestic
corporate law” in the United States.
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affected stakeholders with an economic or social interest in the corporation, and
not a decision that is automatically driven by maximizing corporate value.
Like the Supreme Court of Canada in People’s and BCE, the Delaware courts
have considered what it means for directors to act in the best interests of the corporation
in the context of creditors complaining about the decisions of directors that are made in a
vicinity of insolvency

or an insolvency situation and in corporate takeover scenarios.

Two leading Delaware decisions were made in the context of creditors complaining about
decisions of directors that were made in insolvency of vicinity of insolvency situations.
They are the decision of the Court of Chancery in Production Resources Group, L.L.C. v.
NCT Group Inc.,

followed by the decision of the Delaware Supreme Court in North

American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation Inc. v. Rob Ghee-walla, Gerry
Cardinale and Jack Daly,

affirming the decision of the Court of Chancery at first

instance. A number of watershed decisions in Delaware have considered the role of
directors and what it means to act in the best interests of the corporation in a corporate
takeover scenario.

These are the decisions of the Delaware Supreme Court in the

“Revlon line [of cases]”.12617829

126 The Delaware courts use the phrase “zone o f insolvency”, whereas the Supreme Court o f Canada refers
to this state o f affairs as the “vicinity o f insolvency”. This state o f affairs also is referred to as “near
insolvency” or the “twilight zone”. It is more fully addressed in the next chapter. The Foreword and
Acknowledgement o f Directors in the Twilight Zone 11 (London: INSOL International, 2005) defines this
state o f affairs as being when a company runs into financial difficulty and the directors are not sure whether
a formal insolvency will follow.
127 Production Resources Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772 (Del. Ch. 2004) [Production
Resources].
128 North American Catholic, supra note 29.
129 This is how the Supreme Court o f Canada in BCE Inc., supra note 14 at para. 86 referred to the two
cases o f Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1985) [Revlon]
and Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1985) [Unocal].
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As we have seen, the Supreme Court of Canada rejected the traditional
shareholder and creditor primacy model, with its primary focus on achieving
maximization of corporate value, in the leading cases of People’s and BCE. In contrast,
the Delaware Court of Chancery and Supreme Court have continued to emphasize that
the primary duty of directors in acting in the best interests of the corporation is to strive
to maximize corporate value.
Production Resources was a decision of the Court of Chancery.

Production

Resources was both a plaintiff and a judgment creditor of the corporate defendant NCT,
which owed it $2 million. Production Resources was thwarted in its attempt to collect its
judgment debt. In this regard, it issued a complaint against the directors and the chief
financial officer of NCT for breach of fiduciary duty. The claim that the defendants
breached their fiduciary duties through generalized mismanagement was dismissed on the
basis that it was not supported by the facts that had been pleaded. However, the breach
of fiduciary duty claim was allowed to stand. The breach of fiduciary duty claim was
based on the allegation that the directors and chief financial officer of an insolvent NCT
had acted improperly in arranging financing terms and using the money advanced from
NCT’s primary secured creditor so as to prejudice the interests of Production Resources
as an unsecured judgment creditor. The court reasoned that these actions created “an
inference of faithless behaviour”.

Production Resources alleged:130

130 The decision resulted from a motion by the defendants to dismiss the plaintiffs complaint for failure to
state a claim for which relief could be granted.
131 Production Resources, supra note 127 at 777.
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a suspicious pattern of dealing that raises the legitimate concern
that the NCT board is not pursuing the best interests of NCT’s
creditors as a class with claims on a pool of insufficient assets, but
engaging in preferential treatment of the company’s primary
creditor and de facto controlling shareholder (and perhaps of its top
officers, who are also directors) without any legitimate basis for
•• 1
the favouritism.
The Court of Chancery concluded that the complaint alleged sufficient facts to
find the directors of NCT in breach of fiduciary duty. The Court of Chancery held that
the fiduciary duty was owed, however, to the corporation and not to the creditor.
Production Resources had argued that all breach of fiduciary duty claims become direct
claims against directors when the corporation enters the zone of insolvency or becomes
insolvent.

The directors of NCT argued that, at all times, such claims remained

derivative and had to be brought on behalf of the corporation for harm suffered by it. In
deciding that the fiduciary duty was owed to the corporation, the court noted that
“[t]ypically, creditors may not allege fiduciary duty claims against corporate
directors”.132133 The court added that, in a vicinity of insolvency or insolvency situation, the
fiduciary duties of the directors continued to be owed to the corporation but that
Delaware law recognized that an insolvency “necessarily affected the constituency on
whose behalf the directors” pursued their objective of maximizing the economic value of
the corporation.134 In other words, the Court of Chancery in Production Resources
endorsed the economic maximization of corporate value rationale behind the shareholder
primacy model, which in effect becomes a creditor primacy model as financial distress

132 Ibid, at 800.
133 Ibid, at 787.

m Ibid. at 790-791.
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eliminates the likelihood of providing an economic return to the shareholders on their
investments.
The Court of Chancery was not prepared to rule out completely that there might
be an exception to the rule that creditors’ claims for breach of fiduciary duty are to be
brought on behalf of the corporation and not directly against directors.

The court

contemplated that “there might possibly exist circumstances in which the directors
display such a marked degree of animus towards a particular creditor with proven
entitlement to payment that they expose themselves to a direct fiduciary duty claim by
that creditor”.135 This set the stage for the Delaware Supreme Court in North American
Catholic, on appeal from the Court of Chancery, to confirm that acting in the best
interests of the corporation gave rise to a duty on directors, under all circumstances, to
work towards maximizing corporate value and that, under all circumstances, the fiduciary
duty of directors is owed to the corporation and never to the creditors.136
Like Production Resources, the decision of the Supreme Court in North American
Catholic arose from a motion that had been brought by the defendant directors to dismiss
a complaint that the plaintiff North American Catholic had brought against them for
breach of fiduciary duty. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of
Chancery granting the motion and dismissing the complaint. The Supreme Court noted
that, unlike in Production Resources, the plaintiff North American Catholic did not
attempt to allege a derivative claim against the directors for breach of fiduciary duty

135 Ibid, at 798.
136 North American Catholic, supra note 29 at 103 and fn. 43.
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while the corporate debtor was in the vicinity of insolvency or insolvent and, thus, its
complaint failed as directors did not owe a fiduciary duty to creditors.
The Delaware Supreme Court in North American Catholic endorsed the Court of
Chancery’s viewpoint in Production Resources that a director’s primary duty in
managing the business and affairs of the corporation was to maximize corporate wealth.
This is the shareholder primacy model. The Supreme Court concluded,
When a corporation is solvent, [a director’s fiduciary duty to the
corporation] may be enforced by its shareholders, who have
standing to bring derivative actions on behalf of the corporation
because they are the ultimate beneficiaries of the corporation’s
growth and increased value. When a corporation is insolvent,
however, its creditors take the place of the shareholders as the
residual beneficiaries of any increase in value...
...The corporation’s insolvency “makes the creditors the principal
constituency injured by any fiduciary breaches that diminish the
firm’s value.”137138139
Later in its reasons for judgment, the Delaware Supreme Court noted that if
directors were to owe individual creditors a fiduciary duty, then this “would create a
conflict between [a director’s] duty to maximize the value of the insolvent corporation”
and “the newly recognized direct fiduciary duty to individual creditors”.

This conflict

between maximizing corporate wealth and giving priority to the interests of individual
creditors was to be avoided by restricting a director’s fiduciary duty to the corporation.
The Delaware Supreme Court has endorsed clearly a decision-making model that has

137 Ibid, at 102.
Ij8 Ibid, at 101-102 [emphasis in original]. The Court o f Chancery’s decision in Production Resources was
cited as authority for this quote.
139

Ibid, at 103.
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maximization of corporate value as its primary focus, being initially synonymous with
the economic interests of shareholders with a shift to the economic interests of creditors
as the corporation slips into insolvency.
Nonetheless, under Delaware law, there is room, but only the slightest amount of
room, for directors to consider the interests of stakeholders other than shareholders and
creditors. As the Court of Chancery wrote in Production Resources,
These realities, of course, do not mean that directors are required
to put aside any consideration of other constituencies, including
creditors, when deciding how to manage the firm. But it does mean
that directors - as fiduciaries in equity - are primarily focused on
generating economic returns that will exceed what is required to
pay the bills in order to deliver a return to the company’s
shareholders who provided equity capital and agreed to bear the
residual risk associated with the firm’s operations.140
By way of footnote to support the foregoing statement, the Court of Chancery cited the
Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Revlon 41 as authority for the proposition that “[a]
board can consider the interests of other constituencies if they are rationally related to
furthering the interests of shareholders”.142
The Court of Chancery in Production Resources made a point of further
restricting the role of pluralistic considerations in the law of corporate decision-making
by taking the opportunity to interpret narrowly its earlier decision in Credit Lyonnais,143

140 Production Resources, supra note 127 at 787.
141 Revlon, supra note 129.
142 Production Resources, supra note 127 at fn. 48.
143 Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., 1991 WL 277613 (Del. Ch.
Dec. 30, 1991).
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In Credit Lyonnais, the court had to consider a situation in which shareholders claimed
that directors had a duty to undertake a risky investment strategy for their benefit when
the corporation was in the “zone of insolvency” as long as the corporation did not
technically breach legal obligations. In Credit Lyonnais the Court of Chancery held that
directors did not have such a duty to the shareholders and that they could pursue a less
risky course of action where they believed, in good faith, that a riskier investment
strategy might render the company unable to meet its legal obligations to creditors and
others. In Production Resources, the Court of Chancery explained that:
(a)

Credit Lyonnais meant that directors had an obligation “to preserve, and,
if prudently possible, to maximize the corporation’s value to best satisfy
the legitimate claims of all its constituents, and not simply to pursue the
course of action the stockholders might favour as best for them”; and

(b)

its decision in Credit Lyonnais provided directors with a shield for
protection from demands of shareholders to pursue extreme risk at the
expense of the corporation’s economic well-being and did not provide a
sword to creditors or others with which they could attack directors.144

Clearly, in Credit Lyonnais, the downside risk of putting the company out of
business was too great and inconsistent with a director’s mandate “to preserve and if
prudently possible” to increase corporate wealth.

The emphasis and focus under

Delaware law is always on achieving an economic return for the shareholder and creditor
investors with statutory provisions and regulations, equity, and the common law filling in

144

Production Resources, supra note 127 at 787-789.
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to temper any side effects arising from the pursuit of this goal that are deemed to be
socially unacceptable. In other words, the Delaware courts define what it means to act in
the best interests of the corporation first and foremost in terms of maximization of
corporate value for shareholders and if their investment seems lost, then for creditors.
The Delaware Supreme Court again exhibited this emphasis on maximization of
corporate value under Delaware law in its March 2009 decision in Lyondell Chemical
Company v. Ryan.'45 That case involved director approval of a merger with another
chemical company.

In Lyondell, the court held that it was a proper exercise of a

director’s business judgment to adopt a “wait and see” approach to the market for the
corporation’s shares, as opposed to shopping them around, in response to a securities
filing by a third party disclosing its right to buy a block of shares, which signalled that the
company was “in play” — i.e., up for sale.145146 This course of conduct was ruled a
reasonable way to attempt to maximize corporate wealth. The business judgment rule
was invoked to protect the manner in which the directors decided to maximize corporate
wealth when faced with the threat of a corporate takeover.
Maximization of corporate value for shareholders, shifting to maximization of
corporate value for creditors when the investment of the shareholders appears to be lost,
is also the approach that is endorsed by the courts in Australia, New Zealand, and the
United Kingdom on what it means for directors to act in the best interests of the

145 Lyondell Chemical Company v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235 (Del. Sup. Ct. 2009).
146 Scott J. Davis, “United States: Delaware Supreme Court Provides Further Guidance on ‘Revlon’ Duties
and Duty o f Good Faith”, Case Comment (April 7, 2009), online: Mayer Brown LLP
<http://www.maverbrown.com>.
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corporation.147148 As noted in Chapter 3 above, at the trial level in People's, Justice
Greenberg applied the rationale of these commonwealth courts in adopting the concept of
a shareholder primacy model shifting to a creditor primacy model in an insolvency. This
was overturned by the Supreme Court of Canada.
The Canadian rejection of the shareholder primacy model, and its offspring the
creditor primacy model, in favour of pluralism as the governing decision-making rule is
best exemplified by the Supreme Court of Canada’s rejection of the “Revlon line” of
cases in BCE.US Revlon is considered to stand for the proposition that, in a corporate
takeover situation where the interests of shareholders conflict with the interests of
creditors, the interests of the shareholders should prevail. In BCE, the court was called
upon to decide whether BCE’s directors had acted properly in accepting a leveraged buy
out offer that increased share values but decreased bond values. The Supreme Court of
Canada rejected the Revlon proposition, by writing that “[tjhere is no principle that one
set of interests - for example the interests of shareholders - should prevail over another
set of interests. Everything depends on the particular situation faced by the directors and
whether, having regard to that situation, they exercised business judgment in a
responsible way.”149
Clearly, the Supreme Court of Canada did not want to restrict directors in
exercising their powers to act primarily with a view to maximizing corporate value. The

147 Ziegel, “Creditors as Corporate”, supra note 65.
148 BCE, supra note 14 at paras. 84-85.
149 Ibid, at para. 84. Ironically, the application o f pluralism to the situation at hand in BCE resulted in the
Supreme Court o f Canada upholding the directors’ acceptance o f the leveraged buy-out offer that favoured
shareholders over the creditor bondholders.
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Supreme Court of Canada wanted to give directors a broader pluralistic mandate.
However, given the lack of an explanation as to why this should be the case, other than to
rely on a questionable long-standing Canadian legal principle in support of pluralism
being the law in Canada,130 we are left to question whether there was good reason to
deviate from the approach that has been taken by the Delaware courts and other English
speaking common law jurisdictions.

These courts agree that a director’s primary

obligation is to act in the best interests of the corporation. However, the Supreme Court
of Canada differs on how to interpret what this means.

As the following Chapter

explains, it may not have been necessary for the Supreme Court to adopt a pluralistic
meaning of what it means to act in the best interests of the corporation given the statutory
oppression remedy.150

150 The claim that the Supreme Court o f Canada relied on a questionable long-standing Canadian legal
principle to support displacing the shareholder primacy model with a pluralistic one is examined in Chapter
6 below.
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CHAPTER 5
THE OPPRESSION REMEDY
(A)

Introduction
At the time of the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in People’s, there existed

a sufficient amount of pluralism in the decision making process protecting stakeholder
interests. This resulted from duties and liabilities imposed on directors by common law,
in equity, pursuant to an extensive regulatory network, and by virtue of corporate laws.
Included among the relevant corporate statutory provisions was the powerful and flexible
oppression remedy. This chapter argues that, insofar as creditors were concerned, being
the parties who sought relief in both People’s and BCE, the oppression remedy by itself
gave rise to a form of statutory pluralism protecting creditors’ interests. The oppression
remedy required the reasonable expectations of creditors to be regarded by directors in
their decision-making process. This, therefore, made it unnecessary for the Supreme
Court of Canada to define acting in the best interests of the corporation in a pluralistic
way so as to include creditors.
An oppression remedy provision is contained in the CBCA. All provinces, except
Prince Edward Island and Quebec, have similar statutory oppression remedy provisions
in provincial acts dealing with corporations.

The following are the relevant CBCA

provisions.
s.241(l) A complainant may apply to a court for an order under
this section.
(2) If, on an application under subsection (1), the court is satisfied
that in respect of a corporation or any of its affiliates (a) any act or
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omission of the corporation or any of its affiliates effects a result,
(b) the business or affairs of the corporation or any of its affiliates
are or have been carried on or conducted in a manner, or (c) the
powers of the directors of the corporation or any of its affiliates are
or have been exercised in a manner that is oppressive or unfairly
prejudicial to or that unfairly disregards the interests of any
security holder, creditor, director or officer, the court may make an
order to rectify the matters complained of.
(3) In connection with an application under this section, the court
may make any interim or final order it thinks fit including, without
limiting the generality of the foregoing,
...(j) an order compensating an aggrieved person...151
In People’s, and then in BCE, the court acknowledged that the oppression remedy
required directors to consider and balance the interests of the shareholders and creditors
in issue. However, instead of concluding that therefore it was not necessary to displace
the traditional shareholder primacy model with a pluralistic one, the court in BCE
incorporated principles from the law of oppression to further define the court’s pluralistic
meaning for acting in the best interests of the corporation. Thus, an examination of the
law of oppression is necessary to demonstrate that it gives rise to a pre-existing statutory
form of pluralism for shareholders and creditors. This examination will also assist in
understanding the nature and scope of the pluralistic definition that was developed by the
Supreme Court of Canada for the duty to act in the best interests of the corporation. This
is because oppression remedy principles were incorporated into that definition of acting
in the best interests of the corporation. An understanding of the meaning as developed by
the court for acting in the best interests of the corporation exposes the redundancy in the
concept developed by the Supreme Court of Canada.

151

CBCA, supra note 1 at s. 241(1), (2), and (3) [emphasis added].
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(B)

Statutory Pluralism
(I)

Recognized by the Supreme Court of Canada

In People’s, the Supreme Court of Canada envisioned an independent role for the
law of oppression in regulating the conduct of directors towards creditors in an
insolvency or deteriorating financial situation. The court said the following.
[i]f the stakeholders cannot avail themselves of the statutory
fiduciary duty (the duty of loyalty, supra) to sue the directors for
failing to take care of their interests, they have other means at their
disposal.
The fact that creditors’ interests increase in relevancy as the
corporation’s finances deteriorate is apt to be relevant to, inter alia,
the exercise of discretion by a court in granting standing to a party
as a “complainant”... to bring an oppression remedy claim...
Section 241 of the CBCA provides a possible mechanism for
creditors to protect their interests from the prejudicial conduct of
directors. In our view, the availability of such a broad oppression
remedy undermines any perceived need to extend the fiduciary
duty imposed on cdirectors
by Section 122(l)(a) of the CBCA to
'y
include creditors.
i

In reaching its conclusion that the existence of the oppression remedy was a factor
negating any need to equate acting in the best interests of the corporation with the
interests of creditors in an insolvency or situation of financial distress, the Supreme Court
of Canada cited with approval an essay by David Thomson.152153 In his essay, Thomson
theorized that, although Justice Greenberg’s trial decision in People’s (adopting a shifting
duty on directors in favour of creditors) marked in Canada an “interesting development in
152 SCC Peoples, supra note 16 at paras. 47, 49, 50, and 51.
153 David Thomson, “Directors, Creditors and Insolvency: A Fiduciary Duty or a Duty Not to Oppress?”
(2000), 58 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 31.
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the doctrine of fiduciary duty”, the practical effect of this development was redundant “as
[the] courts already allow creditors to access the oppression remedy in order to protect
themselves from conduct by directors that is prejudicial to or that disregards their
interests”.154 Thomson arrived at this conclusion after reviewing the cases giving rise to
duty-shifting in Great Britain, New Zealand, and Australia and noted that, in his view,
“there [did] not appear to be a qualitative difference between cases argued as a breach of
fiduciary duty and oppression cases”.155 In other words, the oppression remedy already
influenced directors to consider the interests of creditors and not to oppress, unfairly
prejudice, or unfairly disregard these interests in making corporate decisions.

A

pluralistic definition for what it means to act in the best interests of the corporation was
not required to accomplish this protection for creditors.
While the Supreme Court of Canada in People’s cited Thomson’s essay as
authority for the proposition that the oppression remedy was available to creditors to
protect themselves against directors exercising their powers in such a way as to oppress,
unfairly prejudice, or unfairly disregard their interests, the court did not otherwise engage
in a more detailed analysis of the law of oppression or, in particular, the application of
this law in the context of an insolvency or deteriorating financial situation.
In BCE, the Supreme Court of Canada endorsed a two-step approach to deciding
oppression remedy claims. The first step is a threshold test. It requires the court to ask
itself whether the evidence that has been adduced establishes the reasonable expectation
as asserted by the claimant. Upon passing the threshold test, the second step requires a
154 Ibid, at 51.
155 Ibid, at 47.
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further review of the evidence to determine whether the reasonable expectation that was
found to exist was violated by conduct falling within the terms “oppressive”, “unfairly
prejudicial”, or “unfairly disregard”.156
With respect to the first branch of the test for deciding oppression remedy claims,
the Supreme Court of Canada set out the following factors that are to be considered in
determining the existence of reasonable expectations that are to be protected:
general commercial practice; the nature of the corporation; the
relationship between the parties; past practice; steps the claimant
could have taken to protect itself; representations and agreements;
and the fair resolution of conflicting interests between corporate
stakeholders.157

These, then, are the factors that are to be applied in determining the reasonable
expectations of shareholders and creditors that are to be protected by directors in carrying
out their powers. In short, the oppression remedy gives rise to a statutory form of
pluralism requiring directors in their decision-making to consider and protect the
reasonable expectations of the shareholders and creditors in the circumstances. This
would include circumstances of financial distress and insolvency. The existence of a
statutory form of pluralism does not support displacing the traditional shareholder
primacy model with a pluralistic one. Rather, it demonstrates that adopting a pluralistic
definition for acting in the best interests of the corporation was not necessary, and
especially ill advised without examining the balance between the traditional shareholder

156 BCE, supra note 14 at paras. 56 and 68.
157 Ibid, at para. 72.
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primacy model and the law arising by virtue of statute, common law, and in equity for
protecting the plurality of stakeholder interests.
(II)

Defining “Complainant”

To what extent may a shareholder or creditor take advantage of the oppression
remedy?

Only a “complainant”158 qualifies to apply for judicial relief under the

oppression remedy. A complainant is statutorily defined as a current or former registered
holder of a security in a corporation, and security is defined to include a debt obligation, a
current or former director or officer, and any other “proper person” in the “discretion of
the court”.159 The statute is consistent in making security holders, both in the nature of
shareholders and creditors that are registered holders of debt obligations, directors, and
officers both complainants and intended victims.

However, not all creditors are

registered holders of corporate debt obligations, and, therefore, creditors such as trade
and judgment creditors are recognized as intended targets of oppression but not
necessarily as complainants. They first need to qualify as a “proper person”. When will
a corporate stakeholder, and in particular a creditor not registered as a holder of a
corporate debt obligation, qualify “in the discretion of the court” to be a “proper person”
and, thus, a “complainant”?
As stated in First Edmonton Place, an applicant will qualify as a complainant
...if the act or conduct of the directors or management of the
corporation which is complained of constituted a breach of the
underlying expectations of the applicant arising from the
158 CBCA, supra note 1 at s. 238.
159 Ibid, at ss. 2.(1) & 238.
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circumstances in which the applicant’s relationship with the
corporation arose.160
A corporate stakeholder will be a complainant in circumstances where it can be
said that the corporate stakeholder has a reasonable expectation that the company’s
affairs will be conducted with a view to protecting its reasonable expectations.1611623
A wrongfully dismissed employee turned judgment creditor was found to be a
complainant where a corporate reorganization had the effect of depriving him of
collecting on his judgment in Downtown Eatery (1993) Ltd. v. Ontario.
Hawkin, in USE Red Star v. 1220103 Ontario Ltd.,

Justice

decided that a creditor was not an

eligible complainant in circumstances where a creditor had brought an oppression action
against a director for unpaid cartage services on the basis that the company was insolvent
when it ordered the cartage services and the director was aware of this situation and yet
continued to order cartage services knowing that the company would not be able to pay
for such services. Justice Hawkin held,

160 First Edmonton Place Ltd. v. 315888 Alberta Ltd. (1988), 60 Alta. L.R. (2d) 122 (Q.B.) at 152, adj.
(1989), 71 Alta. L.R. (2d) 61 (C.A.).
161 Downtown Eatery (1993) Ltd. v. Ontario (2001), 54 O.R. (3d) 161 (C.A.) at paras. 56 and 62
[Downtown Eatery]. In Olympia & York Developments (Trustee of) v. Olympia & York Realty Corp.
(2001), 28 C.B.R. (4th) 294 (Ont. S.C.J.), a ffd (2003), 68 O.R. (3d) 544 (C.A.), Justice Farley, in granting
standing as a complainant to a trustee in bankruptcy for the corporation’s unsecured creditors, wrote at
para. 30:
While oppression cases should not be used by creditors to facilitate ordinary debt collections,
where there is superadded to the equation allegations/facts to support one o f the three claims o f
either (a) "oppression", (b) "unfairly prejudicial" or (c) "unfairly disregards", then creditors have
been permitted to be complainants pursuant to s. 245(c) as a "proper person".
162 Downtown Eatery, ibid.
163 USF Red Star v. 1220103 Ontario Ltd. (2001), 13 B.L.R. (3d) 295 (Ont. S.C.J.) [USF Red Star].
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...directors of a company may, with impunity, cause the company
to order goods and services which they have no objective reason to
believe the company can pay for in the absence of a preference or
fraudulent activities which impair the company’s ability to meet its
obligations. As Farley J. said [at page 4 of Royal Trust Corp. o f
Canada v. Hordo, [1993] O.J. No. 1560 (Ont. Gen. Div.
Commercial List)], “It does not seem to me that debt actions
should be routinely turned into oppression actions.”164165
However, the Supreme Court of Canada cast doubt on the correctness of Justice
Hawkin’s conclusion by its acknowledgement in People’s that:
creditors’ interests increase in relevancy as the corporation’s
finances deteriorate is apt to be relevant to, inter alia, the exercise
of discretion by a court in granting standing to a party as a
“complainant”... to bring an oppression remedy claim.1 5
Therefore, unsecured creditors have reasonable expectations that directors will not order
goods and services in circumstances where it is unlikely that the corporation will be able
to pay for such goods and services. Further, such conduct arguably falls outside the
scope of risk of non-payment that is assumed by unsecured suppliers in entering into
trade relations with the company.
Asset-stripping cases, in which contingent creditors have been given status as
complainants (such as in Downtown Eatery166167), cast further doubt on the correctness of
Justice Hawkin’s conclusion in USF Red Star.
Manufacturer’s Life Insurance Co. v. AFG Industries

Justice Pattillo’s decision in
i

cn

% t

was one such asset-stripping

164 Ibid, at para. 30.
165 SCC Peoples, supra note 16 at para. 49.
166 Downtown Eatery, supra note 161.
167 Manufacturer’s Life Insurance Co. v. AFG Industries (2008), 44 B.L.R. (4th) 277 (Ont. S.C.J.).
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case. Justice Pattillo was called upon, among other things, to consider a motion by the
parent company defendant to strike an oppression claim that had been brought against it
on the basis that the plaintiff could not qualify as a complainant in the circumstances as
pleaded. The plaintiff had advanced a claim for recovery of environmental remediation
costs against a subsidiary and a claim for an oppression remedy against the parent
company on the basis that the parent company had caused the subsidiary to divest itself
of all of its assets, thereby precluding recovery of any judgment for environmental
damage that was awarded against the subsidiary. Justice Pattillo noted a series of cases in
which asset-stripping in the face of a claim would allow a contingent creditor to qualify
as a complainant. Justice Pattillo concluded that it was not. “plain and obvious” on the
motion to strike that, at trial, the plaintiff would not be found to be a complainant.
Therefore, the oppression claim was allowed to proceed to trial.
In 1413910 Ontario Inc. (c.o.b. as Bulls Eye Steakhouse and Grill) v.
McLennan,168169 which was another asset-stripping case, Justice Campbell held that a tenant
was a complainant. The tenant obtained partial summary judgment against its landlord
and, before damages could be assessed, the landlord sold its plaza, being its only asset,
and used the net proceeds to pay amounts owing to its sole shareholder. Justice Campbell
awarded judgment against the shareholder in favour of the tenant. In so doing, Justice
Campbell accepted the notion that a contingent creditor cannot reasonably expect that a
defendant corporation will be operated simply for the contingent creditor’s benefit in the

168 Ibid, at paras. 30-32.
169 1413910 Ontario Inc. (c.o.b. Bulls Eye Steakhouse & Grill) v. McLennan (2008), 53 B.L.R. (4th) 115
(Ont. S.C.J.), additional reasons (2008), 53 B.L.R. (4,h) 125 (Ont. S.C.J.), a ff d (2009), 309 D.L.R. (4th) 756
(Ont. C.A.) [Bulls Eye Steakhouse].
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event that it becomes a judgment creditor. Justice Campbell concluded that there must be
facts in existence that create some form of holding out by the defendant that the claim can
be satisfied, so as to create a reasonable expectation. In Bulls Eye Steakhouse, such a
reasonable expectation had been created because, previously, the contingent creditor had
brought an unsuccessful motion to appoint a receiver.

On that motion, responding

affidavits had been filed and cross-examinations on affidavits had taken place, thereby
giving rise to a reasonable expectation that, after the close of the pending sale of the
plaza, sufficient funds would be held in the event of judgment being awarded.17017
(Ill)

Defining Oppressive Conduct

In order to avail themselves of the oppression remedy, shareholders and creditors
will need to satisfy the second branch of the test upon qualifying as a complaint and the
court accepting the reasonable expectation asserted by the complainant. What does it
mean for directors to act in such a way as to violate the reasonable expectations of
shareholders or creditors, being the second branch of the oppression remedy test that was
established in BCE1

The law arising under the oppression remedy was thoroughly

analysed and summarized by the Manitoba Court of Appeal in Danylchuk v. Wolinsky

171

in the context of an oppression remedy claim by shareholder creditors against shareholder
directors. The Manitoba Court of Appeal cited with approval the following definitions of
the elements of the oppression remedy.
“Oppressive” has been defined as “burdensome, harsh and
wrongful.” As to “unfairly prejudicial”, “unfair” has been taken to
170 Ibid, at paras. 39-45.
171 Danylchuk v. Wolinsky (2007), 287 D.L.R. (4th) 646 (Man. C.A.) [Danylchuk],
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mean inequitable or unjust and “prejudicial” as detrimental or
damaging to the applicant’s right or interests. “Unfairly disregard”
has been treated as meaning to unjustly or without cause pay no
attention to or treat as of no importance the interests of
172
A
complainants.
The Manitoba Court of Appeal also adopted the statements of Hamilton J.A. in
Cohen v. Jonco Holdings Ltd.}13 citing with approval the analysis of John Campion,
Stephanie A. Brown, and Alistair H. Crawley,174 that “unfairly prejudicial” looks at the
effect of the conduct (that is, whether the result was unfair) and “unfairly disregards”
looks at whether the process was unfair.173
A further principle to be highlighted with respect to the oppression remedy is that
“evidence of bad faith or want of probity in the action complained of is unnecessary” to
qualify for judicial relief.176 Upon finding “oppression”, the court may make any order
that it thinks fit to remedy the conduct about which a complaint has been made.
regard, the oppression remedy is “a remedy of maximum discretion”.

In this

Lastly, it is

worthy to note that the statutory oppression remedy under the Ontario Business17234568

172 Ibid, at para. 22 citing with approval Justice Hunt in Novel Energy (North America) Ltd. v. Glowicki
(1994), 148 A.R. 161 (Q.B.).
173 Cohen v. Jonco Holdings Ltd. (2005), 192 Man. R. (2d) 252 (C.A.).
174 John Campion, Stephanie A. Brown, and Alistair H. Crawley, “The Oppression Remedy: Reasonable
Expectations o f Shareholders” [1995] Special Lectures, LSUC Law and Remedies 229.
175 Danylchuk, supra note 171 at para. 22
176 Thomson, supra note 153 citing Brant Investments Ltd. v. Keep Right Inc. (1991), 3 O.R. (3d) 289
(C.A.); Sidaplex - Plastic Suppliers Inc. v. Ella Group Inc. (1998), 40 O.R. (3d) 563 (C.A.) [Sidaplex], and
Downtown Eatery, supra note 161.
177 Danylchuk, supra note 171 at para. 45.
178 Hon. James Farley, Q.C., Roger J. Chouinard and Nicholas Daube, “Expectations Of Fairness: The State
o f the Oppression Remedy in Canada Today” (2007), 33 Advocates’ Quarterly 261 at 262.
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Corporations Act may be more expansive than the statutory oppression remedies in other
provincial corporations statutes, and in the CBCA, in that it provides protection against
any act or omission that “threatens to effect a result... that is oppressive or unfairly
prejudicial or that unfairly disregards the interests” of eligible complainants.179180
Therefore, the statutory oppression remedy under the Ontario Business Corporations Act
may be used to address anticipatory oppression.
(IV)

Personal Liability of Directors For Oppressing Shareholders and Creditors
Directors need only look at the abundance of jurisprudence arising from judicial

decisions to appreciate that they are exposed to a real and onerous risk of personal
liability under the oppression remedy.

The threat of personal liability, and the

assumption that directors will conduct themselves so as to avoid it, influences directors to
honour reasonable expectations. Thus, the effectiveness of this intended consequence
will depend on the level and nature of a director’s personal liability for breaching the
duty. To illustrate that the oppression remedy does give rise to a real and onerous risk of
personal liability being imposed by the courts on directors for breaching reasonable
expectations, the following four judicial decisions are offered as representative case
studies.
In Remo Valente Real Estate (1998) Ltd. v. Portofino Riverside Tower Inc.,

180

a

case dealing with a corporate reorganization for the purpose of defeating an exclusive
listing agreement for the sale of condominiums, Justice Brockenshire held that the

179 Ibid, at 268 [emphasis added]. See also Business Corporations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. B. 19, s. 248.
180 Remo Valente Real Estate (1998) Ltd. v. Portofino Riverside Tower Inc. (2007), 86 O.R. (3d) 667
(S.C.J.).
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directors’ conduct was “oppressive” and awarded $1 million in damages against the
directors personally in favour of the creditor realtor. In Prime Computer o f Canada Ltd.
v. Jeffrey,181 a case in which a director awarded himself a significant salary increase in
the face of a judgment debt against the corporation and corporate cash flow problems,
Justice Smith held that the director’s conduct was oppressive and ordered the director to
pay to the sheriff $79,700 to the credit of the plaintiff, representing the unwarranted
increase in salary.
In Danylchuk,

the Manitoba Court of Appeal considered a case of directors,

who were also shareholders, using companies as their personal bank accounts and making
unauthorized payments of personal expenses or expenses that had no corporate purpose to
the prejudice of other shareholders, who were also creditors that had advanced loans to
the companies. The court upheld the application judge’s finding of “oppression” and the
monetary award against the director respondents personally in the amount of $875,000,
being one-half of the shareholder loans owing to the applicants. Only one-half of the
shareholder loans were ordered to be repaid, as the judge was of the view that the
applicants may have lost their investment in any event, even without the oppressive
conduct that was the subject of the complaint.
In Sidaplex-Plastics Supplies Inc. v. Elta Group Inc.,

the Ontario Court of

Appeal dealt with an appeal from the decision of Justice Blair of the General DivisionCommercial List, which, in part, held a director personally liable to a judgment creditor182
181 Prime Computer o f Canada Ltd. v. Jeffrey { 1991), 6 O.R. (3d) 733 (Gen. Div.).
182 Danylchuk, supra note 171.
i8j Sidaplex,

supra note 176.
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under the oppression remedy. In this case, Sidaplex-Plastics Supplies Inc. (“Sidaplex”)
had a consent judgment against Elta Group Inc. (“Elta”) and the parties agreed that the
judgment would not be enforced pending the determination of other issues that were in
dispute between them. As security for the consent judgment, Elta provided Sidaplex with
a letter of credit. Inadvertently, the letter of credit was made for a fixed term and was not
renewed upon expiration.

Elta sold off substantially all of its assets to pay other

creditors, leaving Sidaplex unable to collect its judgment when the time came, as the
letter of credit had expired and Elta had no assets. Sidaplex brought an application for an
oppression remedy against the director of Elta, seeking judgment against him in the
amount of the outstanding judgment against Elta.
Justice Blair held that the director’s failure to renew the letter of credit was an
omission that attracted liability under the oppression remedy in that it was unfairly
prejudicial to the interests of the judgment creditor, Sidaplex, and ordered the director of
Elta to pay to Sidaplex the sum of $97,076.36, being the amount of the judgment debt
against Elta that should have been secured by the letter of credit.

In coming to his

decision, Justice Blair found that the director of Elta had received a personal benefit in
selling off all of the assets of Elta and paying other creditors, as this resulted in the
release of his personal guarantee of certain of Elta’s obligations. This personal benefit
was derived by the director of Elta as a result of his omission in failing to renew the letter
of credit and selling the assets of Elta to the prejudice of Sidaplex. It was, or ought to
have been, immaterial, as the Ontario Court of Appeal, in upholding Justice Blair’s
decision to impose personal liability on the director, made a point of emphasizing that, in
184 Ibid, at para. 3.
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order to obtain an oppression remedy, it was not necessary to prove bad faith or want of
probity.185186
It is difficult to overturn on appeal a finding of personal liability against a director
under the oppression remedy. The Ontario Court of Appeal acknowledged its limited
power of review on appeals of oppression remedy cases, as, under the oppression remedy,
the court at first instance may make any order that “it thinks fit”, thereby giving the court
“at first instance a broad discretion and the appellate court a limited power of review”.
Thus, directors not only face a real risk of personal liability but also one that will be
difficult to overturn on appeal.
In Sidaplex, the Ontario Court of Appeal cited with approval the following
reasons for decision of Justice Blair, in which Justice Blair imposed personal liability on
the directors.
Courts have made orders against directors personally, in
oppression remedy cases... These cases, in particular, have
involved small, closely held corporations, where the director
whose conduct was attacked has been the sole controlling owner of
the corporation and its sole and directing mind; and where the
conduct in question has redounded directly to the benefit of that
person...
Lawyers and judges tend to worry and fuss a great deal about
whether or not a given set of circumstances permits the piercing of
the “corporate veil”... [T]he issue, in my view, is not so much one
of piercing the corporate veil as it is a question of the overall
application of s. 248(2) of the OBCA and the interplay between its
various provisions...

185 Ibid, at para. 4.
186 Ibid, at para. 4.
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When the power of the director is exercised in a fashion which
causes an act or omission of the corporation which effects an
unfairly prejudicial result, or a result which unfairly disregards the
interests of the complainant - or which causes the business or
affairs of the corporation to be conducted in a manner which has
the same effect - those powers themselves have been “exercised in
a manner” which is caught by the section, in my opinion. Liability
therefore lies directly with the director, under the section, in
appropriate cases.187
The Court of Appeal could find no “error in principle” in these words. There is a
real and effective risk of personal liability that is imposed on directors via the oppression
remedy. This is made clear in the foregoing four representative case studies and by the
asset-stripping cases that were reviewed earlier in this chapter.
(V)

Requirement for Culpable Conduct Needed to Support Personal Liability
In the above oppression remedy cases involving director liability, there appears to

have been some element of personal gain, preferential treatment, or bad faith in respect of
the conduct of the director under review. Therefore, it would appear, based on these
cases, that courts are somewhat reluctant to impose personal liability on directors in
favour of creditors without the existence of one of these elements, notwithstanding clear
judicial pronouncements that it is not necessary to prove bad faith or lack of probity as an
element of an oppression remedy claim.
The fact that the directors in USF Red Star ordered cartage services knowing that
the company could not pay for them arguably constitutes conduct that falls within the
realm of bad faith or want of probity. Thus, the trend in judicial decisions of imposing
liability on directors for conduct of this nature makes it arguable that personal liability
187 Ibid, at paras. 3-4.
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should have been imposed on the directors for oppressive conduct in USF Red Star.
Although Justice Hawkin interpreted the conduct of the directors differently, he did
nonetheless recognize what appears to be a judicial trend requiring some element of
personal gain, preferential treatment, or bad faith or want of probity on the part of
directors for personal liability to attach for oppressive conduct, again notwithstanding
judicial pronouncements that such elements are not required to prove oppression. In
particular, Justice Hawkin cited with approval the following passage from the Ontario
Court of Appeal in Montreal Trust Co. o f Canada v. ScotiaMcLeod Inc.
The decided cases in which employees and officers of companies
have been found personally liable for actions ostensibly carried out
under a corporate name are fact-specific. In the absence of findings
of fraud, deceit, dishonesty or want of authority on the part of
employees or officers they are also rare.
Considering that a corporation is an inanimate piece of legal
machinery incapable of thought or action, the court can only
determine its legal liability by assessing the conduct of those who
caused the company to act in the way that it did. This does not
mean, however, that if the actions of the directing minds are found
wanting, that personal liability will flow through the corporation to
those who caused it to act as it did. To hold the directors of
Peoples personally liable, there must be some activity on their part
that takes them out of the role of directing minds of the
corporation. In this case there are no such allegations.
I OQ

When courts are asked to impose personal liability on directors under the
oppression remedy, they are not “piercing the corporate veil”. Rather, the court is being
asked to use its statutory discretionary power to remedy the situation under examination
by imposing personal liability on directors. Nonetheless, the effect on directors is the189

188 Montreal Trust Co. o f Canada v. ScotiaMcLeod Inc. (1995), 26 O.R. (3d) 481 (C.A.) at 490-491.
189 USF Red Star, supra note 163 at para. 21.

94

same whether resulting from statutory liability or the court’s exercise of its inherent
jurisdiction to “pierce the corporate veil”. In either case, the court is being asked, and is
given the power, to look past the separate legal personality of the corporation and grant
relief personally against the directors. Regardless of the legal concept that is employed to
attack directors personally, it appears that the courts require some form of behaviour on
the part of directors that justifies imposing personal liability on them for corporate
conduct.

For example, in Alvi v. Misir,m Justice Cameron had to consider the

circumstances in which directors will be held to owe a fiduciary duty or duty of care to
someone other than the corporation and, thus, have personal liability. Justice Cameron
explained the circumstances under which directors will have personal liability as follows.
1. participation in tortious conduct towards persons who have not
accepted the principle of limited liability or have not
knowingly elected to deal with a corporation...and
2. fraud, dishonesty, want of authority or other conduct
specifically pleaded which justifies piercing the corporate veil,
the corporate veil is a sham or where the conduct exhibits a
separate identity of interest from the bona fide interests of the
■
191
corporation...
The law, therefore, is unclear whether claims by shareholders and creditors
against directors for personal liability due to oppressive conduct require proof of personal
gain, preferential treatment, or bad faith or want of probity. On the one hand, judicial
pronouncements defining the elements of oppression say that such conduct is not an
element of oppression. On the other hand, when examining the cases in which personal
liability for oppressive conduct has attached to directors, and in particular the facts of190
190 Alvi v. Misir (2004), 73 O.R. (3d) 566 (S.C.J.) [Alvi].
191 Ibid, at para. 52.
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these cases, there seems to be a judicial trend of requiring some form of conduct that the
court considers to be culpable and worthy of attracting personal liability for oppressive
conduct. As Justice Farley cautioned, in applying the oppression remedy, “the surgery
should be done with a scalpel and not a battle axe ... even if the past conduct of the
oppressor were found to be scandalous”.

1

In cases where directors are protected by liability insurance, it can be assumed
that directors will nonetheless still attempt to conduct themselves within the parameters
of the law and, in particular, the law of oppression for the following five reasons. First,
acting within the law is the commercially moral way to act. Second, directors will want
to avoid the increased premiums and deductibles that will have to be paid by the
corporation and that go along with claims that are made against directors.

Third,

insurance coverage is not necessarily an absolute shield protecting against wrongful
conduct.192193 Fourth, directors will not want to risk failing to qualify for liability insurance
coverage upon renewal of the policy as a result of too many claims having been made.
Lastly, claims against directors may give rise to criticism with respect to the performance
of their duties and responsibilities, which ultimately may lead to their replacement as
directors.

192 Farley, Chouinard, and Daube, supra note 178 at 272.
193 For general discussion o f the nature and scope o f directors’ and officers’ liability insurance in Canada,
see Donley and Kent, supra note 99.
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(C)

Influence of the Oppression Remedy on Pluralistic Concept for Acting in
Best Interests of Corporation
Given the nature and scope of the statutory oppression remedy, it is arguable that

it was not necessary to replace the traditional shareholder primacy model with a
pluralistic one in order to require directors to consider and fairly balance the interests of
shareholders and creditors in defining what it means to act in the best interests of the
corporation. Even so, that is exactly what the Supreme Court of Canada did in People’s
and, thereafter, in BCE. Furthermore, in BCE, the Supreme Court of Canada elaborated
on the pluralistic concept of best interests of the corporation by incorporating therein
oppression remedy principles.
The Supreme Court of Canada in BCE reiterated its remarks in People’s by saying
that, “although directors must consider the best interests of the corporation, it also may be
appropriate, although not mandatory, to consider the impact of the corporation’s
decisions on shareholders or particular groups of stakeholders”.194 Thus, the Supreme
Court of Canada repeated that the pluralistic decision-making model was permissive, in
that directors “may” consider the interests of stakeholders. However, using oppression
law principles, the court seems to have gone on to create a mandatory form of the
pluralistic decision-making model.
In particular, the Supreme Court of Canada, in BCE, added an element to the
pluralistic definition of what it means to act in the best interests of the corporation: a
positive requirement to treat equitably and fairly all stakeholders who are affected by the

194 BCE, supra note 14 at para. 39.
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decision because, according to the court, that is what they are entitled to reasonably
expect. The court wrote that,
...the corporation and shareholders are entitled to maximize profit
and share value, to be sure, but not by treating individual
stakeholders unfairly. That treatment - the central theme running
through the oppression jurisprudence - is most fundamentally what
stakeholders are entitled to ‘reasonably expect’.195
Thus, directors have been directed by the court to treat all stakeholders equitably
and fairly in the corporate decision-making process so as to honour their reasonable
expectation to be treated as such.

From a practical perspective, this can only be

accomplished by directors seeking out and determining which stakeholders may be
affected by the contemplated corporate transaction and then ensuring that the various
interests in this constituency are treated fairly and equitably.
Shareholders and creditors are the two main corporate stakeholders.

The

oppression remedy gives rise to a powerful influence on directors to honour the
reasonable expectations of these two corporate stakeholders by threat of personal
liability. A subsequent pluralistic decision-making model for what it means to act in the
best interests of the corporation does not give rise to any additional reason for directors to
consider the reasonable interests of shareholders and creditors in the corporate decision
making process. The pluralistic decision-making model is redundant as far as
shareholders and creditors are concerned.

Moreover, it displaced the traditional

shareholder primacy model without any examination as to the rationale behind it and
whether and to what extent this rationale should be disturbed to provide further

195 Ibid, at para. 64.
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protection, over and above existing laws arising by statute, common law, and in equity,
for protection of stakeholder interests.
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CHAPTER 6
A STATEMENT OF THE LAW ARISING FROM P E O P L E ’S
(A)

Introduction
The starting point in the in Canada for examining the statutory duties of directors

in an insolvency or situation of financial distress is the decision of the Supreme Court of
Canada in People’s. The issue in People’s was the decision of the corporation’s directors
to implement a joint inventory procurement policy between People’s and its parent
company Wise. This policy saw People’s making all inventory purchases from North
American suppliers for both People’s and Wise, and Wise, in turn, making all purchases
from overseas suppliers for the two companies. People’s would then sell to Wise and
charge Wise accordingly and vice versa. This arrangement was more favourable to Wise
than to People’s in that eighty-two per cent of total inventory that was purchased came
from North American suppliers, resulting in a significant trade receivable owing from
Wise to People’s. The policy was implemented on February 1, 1994 and, by April 30,
1994, Wise owed People’s fourteen million dollars under the policy. Marks & Spencer
had sold People’s to Wise and had financed the purchase price with security over
People’s assets.

The purchase price financing terms contained certain financial

covenants, including a prohibition against People’s providing financial assistance to
Wise. Marks & Spencer took the position that People’s financing of inventory for Wise
under the policy breached the purchase price financing terms and, thus, it demanded that
the policy be rescinded.
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By December 1994, Marks & Spencer initiated bankruptcy proceedings against
both People’s and Wise and both became bankrupt. The sale of the assets of People’s
and Wise raised sufficient money to pay the secured creditors and the landlords’ claims.
The balance of creditors with unsatisfied claims were unsecured creditors.

They

consisted substantially of trade creditors. The receivable that was owing from Wise to
People’s was not collectible, to the prejudice of People’s unsecured creditors. The trustee
in bankruptcy for the unsecured creditors of People’s took issue with the actions of its
directors in deciding upon and implementing a policy that provided financial assistance to
a related company to the detriment of People’s and its creditors.
It was in the context of the foregoing facts that the Supreme Court of Canada
examined the statutory fiduciary duty and duty of care imposed on directors, and the
effect of the oppression remedy on the conduct of directors, arising under the CBCA.196
The statutory fiduciary duty requires directors to act in the best interests of the
corporation. The statutory duty of care requires directors to exercise the care, diligence,
and skill of a reasonably prudent director in comparable circumstances. The oppression
remedy imposes personal liability on directors for conduct that is oppressive of, among
others, shareholders and creditors or that is unfairly prejudicial to or that unfairly
disregards their interests.
196 These are known as the fiduciary duty, the duty o f care, and the oppression remedy. The first two o f
these duties are found in s. 122(l)(a) and (b) o f the CBCA, supra note 1. This section imposes on “[e]very
director and officer o f a corporation in exercising their powers and discharging their duties [to] (a) act
honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests o f the corporation; and (b) exercise the care,
diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would exercise in comparable circumstances”. The
oppression remedy was discussed in Chapter 5 above. The oppression remedy arises under s. 241(1),(2),
and (3) o f the CBCA, supra note 1. In short, it requires directors and officers not to exercise their powers
“in a manner that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to or that unfairly disregards the interests o f any”
shareholder or creditor. The provincial corporations statutes contain similar statutory duties and an
oppression remedy.
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The trustee in bankruptcy commenced the action for the unsecured creditors of
People’s as a result of alleged breaches of the statutory fiduciary duty and duty of care
under the CBCA. The trustee in bankruptcy’s position was that these duties were owed
by the directors to the unsecured creditors and had been breached.197 The Supreme Court
of Canada held that the fiduciary duty was owed only to the corporation, not to the
creditors, and that, while the duty of care might be owed to the creditors, it had not been
breached. Although the trustee did not include an oppression remedy claim on behalf of
the unsecured creditors against the directors, the Supreme Court nonetheless felt it
necessary to point out that it was open to creditors to pursue directors under the
oppression remedy and, thus, they were not left without a remedy by restricting the
fiduciary duty to the corporation.198 Based on the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in
People’s, directors owe a statutory fiduciary duty to the corporation, a statutory duty of
care to the corporation and potentially its stakeholders,199 both giving rise to personal
liability if breached, and directors will be held personally liable if their conduct oppresses
the corporation’s shareholders and creditors by disregarding their reasonable
197 SCC People's, supra note 16 at para. 30.
198 Ibid, at paras. 51-57. Even though the fiduciary duty is owed to the corporation, it may nonetheless be
enforced by creditors by way o f derivative claim on behalf o f the corporation, thereby recovering for the
corporation any loss or damages suffered by it in which the creditors would be entitled to share.
199 While this paper does not concern itself with the statutory duty o f care, it is important to note that the
statutory duty o f care does not give rise to a cause o f action by stakeholders against directors. The cause of
action arises under the common law tort o f negligence. The existence o f the statutory duty o f care may be
taken into account by the court in determining the standard o f behaviour that should be reasonably
expected. Furthermore, the law as to whether directors owe a common law duty o f care to creditors
remains to be determined. That will depend on the application o f the two-part test for determining whether
a duty o f care arises. This two-part test is firstly based on foreseeability and sufficient proximity, which
will give rise to a duty o f care. However, the second part o f the test requires an examination o f whether
there may be public policy reasons for not allowing the duty o f care to stand. In the case o f a potential duty
o f care to creditors, relevant policy reasons negating the existence o f any duty may be the potential for
indeterminate personal liability o f directors and conflicting duties to the corporation and creditors for a
director to discharge. See: Festival Hall Developments Ltd. v. Michael Wilkngs (2009), 57 B.L.R. 210
(Ont. S.C.J.).
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expectations.

Given the Supreme Court of Canada’s pluralistic interpretation of the

statutory fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the corporation, all three of
foregoing concepts under Canadian law are pluralistic in nature. This has resulted in the
marginalization of the maximization of corporate value principle, being the rationale
behind the shareholder primacy interpretation of acting in the best interests of the
corporation. This increase in the level of pluralism in corporate decision-making was
done at the expense of the maximization of corporate value principle without any costbenefit analysis.
(B)

The Potential Conflict of Interest Raised by P e o p le ’s
The Supreme Court’s decision in People’s exposed a potential conflict of interest

for directors between the interests of the corporation and stakeholders.

Under the

statutory fiduciary duty and duty of care, directors owe simultaneous duties to the
corporation and potentially to its stakeholders, such as its shareholders and creditors.
This would put directors in a conflict of interest situation if they had to choose between
the competing interests of the corporation and stakeholders. Under the oppression
remedy, an onus is placed on directors to honour the reasonable expectations of
shareholders and creditors. At the same time, directors have a duty to act in the best
interests of the corporation. Again, directors would be put in a conflict of interest
situation if the reasonable expectations of shareholders and creditors were not consistent
with the best interests of the corporation. An insolvency or deteriorating financial
situation would be an obvious scenario giving rise to a potential conflict of interest for
directors. The dilemma raised for directors is whose interests should they be looking to
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favour as between the corporation, shareholders, and creditors when not all economic
interests can be fully satisfied?
Justice Cameron noted this conflict in Alvi v. Misir,200201 a case in which the
shareholders commenced proceedings against the directors for, among other things,
negligence and breach of fiduciary duty. Alvi was decided after the Supreme Court of
Canada’s decision in People’s. In dismissing the claim of the shareholders against the
directors, the court held the following.
[i]n view of the fact that the statutory duties of good faith, loyalty
and care are owed to the corporation, the directors cannot have
separate duties of the same nature owing to the shareholders. Such
parallel duties would create untenable and unrealistic conflicts.
They would render impossible the position of a director or officer
of a corporation, particularly where the corporation is faced with
adverse economic circumstances...
The same reasoning must apply to any claim based on fiduciary
duty in equity. Such a duty overlaps substantially the statutory
duty to the corporation to act honestly and in good faith and in the
best interests of the corporation.
In Alvi, the court concluded that a director’s duty to the corporation is paramount
in the event of conflict with a director’s duty to shareholders. Subsequently, in BCE, the
Supreme Court of Canada extended the paramountcy of a director’s duty to the
corporation over any duty owed to stakeholders.
The Supreme Court of Canada took the opportunity in BCE to make it clear that
any conflict between a director’s duty to act in the best interests of the corporation and a

200 Alvi, supra note 190.
201 Ibid, at paras. 57-58.
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director’s intention to honour reasonable expectations of shareholders and creditors under
the oppression remedy, was to be settled in favour of the corporation. The court wrote
the following.
The fact that the conduct of the directors is often at the centre of
oppression actions might seem to suggest that directors are under a
direct duty to individual stakeholders who may be effected by a
corporate decision ... People sometimes speak in terms of directors
owing a duty to both the corporation and to stakeholders. Usually
this is harmless, since the reasonable expectations of the
stakeholders in a particular outcome often coincide with what is in
the best interests of the corporation. However, cases (such as these
appeals) may arise where these interests do not coincide. In such
cases it is important to be clear that the directors owe their duty to
the corporation, not to stakeholders, and that the reasonable
expectation of stakeholders is simply that the directors act in the
best interests of the corporation...viewed as a good corporate
citizen.202
Given this pronouncement, directors will be excused from acting oppressively
against shareholders and creditors, under the oppression remedy, if their actions are in the
best interests of the corporation.

While the Supreme Court of Canada’s foregoing

remarks were made in the context of an analysis of a potential conflict between a
director’s duty to act in the best interests of the corporation and a director’s desire not to
oppress, unfairly prejudice, or unfairly disregard the interests of creditors under the
oppression remedy, the remarks would apply to any conflict between a director’s duty to
the corporation and a director’s duty or inclination to protect the interests of third parties
as, after all, the Supreme Court of Canada leaves no question but that the duty to the
corporation to act in its best interests is to be paramount.

202

BCE, supra note 14 at paras. 66 and 81.
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(C)

What Does it Mean for Directors to Act in the Best Interests of the
Corporation? A Pluralistic Corporate Decision-Making Model
The Supreme Court of Canada in People’s used these words to describe the nature

and scope of a director’s paramount duty to act in the best interests of the corporation.
We accept as an accurate statement of law that in determining
whether (directors) are acting with a view to the best interests of
the corporation it may be legitimate, given all the circumstances of
the case, for the board of directors to consider, inter alia, the
interests of the shareholders, employees, suppliers, creditors,
consumers, governments and the environment.
The various shifts in interests that naturally occur as a
corporation’s fortunes rise and fall do not, however, affect the
content of the fiduciary duty under Section 122 (l)(a) of the
CBCA. At all time, directors and officers owe their fiduciary
obligation to the corporation. The interests of the corporation are
not to be confused with the interests of the creditors or those of any
other stakeholders ...
...In resolving these competing interests, it is incumbent on the
directors to act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best
interests of the corporation. In using their skills for the benefit of
the corporation when it is in troubled waters financially, the
directors must be careful to attempt to act in its best interests by
creating “better” corporation, and not favour the interests of any
one group of stakeholders.203
Lee succinctly and simply summarizes the state of the law arising from the
Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in People’s as follows.
The Supreme Court does not flesh out the concept of the “best
interest of the corporation”, except to tell us that it is not
synonymous with the best interests of the shareholders; that the
interests of shareholders and non-shareholders alike may be taken
into account, although none is paramount; and that the board
should strive to “creat[e] a ‘better’ corporation”. In other words,
other than ruling out monism [i.e., the shareholder primacy
203 SCC Peoples, supra note 16 at paras. 42,43, 46, and 47.
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decision-making model], the court essentially leaves the definition
of “best interests of the corporation” to the board of directors.204205
As can be seen, the Supreme Court of Canada in People’s adopted a permissive
pluralistic decision-making model for directors. In other words, it was permissible for
directors to consider the interests of any affected stakeholder in striving to create a
“better” corporation, but such consideration was not mandatory. As a result, directors
could not be criticized for departing from the traditional decision-making model, where
acting in the best interests of the corporation was defined as maximizing profit for
corporation’s shareholders, if to do so was what reasonably needed to be done in the
circumstances to create a “better” corporation.
The Supreme Court of Canada in BCE converted the pluralistic decision-making
model into a mandatory one by mandating directors to treat all affected stakeholders
equitably and fairly in the decision-making process.

It said that that “is most
90S

fundamentally what stakeholders are entitled to reasonably expect.”
(D)

What “Long Recognized” Legal Principle?
In choosing a pluralistic decision-making model over a shareholder primacy

model, shifting to a creditor primacy model upon financial distress or insolvency, the
Supreme Court of Canada in People’s chose to rely on and follow a “long recognized”
Canadian legal principle. In this regard, the Supreme Court of Canada wrote the
following.

204 Lee, “Corporate Law”, supra note 34 at 26. Monism is better known as the shareholder primacy model.
205 BCE, supra note 14 at para. 64.
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...it is clear that the phrase the “best interests of the corporation”
should be read not simply as the “best interests of the
shareholders”. From an economic perspective, the “best interests
of the corporation” means the maximization of the value of the
corporation... However, the courts have long recognized that
various other factors may be relevant in determining what directors
should consider in soundly managing with a view to the best
interests of the corporation. For example, in Teck Corp. v. Millar
(1972), 33 D.L.R. (3d) 288 (B.C.S.C.), Berger J. stated, at p. 314:
A classical theory that once was unchallengeable
must yield to the facts of modem life. In fact, of
course, it has. If today the directors of a company
were to consider the interests of its employees no
one would argue that in doing so they were not
acting bona fide in the interests of the company
itself. Similarly, if the directors were to consider
the consequences to the community of any policy
that the company intended to pursue, and were
deflected in their commitment to that policy as a
result, it could not be said that they had not
considered bona fide the interests of the
shareholders.
I appreciate that it would be a breach of their duty
for directors to disregard entirely the interests of a
company’s shareholders in order to confer a benefit
on its employees: Parke v. Daily News Ltd., [1962]
Ch. 927. But if they observe a decent respect for
other interests lying beyond those of the company’s
shareholders in the strict sense, that will not, in my
view, leave directors open to the charge that they
have failed in their fiduciary duty to the company.
The case of Re Olympia & York Enterprises Ltd. and Hiram
Walker Resources Ltd. (1986), 59 O.R. (2d) 254 (Div. Ct.),
approved, at p. 271, the decision in Teck, supra. We accept as an
accurate statement of law that in determining whether they are
acting with a view to the best interests of the corporation it may be
legitimate, given all the circumstances of a given case, for the
board of directors to consider, inter alia, the interests of
shareholders, employees, suppliers, creditors, consumers,
governments and the environment.206

206

SCC Peoples, supra note 16 at para. 42 [emphasis added].

108

Lee demonstrates that the pluralistic corporate decision-making model that was
endorsed by the Supreme Court of Canada was not, as stated by the court, a “long
recognized” principle of Canadian law.

After reviewing Justice Berger’s reasons for

decision in Teck Corp. v. Millar,208 including the reasons for decision in the English
decision of Parke v. Daily News Ltd.20728209 to which Berger J. referred, and after reviewing
the judicial treatment of Teck and Parke in Canada prior to the Supreme Court of
Canada’s decision in People’s, Lee concludes the following.
Teck is not, contrary to the court’s suggestion, exemplary of a
position “long recognized” by the courts. It is a solitary judicial
endorsement, likely obiter, of a controversial legal proposition.21021
With respect to the Supreme Court of Canada’s reliance on Re Olympia & York
Enterprises Ltd. and Hiram Walker Resources Ltd.

as being a case following and

applying Justice Berger’s pluralistic corporate decision-making model, Lee concludes
that such reliance by the court to support what it says is a “long recognized” Canadian
legal principle is “[ejqually questionable”.212 Lee points out that Re: Olympia & York
contains no reference to Justice Berger’s pluralistic definition of corporate decision

207 Ian B. Lee, “People’s Department Stores v. Wise and the ‘Best Interests o f the Corporation’” (2004), 41
Can. Bus. L. J. 212 at 213-217 [Lee, “People’s”].
208 Teck Corp. v. Millar (1972), 33 D.L.R. (3d) 288 (B.C.S.C.) [Teck] as cited in SCC Peoples, supra note
16 at para. 42.
209 Parke v. Daily News Ltd., [1962] Ch. 927 [Parke] as cited in SCC Peoples, supra note 16 at para. 42.
210 Lee, “People’s”, supra note 207 at 217.
211 Re Olympia & York Enterprises Ltd. and Hiram Walker Resources Ltd. (1986), 59 O.R. (2d) 254 (Div.
Ct.) [Re Olympia & York] as cited in SCC Peoples, supra note 16 at para. 42.
212 Lee, “People’s”, supra note 207 at 217.
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making and that, while the Ontario Divisional Court did cite Tech, it quoted from a
different part of Justice Berger’s opinion. He notes that the court relied on Teck for its
finding that the directors had not violated their duties in resisting a hostile takeover that
they believed was contrary to the interests of the shareholders, as they had taken “all
reasonable steps to maximize value for all shareholders”.213
As the Supreme Court of Canada failed to deal with the underlying debate and
instead chose to rely on a questionable “long recognized” Canadian legal principle, the
debate as to which model of corporate decision-making we should impose on directors
has not been settled on a principled basis by the court.
(E)

Statement of Law as to Nature of Corporate Decision-Making Model in
Canada for Acting in the Best Interests of the Corporation
In general terms, a director’s duty to act in the best interests of the corporation

means that directors are required to exercise their powers of office to strive to create a
“better corporation”, as directed by the Supreme Court of Canada’s in People’s, and to
have the corporation act as a “good corporate citizen”, as directed by the Supreme Court
of Canada’s in BCE. This mandate is to be carried out with regard to the interests of
affected stakeholders.
More specifically, how Canadian law interprets what it means for directors to act
in the best interests of the corporation may be broken down into the following elements.
(a)

Directors have a primary duty to act in the best interests of the
corporation.

213

Ibid, at fti. 25.
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(b)

From an economic perspective, this means maximizing corporate value.
However, this objective is qualified in that directors must ascertain the
reasonable interests of affected stakeholders and treat those reasonable
interests fairly and equitably in the corporate decision-making process,
failing which they will not have acted in the best interests of the
corporation.

Shareholders and creditors, in particular, are afforded

specific protection against directors exercising their powers in such a way
as to oppress them by disregarding their reasonable expectations.
(c)

The existence and scope of the reasonable interests of affected
stakeholders that must be treated fairly and equitable, and the reasonable
expectations of shareholders and creditors that are to be honoured, are to
be informed by an examination of the following facts:

general

commercial practice; the nature of the corporation; the relationships
among the parties; past practices of the parties; measures that the affected
stakeholder could have taken to protect itself from experiencing or
suffering the harm complained about; representations and agreements;
and, the fair resolution of conflicting interests among corporate
stakeholders.
(d)

As demonstrated in Chapter 2, when a corporation is profitable, is wellcapitalized, and has good prospects, the objective of maximizing corporate
value generally benefits all stakeholders, but when a corporation begins to
experience financial distress or becomes insolvent, the reasonable interests
of the stakeholders may begin to compete and conflict with the

Ill

corporation and one another.

In the event of such conflict, as

demonstrated in this chapter, it must be resolved in accordance with what
is in the best interests of the corporation.

Any conflict between the

interests of the corporation and the interests of the stakeholders is to be
resolved in favour of the corporation.
As is evident from the above, a complicated pluralistic decision-making model is
the governing doctrine in Canada for what it means for directors to act in the best
interests of the corporation. One would think that the Supreme Court of Canada in
People’s and BCE would have arrived at such an intricate pluralistic decision-making
model after careful consideration of the underlying debate among competing corporate
decision-making models for what it means for directors to discharge their paramount duty
to act in the best interests of the corporation. One also would expect a more careful
analysis of whether the introduction of a pluralistic decision-making model was
necessary given the nature and scope of the available statutory oppression remedy. A
more focused and goal oriented model would have resulted from not disturbing the
traditional shareholder primacy model, with a shift to a creditor primacy model upon
financial distress or insolvency. This would have resulted in a mandate to directors,
under all circumstances, to maximize corporate value for the general benefit of society,
within the parameters and constraints of the laws arising from corporate statutory law,
statutory laws of a regulatory nature, common law, and in equity.
Despite the Supreme Court of Canada’s endorsement of pluralism as being the
law in Canada for what it means to act in the best interests of the corporation, and the
resulting dilution of the traditional economic rational for this meaning, it seems that
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judges continue to view corporations from the traditional perspective of existing
fundamentally for an economic purpose and the actions of directors being judged from
that perspective. For example, Justice Wilton-Siegel recently undertook an objective
economic approach in determining whether a director breached his statutory fiduciary
duty to the corporation by directing the corporation to make a number of recorded
unsecured loans to other corporations for real estate investments.214 The director had a
controlling interest in the other corporations.

Justice Wilton-Siegel held that an

“objective test” was to be applied in determining whether the director acted in good faith
and in the best interests of the corporation.215 The judge determined that the loans were
“highly risky”, being in the nature of “equity investments”, and that the “economic reality
of the loans is that [the lending corporation] bore all the downside risk and [the
borrowing corporations] realized all of the up-side benefit”.216 Justice Wilton-Siegel
concluded,
No reasonably prudent director would have made the loans [to the
borrowing corporations related to the director] of the nature
described above and on an unsecured and unguaranteed basis. The
only reasonable explanation is [the director’s] preferment of his
own interests over those of [the corporation].217
For these reasons, Justice Wilton-Siegel decided that the director had not acted in
good faith with a view to the best interests of the corporation. As the related borrowing

214 Paragon Development Corp. v. Sonka Properties Inc. (2009), 96 O.R. (3d) 574 (S.C.J.).
215 Ibid, at para. 137.

2X6 Ibid, at para. 138.

217 Ibid, at para. 140.
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corporations could not repay the loans, judgment was ordered against the director for the
balances of the loans under the oppression remedy.

218 Ibid, at para. 159.

91 R
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CHAPTER 7
THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
I argue in this chapter that what is known as the business judgment rule supports
neither pluralism, nor the shareholder primacy. It is neutral. The business judgment rule,
however, creates a certain standard of care that directors must discharge in applying
either model.
A review of what it means for directors, in the corporate decision-making process,
to treat equitably and fairly all stakeholder interests and to pay particular attention to the
reasonable expectations of shareholders and creditors would not be complete without an
examination of the business judgment rule. The business judgment rule is the final
judicial lens through which the courts examine and define the conduct of directors. It is
the last defence that is available to directors whose conduct is impugned.
In BCE, the Supreme Court of Canada commented on the role of the business
judgment rule in assessing the conduct of directors as follows.
Courts should give appropriate deference to the business
judgement of directors who take into account these ancillary
interests [i.e. the stakeholders], as reflected in the business
judgment rule. ‘The business judgment rule’ accords deference to a
business decision so long as it lies within a range of reasonable
alternatives... it reflects the reality that directors, who are
mandated Section 102 (1) of the CBCA to manage the
corporation’s business and affairs, are often better suited to
determine what is in the best interests of the corporation. This
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applies to decisions on stakeholders’ interests, as much as other
•
910
directorial decisions.
The business judgment rule applies to and plays a prominent role in all directorial
decisions that are subject to court review.

Justice Farley et. al. have described the

business judgment rule as “[t]he most important” limiting factor in the court’s use of the
oppression remedy.

The Supreme Court of Canada invoked the business judgment rule

in order to save the directors of People’s from an alleged breach of their duty of care to
the unsecured creditors of People’s.

The Supreme Court of Canada, in People’s,

described the business judgment rule and its purpose as follows.
... Business decisions must sometimes be made, with high stakes
and under considerable time pressure, in circumstances in which
detailed information is not available. It might be tempting for
someone to see unsuccessful business decisions as unreasonable or
imprudent in light of information that becomes available ex post
facto. Because of this risk of hindsight bias, Canadian courts have
developed a rule of deference to business decisions called the
“business judgment rule”, adopting the American name for the
rule...
As long as the directors have selected one of several reasonable
alternatives, deference is accorded to the board’s decision...
Directors and officers will not be held to be in breach of the duty
of care under s. 122(l)(b) of the CBCA if they act prudently and
on reasonable informed basis... Courts are ill-suited and should be
reluctant to second-guess the application of business expertise to
the considerations that are involved in corporate decision making,
but they are capable on the acts of any case of determining whether
any appropriate degree of prudence and diligence was brought to
bear in reaching what is claimed to be a reasonable business
decision at the time it was made.2192021

219 BCE, supra note 14 at para. 40.
220 Farley, Chouinard, and Daube, supra note 178 at 282.
221 SCC Peoples, supra note 16 at paras. 64-68 [emphasis in original].
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Clearly, the business judgment rule calls for judicial deference to be granted to
directors. This call for judicial deference might cause one to question the relevancy of
any corporate decision-making model for governing the behaviour of directors as, under
the business judgment rule, they are given wide latitude to act within the concept of
reasonableness. However, a closer look at the business judgment rule suggests that, to
the contrary, it is a concept that better defines the role, or accountability, of directors,
within the applicable decision making model. .
The conditions of applicability of the business judgment rule are that:
(a)

directors must have acted prudently by informing themselves of the
relevant facts before making their decision;

(b)

directors must have acted honestly and in good faith; and,

(c)

the decision made must be a reasonable option in the circumstances. ,222

Directors will be judged therefore on the basis of whether they were diligent in
informing themselves of and considered all relevant information and, then, whether the
decision was within a range of reasonable options. Viewed from this perspective, the
business judgment rule is more a development of the concept of objective reasonableness,
whereby directors are to be judged based on what a reasonably prudent director would
have done when confronted with having to reconcile the competing interests of the
corporation and its stakeholders in a deteriorating financial situation or insolvency.

222 Rousseau, supra note 74 at 376. See also Farley, Chouinard, and Daube, supra note 178 at 283-284.
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In any event, the business judgment rule works to further define the pluralistic
corporate decision-making model that is applicable in Canada in that, in working within
the model, directors need to diligently inform themselves of all relevant facts and act
honestly and in good faith and their decision must be within a range of reasonable
alternatives to be chosen.. Although the Supreme Court of Canada applied the business
judgment rule to exonerate the directors in People's, a review of the facts of that case and
the application of the business judgment rule from a different perspective provides a good
illustration of the way in which the business judgment rule works to define the decision
making role of directors.
The directors of People’s allowed it to finance the purchase of stock for its parent
company, Wise, on unsecured credit terms. The financing of stock for Wise by People’s
under the joint inventory procurement policy was accomplished on terms that gave rise to
People’s carrying a significant unsecured receivable from Wise. This contributed to
People’s already-existing financial troubles because Wise could not pay the significant
sum of money that it owed People’s. Rousseau argues that the Quebec Court of Appeal
in applying the business judgment rule, to support overturning the trial judge’s finding of
liability on the directors, paid insufficient attention to the relevance of process in the
corporate decision-making that led to the joint inventory procurement policy.223 He adds
that a more “robust application” and a “more refined” analysis of the business judgment
rule by the Quebec Court of Appeal would not have saved the directors of People’s. He
argues that, on the facts, it is doubtful that the directors followed a diligent decision
making process in relying on the recommendation of an experienced officer of People’s
22j Rousseau,

ibid.
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to implement the joint inventory procurement policy, as they never directed their minds
to the credit-worthiness of Wise or the financial consequences for People’s in carrying
such a large inter-company receivable. In other words, directors cannot blindly follow
professional advice as the directors of People’s arguably did.224
Rousseau’s criticism was that the Quebec Court of Appeal failed to consider that
the directors of People’s may have engaged in a deficient corporate decision-making
process by not taking into consideration and assessing (or ignoring) the impact of the
joint inventory procurement policy on People’s in circumstances of existing financial
stressors. This criticism would seem to apply equally to the Supreme Court of Canada’s
reasons for upholding the Quebec Court of Appeal’s decision in People’s on the
application of the business judgment rule. The Supreme Court of Canada acknowledged
the existence of “troublesome circumstances”225 at the time at which the domestic
inventory procurement plan was implemented, but it excused the directors from liability
notwithstanding that it does not appear that they factored these “troublesome
circumstances” into their decision-making as directors of People’s. The Supreme Court
of Canada did not explain why it chose the conclusions of the Quebec Court of Appeal
over the trial judge in respect of the applicability of the business judgment rule to protect
the directors, other than to say that,
. ..[ajfter considering all the evidence, we agree with the Court of
Appeal that the implementation of the new policy was a reasonable
business decision that was made with a view to rectifying a serious
and urgent business problem in circumstances in which no solution
224 Ibid, at 369, 377, and 379.
225 SCC Peoples, supra note 16 at para. 71.
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may have been possible. The trial judge’s conclusion that the
policy led inexorably to People’s failure and bankruptcy was
factually incorrect and constituted a palpable and overriding error.
226

There were, in essence, two factual considerations that the Supreme Court of
Canada emphasized as having been overlooked by the trial judge, thus resulting in an
erroneous conclusion of liability.226227 First, the court was of the view that the trial judge
failed to properly appreciate that there existed other negative financial conditions that
contributed to bankruptcy of People’s and, thus, the joint inventory procurement policy
was not the sole cause. Second, the court concluded that the trial judge overlooked the
fact that there existed no “economic incentive” for the directors of People’s “to
jeopardize the interests of People’s in favour of the interests Wise”. In support of this
proposition, the court pointed out that People’s had tax losses to carry forward and, thus,
there would have been an incentive for the directors to keep People’s profitable in order
to be able to take advantage of these tax losses.
These two factual considerations, concerning themselves with causation and
motive, do not address the decision-making process that led to the directors of People’s
agreeing to put in place a questionable joint inventory procurement policy favouring a
related company. Neither the Quebec Court of Appeal nor the Supreme Court of Canada
took a hard look at the decision-making process that was undertaken by the directors of
People’s to examine if it was deficient, and thus unreasonable, due to their failure to
inform themselves and consider whether the implementation of a policy favouring a

226 Ibid, at para. 68.
227 Ibid, at paras. 69-71.
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related company would exacerbate existing financial problems for People’s.

Thus, it

may be argued that these courts did not properly invoke what has become known as the
business judgment rule in refusing to hold the directors accountable for their actions that
prejudiced both People’s and its unsecured creditors.
It can be seen how the business judgment rule places a positive onus on directors
to diligently inform themselves of all relevant factors and, thereafter, to base their
decision on reasonable grounds in fulfilling their mandate, whether under the Canadian
form of the pluralistic decision-making model or the traditional shareholder primacy
model. The business judgment rule would also apply in determining when the creditor
primacy model should displace the shareholder primacy model. Whatever the applicable
decision making model, in applying it directors are to diligently inform themselves, act
honestly and in good faith, and make a decision that falls within a range of reasonable
options. In this fashion, the business judgment rule holds directors accountable.
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CHAPTER 8
THE SHIFT - IS “VICINITY OF INSOLVENCY”
CAPABLE OF BEING DEFINED?
If one accepts, as this paper argues, that acting in the best interests of the
corporation should be equated with acting to maximize corporate value for shareholders
with a shift to maximizing (which may mean preserving) corporate value for creditors
when it appears that the shareholders have lost their investment, then one needs to
determine when that shift should take place. Some context may help us better understand
this question.

From a practical perspective, as a corporation begins to experience

financial distress and as its financial situation either does not get better or worsens,
directors are faced with the following three basic options:
1.

continue to take self-imposed restructuring measures with a view to
turning around the corporation’s failing financial fortunes as a going
concern enterprise;

2.

file for “bankruptcy protection”228 to attempt to restructure the company
under and in accordance with a regulated bankruptcy and insolvency
regime that is designed to stay claims and rank stakeholder interests; or,

228 To “file for bankruptcy protection” is a colloquial term that is used to refer to the act o f a debtor
obtaining a stay o f proceedings against the claims o f creditors to allow the debtor an opportunity to
formulate a proposal or plan for compromising its debts. Under ss. 50, 50.4, 69, and 69.1 o f the
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, as amended [BIA\, this is accomplished by the debtor
filing either a notice o f intention to file a proposal or a proposal, following which an automatic stay o f
proceedings arises. Under ss. 9 to 11 o f the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36,
as amended [CCAA], this is accomplished by the debtor applying to the court for an initial stay of
proceedings to allow it to formulate a restructuring plan for presentation to its creditors.
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3.

voluntarily cease operations and liquidate the company or assign the
company into bankruptcy,

if necessary, to provide for an orderly

liquidation process and ordering of priorities among stakeholders within a
bankruptcy and insolvency regime.
This chapter concerns itself with the conduct of directors under the first option - a
voluntary restructuring of the company with a view to turning it around and maintaining
it as a going concern. In that context, when does the shift take place such that acting in
the best interests of the corporation is to be equated with acting in the best interests of the
creditors? The most common answer that is presented in judicial decisions and academic
literature is that the shift should take place when the corporation is in the vicinity of
insolvency, as that is when the creditors become the residual risk-bearers. The standard
criticism of this argument is that “vicinity of insolvency” is too nebulous or ambiguous as
a concept and, thus, it is not capable of legal definition. This chapter examines whether
the vicinity of insolvency concept is capable of definition, hence supporting the
proposition that the shift should occur at that point in time.
As noted in previous chapters, the Delaware Supreme Court in North American
Catholic

and the Supreme Court of Canada in People’s

put an end to the notion that

directors owed a fiduciary duty directly to creditors to operate the corporation in their
best interests when a corporation entered the vicinity of insolvency or became insolvent.29301

229 BIA, ibid, at ss. 49 and 69.3. Upon the corporation being assigned into bankruptcy by its directors, an
automatic stay o f proceedings against unsecured creditors arises.
230 North American Catholic, supra note 29.
231 SCC Peoples, supra note 16.

123

Both courts held that, under all circumstances, the duty of directors was owed to the
corporation and if directors caused actionable injury to the company that also resulted in
loss or damage to the creditors, then the creditors could pursue recovery from the
directors for their breach of fiduciary duty to the corporation by way of derivative claim.
Having made the determination that a fiduciary duty to creditors does not arise
when the corporation enters the vicinity of insolvency or becomes insolvent, neither the
Delaware Supreme Court nor the Supreme Court of Canada was required to address the
meaning of “vicinity of insolvency”. This fact did not deter the Supreme Court of
Canada, which held that the phrase “vicinity of insolvency” “is incapable of definition
and has no legal meaning”. Nevertheless, the court did concede that “[wjhat it is
intended to convey is a deterioration in the corporation’s financial stability”.232
The Supreme Court of Canada’s view that the concept is not capable of being
defined with sufficient legal precision is supported by a number of articles. They point
out that trying to define zone or vicinity of insolvency is a “guessing game”.233 It is a
concept that cannot be defined because it is too “obscure”,234 “like trying to hit a fastmoving target”.235 It is a concept that is “plagued by ambiguity”.236 It is a “shapeless

232 Ibid, at paras. 45-46.
23j Edwards, supra note 22 at 1.

2j4 Ramesh K.S. Rao, David Simon Sokolow & Derek White, “Fiduciary Duty a la Lyonnais'. An Economic
Perspective on Corporate Governance in a Financially Distressed Firm” (1996-1997), 22 J. Corp. L. 53 at
64.
235 Ibid, at 69.

2j6 Kandestin, supra note 22 at 1240.
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concept”.

Nicholls argues that it gives rise to a variation of “Zeno’s paradox”, thereby

minimizing the significance of the shift to maximizing corporate value for creditors.
Nicholls points out that before becoming insolvent the company was “almost insolvent”
and, before that, “almost almost insolvent ... [a]nd so on ... to the moment of original
incorporation”.237238

Consequently, the concept is not capable of legal definition.

Furthermore, it has been noted that companies often slip through and into insolvency and
back out again, making it difficult and perhaps unfair to shareholders to delineate an
exact point in time at which directors should start focusing on protecting the investment
of the creditors over that of the shareholders.239
It has been argued that relying on an ambiguous concept for determining when
directors should switch from maximizing corporate value for shareholders to doing so for
creditors results in a “notice problem” for directors, in that they do not know when to
switch their focus.

The argument continues that this may lead to decision-making

paralysis, whereby innovative insolvency countermeasures and value-maximizing
decisions are missed.240

Nonetheless, the vicinity of insolvency distinction is an

important one because, based on a value-maximizing model of corporate decision
making, it is the benchmark for the point at which the creditors become the residual riskbearers and maximizing corporate value is to be seen through their eyes.

237 Ibid, at 1265.
2j8 Nicholls, “Liability o f Corporate Officers”, supra note 82 at 34.
2j9 Jacob S. Ziegel, “Corporate Governance and Directors’ Duties to Creditors: Two Contrasting
Philosophies”, [2003] Ann. Rev. o f Insol. L. 67 at 77.

240 Edwards, supra note 22 at 9.
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Thus, the purpose of defining when a corporation has entered the vicinity of
insolvency is to determine when directors should become extra-vigilant in monitoring the
financial affairs of the company. It is at that point that directors must strike the right
balance between rebuilding equity for the shareholders and settling for maximizing value
for creditors. As the corporation slides closer to insolvency or becomes insolvent, the
likelihood of providing an economic return on investment to the shareholders diminishes
and the role of the directors in maximizing corporate value for creditors becomes clearer.
Therefore, one way for determining when directors should be put on notice to pay special
attention to the situation is by using the existing statutory test for insolvency as the gauge.
In this regard, the question becomes “how close is the corporation to becoming and
staying insolvent”?
The Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act defines an “insolvent person” (which includes
a corporation) as an entity who is not bankrupt, resides, carries on business or has
property in Canada, whose liabilities to creditors amount to at least one thousand dollars,
and:
(a)

who is unable to meet his obligations generally as they come due;

(b)

who has ceased paying his current obligations in the ordinary course of
business as they come due; and,

(c)

the aggregate of whose property is not, at fair valuation, sufficient, or, if
disposed of at a fairly conducted sale under legal process, would not be
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sufficient to enable payment of all his obligations, due and accruing
due.241
Under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, an assignment or proposal may be filed
by an “insolvent person”242 and a fraudulent preference243 by an “insolvent person” in
favour of a creditor may be attacked if it was made in the three-month period prior to
bankruptcy or within one year of bankruptcy if the parties are related. Further, one of the
acts of bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act is if a person “ceases to meet
his liabilities generally as they become due”.244 Therefore, there is no shortage of
Canadian judicial decisions defining when a person becomes insolvent.245
Given the statutory test for an insolvent person, directors are given notice of what
they have to watch for and they should be able to identify the risk of an approaching
insolvency or when the corporation has in fact become insolvent. In essence, directors
are being told to monitor cash flow, projected cash flow, and the value of assets as
compared to liabilities.

241 BIA, supra note 228 at s. 2 “Definitions”.
242 Ibid, at ss. 49(1) and 50(1 )(a).
243 Ibid, at s. 95.
244 Ibid, at s. 42(l)(j).
245 An extensive summary o f such judicial decisions may be found under the appropriate annotations for
each relevant section in Lloyd W. Houlden, Geoffrey B. Morawetz and Janis P. Sarra, eds., The 2010
Annotated Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2009) at paras. B25, D72, E8, and
F21. Particular note is made o f Justice Farley’s finding in Re Stelco Inc. (2004), 48 C.B.R. (4th) 299 (Ont.
S.C.J.[Commercial List] at para. 40, leave to appeal to Ont. C.A. refused (2004), CarswellOnt 2936 (C.A.),
further leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused (2004), 338 N.R. 196 (note), that, in the context o f a corporate
restructuring or “rescue” under the BIA, supra note 228 or CCAA, supra note 228, the test for insolvency
“would be to see whether there is a reasonably foreseeable ... expectation that there is a looming liquidity
condition or crisis which will result in the applicant running out o f ‘cash’ to pay its debts as they become
due ... without the benefit o f the stay” ordered by the court.
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The law tells directors that an inability to meet liabilities as they generally
become due is not a complete inability, as that would require liquidation of assets to meet
liabilities thereby rendering meaningless the balance sheet insolvency test. However, it
does include the situation of a corporation that cannot satisfy its obligations without
liquidating assets that are not normally liquidated in the ordinary course of business.246 It
should be a sign to directors that the company is insolvent or there is a material risk of
insolvency if they are contemplating liquidating assets that are not normally liquidated in
the ordinary course in an effort to raise money to meet corporate obligations.
Further, many corporations rely on a revolving credit facility, such as a line of
credit or an overdraft facility, from a financial institution to finance costs.

In this

situation, as long as the corporation is within its financial covenants and has sufficient
credit at its disposal in its credit facility to pay costs, it will be able to meet its obligations
generally as they come due. If the corporation is dependent on its credit facility to cover
costs and the directors are aware that the corporation no longer has access to credit under
its credit facility or that its “bum rate” on cash is such that it will run out of credit, then
the law tells directors that the company is not able meet its liabilities generally as they
come due.247 Again, directors are given notice of a material insolvency risk.
To prove that a corporation has ceased paying its obligations generally as they
come due, the usual legal procedure is to call a number of creditors who will testify that
their accounts are overdue and that they have been pressing for payment without success

246 Ibid, at para. F 206 citing Re Pac. Mobile Corp. (1979), 32 C.B.R. (N.S.) 209 (Que. S.C.).
247 Ibid, at para. F 206 citing Re Bel Air Elec. Inc. (1962), 3 C.B.R. (N.S.) 252 (Que. S.C.).
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or with only partial success.248 Thus, the law again has given directors clear notice of a
threatened insolvency if the corporation has begun to struggle to pay its obligations that
are falling due and an insolvency in fact if it has stopped paying them.
The starting point for determining the legal test of insolvency based on a
corporation’s assets being less than its obligations is the company’s balance sheet of
assets and liabilities.

However, the book value that is ascribed to assets cannot be

accepted at face value and such assets need to be assessed to determine their sale value
“if disposed of at a fairly conducted sale under legal process”.249 Again, the law informs
directors as to what they have to look out for in terms of when the recoverable value of a
corporation’s assets may be diminishing in value or has reached the point where the
collective recoverable value is less than the corporation’s debts.
By being aware of the test for an insolvent person, directors will know when the
corporation is confronting a material risk of insolvency.

Being unable to meet

obligations coming due and ceasing to pay current liabilities are insolvency tests under
the BIA that generally are determined by a cash-flow analysis.

Not having assets

sufficient in value to pay all debts is generally considered to be a balance sheet
insolvency test.

Thus, directors need to have a reasonable understanding of such

accounting concepts and they need to keep a watchful eye on such indicators, or
barometers, of financial performance.

Regular and ongoing review of cash flow,

248 Ibid, at para. D l l .
249 Ibid, at para. F 206 citing Re King Petroleum Ltd. (1978), 29 C.B.R. (N.S.) 76 (Ont. S.C.); Re Arthur
Lennox Contractors Ltd. (No. 2) (1959), 38 C.B.R. 125 (Ont. S.C.); Touche Ross Ltd. v. Weldwood o f
Canada Sales Ltd. (1983), 48 C.B.R. (N.S.) 83; additional reasons at (1984), 49 C.B.R. (N.S.) 284 (Ont.
S.C.).
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projected cash flow, and balance sheets will give clear notice of a threatened insolvency
disturbance. It would be a rare situation for directors to be unaware of the threat of
looming insolvency or that the corporation is in a state of insolvency. If directors are
having a discussion about a chronic “cash crunch” or are expressing a concern in respect
of the realizable value of the corporation’s assets relative to its debts, then the corporation
is likely in the vicinity of insolvency.
Directors who are doing their job properly receive notice or warning of a
developing insolvency and know when it has matured into a state of insolvency. As such,
the “notice problem” as to when directors should shift to managing the business and
affairs of the corporation primarily in the best interests of the creditors is arguably not a
problem at all. The shift should occur when the risk of insolvency is serious or material.
What is a serious or material risk of insolvency is one that requires significant
counteractive measures.
Further, we should not shy away from identifying a material risk of insolvency,
thereby giving legal meaning to the concept vicinity of insolvency, because it can be
identified by using the standard legal objective test. One of the principles of our legal
system is the standard of the reasonable person, to be objectively determined. We have
no problem, for example, assessing the impugned actions of directors for whether they
acted as is expected of a reasonable director under the business judgment rule or in
evaluating whether, in a negligence action, the defendant used reasonable care so as not
to harm the plaintiff. As such, the legal objective test can be applied to determine
vicinity of insolvency.

The more important question for directors is how will they

250 Edwards, supra note 22 at 9.
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respond.

Based on a shareholder primacy model of corporate decision-making, the

answer is that directors will take reasonable steps in the circumstances to do what is
required to maximize corporate value and not dissipate it. What will trigger this response
is a material risk of insolvency, being one the requires significant counteractive measures,
to be objectively determined.
The irony of directors having notice of a pending insolvency is that such notice
also may give rise to an incentive on the part of directors to prefer their conflicting
interests over those of the creditors. The following are some examples of when directors’
and creditors’ interests may conflict.
(a)

When directors are also shareholders. Directors may have an incentive to
pursue riskier restructuring opportunities in an attempt to recover their lost
investments. In that case, directors would not be governing with a view to
maximizing corporate value for creditors. In addition, directors may buy
additional time to pursue riskier restructuring opportunities by ordering
goods or services or accessing credit for which they know the corporation
will be unable to pay unless the directors’ gamble pays off.

(b)

When directors are concerned about their reputations. Directors would not
want to be seen as having managed a company into financial distress. To
avoid this perception, there may be an incentive to pursue riskier
restructuring opportunities in an effort to salvage a good managerial
reputation. Like the situation in subparagraph (a), directors would not be
governing in the interests of the creditors and may increase the level of
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corporate debt if and when riskier turn-around opportunities do not prove
successful.
(c)

When directors have personal guarantees to secured creditors, there may
be an incentive to purchase goods from unsecured trade creditors,
knowing that the corporation is unlikely to be able to pay for them. This
would be done in order to increase the value of the secured party’s
collateral, thereby decreasing the exposure on the personal guarantees.

The forgoing incentives for directors to pursue their self-interests must be
deterred if corporate value is to be maximized for the greatest number in a situation of
financial distress or insolvency.

The oppression remedy is an effective deterrent.

Creditors may qualify as “complainants” and the court has a discretion to fashion a legal
remedy to address any oppression of the creditors’, resulting from their reasonable
expectations not being met in the circumstances. One such legal remedy is judgment
against directors personally.
In addition to the oppression remedy, creditors also may seek leave of the court to
bring an action on behalf of the corporation against directors for negligence and on the
basis of a breach of a director’s duty to act honestly and in good faith in the best interests
of the corporation. A judgment for these causes of action would be awarded in favour of
the corporation, but this judgment would be used by the corporation to satisfy its debts
and liabilities.

132

Creditors have an incentive to commence legal proceedings as these legal
remedies are easily accessible and powerful and give rise to personal liability on the part
of directors. They are an effective deterrent.
The examination in this chapter of whether vicinity of insolvency is capable of
legal definition completes the analysis in this thesis of the corporate decision making
models under review. A case study is presented in the following chapter to allow for a
better understanding of the application of the legal theories and concepts which have
been considered in this thesis.
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CHAPTER 9
CASE STUDY
The following factual scenario may help illustrate the operation of the competing
decision-making models.

A steel supplier is seeking to have the directors held

personally liable for the corporation’s unpaid steel purchase.
closely-held corporation.

The debtor is a small,

It manufactures steel hinges for use in automobiles.

The

debtor’s most significant customer also was a supplier of automobile parts.
Approximately ninety percent of the debtor’s business was with this one customer. The
customer would buy hinges from the debtor and incorporate the hinges into a product that
it would manufacture for, and sell to, automobile manufacturers. At all times, the debtor
had a substantial unsecured running account with this customer, which the customer
regularly paid during the second week of each month.
In order to carry on business, the debtor had:
(a)

a line of credit and equipment loans with a bank;

(b)

outstanding shareholder loans for amounts of money that shareholders
advanced over the years for working capital purposes;

(c)

a commercial lease with a landlord for a manufacturing facility;251

251 This factual scenario is based on a file on which I am currently working. I represent the directors o f a
bankrupt corporation, who are defending against a claim by the corporation’s unpaid steel supplier. The
supplier is attempting to hold the directors personally liable on the basis o f alleged fraudulent conduct for
unpaid steel that it supplied to the corporation.
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(d)

employment contracts with labourers to produce the hinges, with drivers
to deliver the hinges to its customers, with salespeople, and with office
staff;

(e)

unsecured suppliers of goods and services; and,

(f)

remittances to the government for Goods and Services Tax payable and in
respect of amounts that were required to be deducted from employees’ pay
for personal income tax, unemployment insurance, and Canada Pension
Plan contributions.

The debtor relied on its line of credit with its bank, receipt of the monthly
payment from its one major customer, and payment from the balance of its customers in
order to have the money to pay its ongoing corporate obligations. On a monthly basis,
the directors of the debtor reviewed historical cash flow and prepared cash flow
projections to ensure that the debtor would have a sufficient incoming stream of cash,
from sales or its line of credit, to pay all of the corporation’s obligations that were
coming due. The debtor could not meet all of its obligations without the monthly receipt
of payment from its one major customer. For the past several years, the debtor showed a
modest profit and the value of its assets was more or less equal to its debts on its year-end
audited financial statements.
On May 1, 2008, the debtor ordered an amount of steel, which was to be delivered
in three shipments on June 14 and 24 and July 14, 2008. The total price of the steel was
$150,000. The purchase price was to be invoiced at the time of each shipment, each in
the amount of $50,000. At the time of shipment, a cheque for this amount of money was
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to be provided to the supplier, post-dated for thirty days from the date of the invoice. The
first delivery was made on June 14 and a cheque, post-dated to July 15, was provided.
The second shipment was made on June 24 and a cheque, post-dated to July 25, was
provided.
On July 8, the directors learned that its major customer had filed for bankruptcy
protection in both the United States and Canada. This caused the directors significant
concern because, without the July payment from the customer, the debtor would not be
able to pay all of its obligations coming due and, without future supply orders from this
customer, the debtor’s business would fail. However, the directors did not feel that
significant corporate turnaround, or “rescue”, measures were warranted because of
subsequent assurances made by the customer supported by the customer’s conduct.
On July 10, the directors met a representative of the customer, who was in charge
of purchasing, and the purchasing agent, who was in charge of the customer’s account
with the debtor. The directors were assured that the customer planned to stay in business,
that the receivable that was due to the debtor for July would be paid, and that the debtor
and the customer would continue to do business, as the debtor was a critical supplier to
the customer. At the meeting between the debtor and the customer, the timing of supply
of pending orders and a possible business expansion also were discussed. Subsequent to
the meeting, discussions in this regard continued.
On July 14, the steel supplier delivered the third steel shipment and the debtor
provided a cheque, post-dated to August 15. Shortly after this steel shipment arrived, the
debtor’s driver returned from a delivery to the customer and advised the directors that the
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customer’s employees had been told that the customer was closing its doors, that the
employees had been sent home, and that the customer’s machinery and equipment were
being removed from the plant. With the closing of the customer’s business, the directors
appreciated the risk that the July receivable would not be paid had dramatically increased,
meaning that the debtor would not be able to pay all of its liabilities that were coming
due, and that the debtor would lose all of its future business with this customer, meaning
that its own business would fail.
The directors recognized that, unless they could rescue the corporation, it would
fail. They needed to determine whether there were measures that could be implemented
to turn around the debtor’s financial situation, failing which an orderly liquidation of the
debtor’s assets would have to be conducted. The directors appreciated that if the debtor
downsized its workforce and did not pay its steel supplier, then it would have enough
credit in the line of credit that was available to it and projected cash from the balance of
its customers to operate for one month. In particular, for this short period of time, the
debtor would have enough money to make the interest payments on its line of credit and
its equipment loan in order to keep its banker from taking steps to realize its security, to
pay its landlord in order to prevent a distraint, to pay a core group of employees in order
to maintain a minimum level of production, and to make all payments that were required
to be made to the government for source deductions and Goods and Services Tax, but
that, in so doing, it would not be able to honour the post-dated cheques to the steel
supplier that were coming due.
The directors also realized that the only long-term hope for the debtor was if it
could replace the lost future business with the customer by entering into new
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arrangements with competitors of the customer that had taken over the customer’s
contracts with the automobile manufacturers.

The directors, as shareholders, were

prepared to loan additional working capital money to the debtor to make up for the loss of
the July receivable from the customer if the directors believed that the loss of the future
business could be replaced. In other words, the shareholders were prepared to loan
further money to the debtor for working capital purposes to replace the loss of the July
receivable if they felt confident that the debtor had a future.

The directors also

recognized that, in order to pursue replacing the lost business with the customer, they had
to use the last unpaid shipment of steel that had been delivered by the steel supplier in
order to have product to offer.
Pursuing tum-around measures in these circumstances would require laying off
some workers, putting a stop payment on the post-dated cheques to the steel supplier,
processing the last shipment of steel that had been delivered but not paid for, pursuing
opportunities for replacing the lost business, and, if these turned out to be promising, then
having the shareholders advance working capital to the debtor to cover the sizeable
receivable that the corporation had lost from its major customer. The company could
then continue as a going concern enterprise. Additionally, any new supply of materials
would have to be on a cash-on-delivery basis until the debtor had re-established its credit.
It was estimated that, in a liquidation scenario, there would be sufficient proceeds
to pay all claims that were secured by statutory deemed trusts or liens and all secured
claims, with surplus money remaining to make partial payment to the unsecured
creditors, including the shareholders on account of their loans. Thus, any liquidation
would have to be done by way of bankruptcy in order to have a process to distribute the
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surplus funds to the unsecured creditors on a pro rata basis. A bankruptcy also would be
necessary for a liquidation in order to take advantage of the trustee in bankruptcy’s right
to have possession of the leased premises for ninety days to allow the liquidation to take
place from the leased premises.
Pursuing the turn-around strategy would jeopardize the pro rata amount that the
unsecured creditors would receive in a bankruptcy liquidation. However, if successful,
the turn-around strategy would result in the unsecured creditors getting paid in full, albeit
over time, and the shareholders eventually recovering their shareholder loan investments.
It also would mean the continuation of employment for a number of people, an ongoing
rental income stream for the landlord, and payment of government claims, which money
is used to fund government programs. The directors reasonably believed that the debtor
would be able to enter into contracts with the entities that had picked up the customer’s
work with the automobile manufacturers. This confidence was based on the facts that the
debtor had a good supply history with its major customer and was set up with the tools,
dies, and machines to manufacture hinges to the specifications that were required by the
automobile manufacturers. However, the debtor’s major customer had been situated one
hour away from the debtor by highway, whereas these new potential customers were
considerably further from the debtor. Thus, timely shipment might prove to be too costly
and a logistical problem. The directors assessed the likelihood of being able to make up
the corporation’s lost business at a little better than even odds. What should the directors
have done in these circumstances?
A pluralistic definition of what it means to act in the best interests of the
corporation would require the directors, in their decision-making process, to consider,
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balance, and treat fairly all affected stakeholders.

That characterization provides

directors with no guidance as to how to go forward. Directors are not given any direction
as to what they need to do to satisfactorily determine the interests of the stakeholders. No
thought has been given to the practical problem that would result for directors upon
canvassing stakeholders to ascertain their interests.

A time consuming consultative

process may arise paralyzing decision making or creating delay and inaction when
directors are required to act quickly.

Directors are not given any criteria to use to

determine priorities among stakeholders. Directors are not given any direction or
explanation as to how much weight to give to stakeholder interests. Directors are not
given any direction as to what it means to treat stakeholders fairly.
A decision-making model that is based on maximization of corporate value is an
action based model. It would tell the directors that they should pursue the opportunity for
lost business and, thus, take measures to keep the company alive and operating as a going
concern by laying off some of the employees, not paying the steel supplier, and
processing the last shipment of steel, if replacing the lost business was realistic and
reasonably likely, thereby satisfying the economic interests of all stakeholders.

If

replacing the lost business was not realistic and reasonably likely, then corporate value
maximization would require a cessation of business and a liquidation in order to preserve
and not squander the existing value of the corporation, thereby satisfying the economic
interests of the most classes of stakeholders. The shareholder primacy model provides a
clearer and more concise mandate for directors.
The oppression remedy would apply to ensure that, in their decision, the directors
do not oppress the steel supplier or other creditors by not protecting their reasonable
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expectations. The overriding consideration in this regard would be that there was an
element of risk of non-payment that was assumed by the steel supplier and other creditors
in dealing with the debtor on an unsecured basis.

Furthermore, our market system

dictates that this risk is not stagnant but is fluid and that, as such, future financial distress
was a foreseeable consequence of doing business with the debtor.

This foreseeable

consequence of an increased credit risk is acknowledged by the standard practice of
unsecured creditors to keep tabs on the aging and collection of their accounts receivable.
This monitoring is done in order to assess, on an ongoing basis, any increased risk of
non-payment. Lastly, the steel supplier and the creditors in general would likely be
aware of the existence of statutory personal liability that is imposed on directors for
corporate debts, which is intended to make payment of these corporate debts a priority.
For example, it can be assumed that creditors are aware, when entering into contracts
with debtors, that statutory personal liability for unpaid wages and vacation pay to
employees or for unremitted source deductions to Canada Revenue Agency will result in
directors giving priority to payment of these claims over the claims of unsecured
creditors.

As such, it would not be reasonable for the steel supplier or other unsecured

creditors to expect payment in full in priority to corporate claims for which the directors
have personal liability in circumstances of financial distress. What the steel supplier and
other creditors are entitled to reasonably expect is that the directors will take measures, if
realistic and reasonable, to maintain the debtor as a going concern business for the good
of the greatest number of stakeholders, without engaging in fraud, deceit, and negligent
or fraudulent misrepresentations. In addition, they are entitled to reasonably expect that
if it is not realistic and reasonable to maintain the debtor as a going concern business for
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the greatest number of stakeholders, then the directors will liquidate the debtor’s assets in
order to preserve value.
The difference between the operation of the pluralistic model and the shareholder
primacy model in this fact scenario is that:
(a)

the pluralistic model allows for a broader range of interests to influence
corporate decision making while the shareholder primacy model does not;

(b)

the corollary of this is that the shareholder primacy model allows for
determining a strategy for acting in the best interests of the corporation
solely from the corporation’s perspective of what measures would
maximize corporate value for as many classes as stakeholders as possible;
and,

(c)

thus, the maximization of corporate value concept is a more efficient and
expeditious one in the pressing circumstances created by financial distress.

The factual scenario that was outlined above was based on an existing set of facts.
The decision that was made by the directors was to proceed with the turn-around strategy.
The debtor entered into some replacement contracts, the shareholders advanced more
money, and the debtor continued in business.

The debtor entered into a settlement

agreement with the steel supplier to repay in monthly instalments the amount that owed
and it continued making payments to all of its other unsecured creditors. However, in
early 2009, the automobile manufacturers themselves began experiencing financial
difficulty, resulting in a significant reduction in demand for hinges.

This situation
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considerably reduced the debtor’s sales and future prospects. The end result was that the
debtor could not generate a sufficient revenue stream to pay all of its obligations.
Approximately one year after the debtor learned of the demise of its major customer, it
made an assignment in bankruptcy. The unsecured creditors and the aggregate amount
that was owed to them did not change substantially from the time at which the debtor
learned of the demise of its major customer to the time of bankruptcy one year later.
However, in the bankruptcy, there were no surplus proceeds available for the unsecured
creditors, including in respect of the shareholder loans. Thus, in hindsight, the general
body of unsecured creditors would have been better served with a bankruptcy liquidation
one year earlier. Ironically, the steel supplier received more than it would have recovered
in a bankruptcy one year earlier as a result of the settlement payments that were made as
part of the restructuring. Also, the shareholders lost the additional money that they had
advanced to the company as part of the restructuring.
If the turn-around strategy had succeeded, then it would have benefited all
stakeholders who were economically dependent on the corporation and their economic
dependents. Regardless of the negative end result, the real-life scenario highlights two
important points that arise from the corporate value maximization principle. First, under
the maximization of corporate value model, the clear focus is always on economically
benefiting the greatest number of stakeholder classes and the economy in general,
whereas, under the pluralistic model, the focus is ambiguous. Second, the functioning of
our free market economic system is based on entrepreneurial risk-taking and such risk
taking is encouraged under the principle of maximization of corporate value, as long as it
is based on sound business judgment.
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CHAPTER 10
CONCLUSION
With the exception of not-for-profit corporations, they are incorporated generally
with a view to carrying on business for the purpose of being profitable and generating
wealth. In simple terms, this means generating revenues that exceed expenses and having
assets that are of greater value than debts and liabilities. This is what is meant by
“maximizing corporate value”. It is the raison d ’etre of a corporation. This economic
motivation is consistent with the best interests of a corporation’s stakeholders. Striving
to maximize corporate value in this way, based on the shareholder primacy model, will
ensure that the economic interests of all classes of stakeholders, or at least the greatest
number of them, are satisfied. To reiterate the Supreme Court of Canada’s observation,
“[t]he interests of shareholders, those of creditors and those of the corporation will be
consistent with each other if the corporation is profitable and well capitalized and has
strong prospects”.
The “maximization of corporate value” rule, upon which the shareholder primacy
model is premised, should not be taken to be the antithesis of pluralism.

When

considered in context, there is a certain amount of pluralism within the principle of
maximization of corporate value.
emphasized.

In particular three contextual factors are to be

First, the pursuit of the maximization of corporate value principle is25

252 SCC Peoples, supra note 21 at paras. 44-45..
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governed by corporate laws. The oppression remedy is one example of how corporate
law affects the pursuit of the principle in a pluralistic manner. Second, as the Delaware
Court of Chancery said, the “realities, of course, do not mean that directors are required
to put aside any consideration of other constituencies.. .when deciding how to manage the
firm” and they may consider the interests of non-shareholder stakeholders, but as long as
they “are primarily focused on generating economic returns...in order to deliver a return
to the company’s shareholders who...agreed to bear the residual risk associated with the
firm’s operations”.

In other words, the reality of managing a corporation is that non

shareholder interests may be relevant to maximizing corporate value, especially over the
long run.

Third, to quote Winkler again, “the actual decision making of corporate

officers is heavily constrained by legal rules from outside of corporate law... [o]ne must
take into account environmental law, labour law, civil rights law, workplace safety law,
and pension law, lest one be left with the distorted and incomplete view of how the law
actually shapes those corporate decision matrices”.*254 These additional “legal rules from
outside of corporate law” would include, as touched upon in this paper but not forming an
integral part of the analysis, certain causes of action arising under common law and
equity, such as misrepresentation and fraud.

This constraint that is placed on the

shareholder primacy model by “legal rules from outside of corporate law” is
accomplished by imposing personal liability on directors.
A fundamental problem with the pluralistic corporate decision-making model is
that it is not a well-defined concept and may be too ambiguous to have any practical

25j Production Resources, supra note 140 at 787.
254 Adam Winkler, “Corporate Law”, supra note 19 at 133.
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significance for directors.

The Supreme Court of Canada mandates directors, in

discharging their duties to act in the best interests of the corporation, to strive to create a
“better corporation” or to have the corporation act as a “good corporate citizen” by
treating fairly all affected stakeholder interests.

This is to be contrasted with the

economic focus of the shareholder primacy model, which is consistent with the
corporation’s raison d ’être.

To manage the corporation such that revenues exceed

expenses and asset values exceed debt loads is a much clearer and direct mandate for
directors to follow than is trying to create a “better corporation” or have the corporation
act as a “good corporate citizen”. By having a clearer understanding of their mandate,
directors will know their boundaries and will not be deterred from taking appropriate
entrepreneurial risk by the threat of personal liability that is created by uncertain
boundaries.
From a practical perspective, the question of what it means to act in the best
interests of the corporation becomes of greater relevance when a corporation experiences
financial distress or is insolvent. When directors are not able to satisfy the economic
interests of all stakeholders with the economic resources at their disposal, their decision
making becomes markedly more difficult and they will be faced generally with the
following two basic questions:
(a)

what measures, if any, can be implemented to return the corporation to
profitability and a positive balance sheet; and,
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(b)

at what point in time should the corporation be wound up and liquidated to
preserve the value of the corporation’s assets if there is no reasonable
likelihood of it continuing as a going concern?

Directors are most in need of guidance and direction in how to manage the business and
affairs of the corporation when they are met with these two questions arising outside of
the ordinary course of business.
A model of corporate decision-making that is based on economic considerations,
as opposed to one requiring a balancing of affected stakeholder interests, provides the
guidance that directors require in situations of financial distress or insolvency when
competing interests arise. The residual beneficiary basis for the shareholder primacy
model supports a creditor primacy model when the corporation enters the “vicinity of
insolvency” or is insolvent. The shareholder primacy model works to the benefit of all
stakeholder classes because, under it, the economic interests of all stakeholder classes
must be satisfied before the shareholders’ economic interests can be satisfied. When the
shareholders appear likely to have lost their investment, because the corporation is in the
“vicinity of insolvency” or is insolvent, they become displaced by the general body of
creditors as the residual beneficiaries. In other words, by requiring directors to maximize
corporate value for the general body of creditors, rather than for the shareholders who
have likely lost their investment, corporate value is maximized for all of the non
shareholder classes of stakeholders that have not yet lost their economic interest in the
corporation. This approach favours directors trying to maintain the corporate entity as a
going concern, as it would have more economic value as a going concern than on a
liquidation basis. Thus, the creditor primacy model meets the public policy objective of
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striving to turn around and maintain as a going concern enterprise a corporation that is in
financial trouble, if possible.
A “shift” to a creditor primacy model also would result in a more efficient use of
economic resources. Directors would not be required to make “high risk, high yield”
decisions with a view to recouping value for the shareholders but likely resulting in a
further diminution in corporate value. Moreover, being prudent so as to, at a minimum,
preserve corporate value would seem to be consistent with the concept of a corporation
being a separate legal entity that is incorporated for the purpose of accumulating wealth.
A corporation that maintains some corporate value is a better corporation than one with
no remaining value.
As for when the “shift” to a creditor primacy model should take place, directors
will know when the corporation has crossed the line and is faced with a material risk of
insolvency, defined in Chapter 8 as when the risk of insolvency becomes serious and
significant counteractive measures need to be taken to turn the corporation’s financial
situation around.

The existence of a material risk of insolvency can be determined

objectively, with protection being afforded to directors under the business judgment rule.
It is important for directors to be cognisant of an approaching insolvency so as to adopt
the appropriate strategy that has the best chance of turning around the corporation’s
financial situation and not a high-risk strategy that is designed to recapture shareholder
equity.
In the final analysis, the corporation and all of its stakeholders are better served
by the corporation focusing primarily on maximization of corporate value within the
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constraints that are imposed by corporate law, the reality that the interests of all non
shareholder stakeholders may be relevant to maximizing corporate value, and the law
outside of corporate law affected directorial behaviour. This mandate did not need to be
disturbed to provide for more emphasis on non-shareholder stakeholders and less
emphasis on the economic purpose of a corporation.
The existence of the business judgment rule is important. It could be argued that
it really does not matter which decision-making model is to be applied since the business
judgment rule significantly weakens or undermines any model. This argument would be
based on the protection that is afforded to directors under the business judgment rule.
However, such an argument is superficial and cannot be supported for two reasons. First,
as demonstrated in Chapter 7 above, a proper application of the business judgment rule
holds directors accountable under the governing decision-making model, meaning that
directors must properly inform themselves of the relevant facts, they must act honestly
and in good faith, and they must make a decision that is among the reasonable
alternatives available. Second, it, therefore, matters which decision-making mandate is to
be applied as it sets out the rules and principles against which directors are to be judged
to determine accountability. The starting point is to consider what the director’s mandate
was and then to determine if this mandate was exercised using sound business judgment.
In conclusion, a corporate law, or accountability, for what it means to act in the
best interests of the corporation based on the shareholder primacy model may be stated as
follows.
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(a)

Directors have a primary duty to act in the best interests of the
corporation.

(b)

This duty means maximizing corporate value.

(c)

The maximization of corporate value is qualified in three respects. First, it
must be pursued according to corporate law. Second, the interests of any
stakeholder may be considered if relevant to maximizing corporate value.
Third, in maximizing corporate value, directors are to act in accordance
with the laws outside of corporate law that govern corporate behaviour.

(d)

Any conflict between what is determined to be in the best interests of the
corporation and a stakeholder interest must be resolved in favour of the
corporation.

(e)

In making decisions, directors are to take reasonable steps to inform
themselves, they are to act honestly and in good faith, and their decision
must come within a range of reasonable alternatives. As long as these
conditions are met, the exercise of a director’s judgment will not be
disturbed.
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